Total at Home Ireland. Cavalry Foot Guards Infantry Windward and Leeward Colonies This statement of the amount of our military establishments should, of itself, be sufficient to convince every one, that they are much greater than can be justified by any public necessity. Nothing but the habit of long submitting to such an extravagant system, and the general ignorance of the nature of it, can account for the indifference with which the public suffers itself to be deluded into a belief of its being necessary. In point of fact, the only reason for having greater military establishments now than we had before the war of 1793, is the acquisition of some new foreign possessions at the end of the war. But this reason is not sufficient to justify more than the addition of a few thousand men to the army, and of a very small naval force. In taking a retrospective view of the progress of our expenditure, it will appear that, next after the fatal step of going to war in 1793, the measure which has led to the most wasteful extravagance, was the arrangement, in 1816, of the peace establishment. This was fixed, as circumstances have since proved, at a higher amount than any necessity required, by six or seven millions a-year. In consequence of the exposure which from time to time has been made of the extravagant profusion and waste of the public money which this arrangement produced, it has been very much changed, and a considerable reduction has taken place; but the amount which is still required for our military establishments is very much beyond what it ought to be. The expenditure in 1832, on the effective service of the army, navy, and ordnance, was £9,050,133,-that is, £600,000 a-year more than double what was paid for the effective and non-effective forces in the peace before 1793. As it is very important to do everything that can be done to support the proposition, that the amount of the expenditure now incurred in our military establishments is very much beyond what it ought to be, we shall proceed to examine some of the details of it. ARMY EXPENDITURE. 1. Number of Men.-The following is an account laid before Parliament of the number of rank and file in the army, on the 1st of January, 1832, and of the distribution of them. No reduction has since taken place in the number of rank and file. Jamaica, Bahamas, and Honduras Total Abroad, exclusive of India 95,837 94,377 JOHN MACDONALD, A. G. In examining the grounds for keeping up so large a force in a time of profound peace, the first point to be considered is, what amount of force is necessary for foreign service; because the reliefs necessary to keep up this number must be taken into consideration in deciding the question of the proper amount of force to be kept up at home. On this point we have the advantage of the experience of what was the conduct of former administrations to guide us. On examining a return to the House of Commons, dated 22d March, 1832, it will be found that, for some years subsequent to the peace, the average establishment of the forces abroad (exclusive of India) was 26,000 rank and file.* The great increase which took place in this force, in subsequent years, and which has been continued to the present time, (in 1834, 33,585 men,) was not owing to any necessity for such an increase, but to accident; for in consequence of the plan by which the army was increased from • See Parliamentary Papers, No. 317, 1832. 82,606 men, in 1824, to 105,270, in 1826,* on the plea of a want of more troops at home, being that of adding a certain number of men to every company of every regiment in the service, the number of men in every regiment at a foreign station was increased, although there existed no circumstances, connected with any of the foreign stations, requiring any such increase. In making an estimate now of what ought to be the number of men kept up on foreign service, exclusive of India, it will be quite safe to proceed on this precedent, of the early years after the peace, and to set down that number at 26,000 men. Of this number, 4,800 will consist of colonial corps, so that the number of regular troops will be 21,200. The latter will require a proportional number to be kept at home, for the purpose of sending out reliefs, according to the established rule, of each regiment being kept abroad ten years and at home four; and also according to our system of depôts, for recruiting regiments abroad. were But this number of 26,000 men is greater than would be necessary, if proper measures taken to establish an efficient militia and police force in the West India Islands. The present plan of militia is extremely defective; and there can be no doubt that a strong police could easily be established. But the practice has been, and no one seems to give himself the trouble, amongst our Ministers, to bestow any thought upon the expediency of changing it, to look only to English soldiers for preserving the internal tranquillity of the West India islands. It was stated by a witness of the highest authority in these matters, in evidence before the Committee of Finance of 1828, that the duty of soldiers in the West Indies was the same as that of a police force. But surely it must be possible to find a sufficiently fit force of this kind without sacrificing English money, and the lives of English soldiers, in this sort of civil local service. In point of fact, the interior protection of our colonies should be left to a militia and a police, as is the case in Cuba, to be paid by the colonists; while the external defence of them from foreign attack should be provided for by our naval squadrons, and a very small establishment of regular troops in each colony. It may further be remarked, that St. Lucia, being now in our possession, removes one of the chief reasons which led to the keeping up a large military force in the West Indies previous to the war of 1793. But of this circumstance no advantage has been taken. The arrangement which has recently been made for giving L.20,000,000, for the purpose of setting the slaves free, ought to diminish the risk of internal disturbance in the islands; and we ought to endeavour to obtain some partial repayment of this sum by reducing our army to the lowest possible point. The force which is now in the East Indies, and which is considered sufficient, is 2,700 caSee Parliamentary Papers, No. 317, 1832. valry, and 14,780 infantry, making together 17,480; which, added to 26,000, will make 43,480 men for the force to be kept on foreign service. The next point to be considered with regard to the number of men the army should consist of, is the force to be kept up at home. Now if 22,903 men were sufficient for England, Scotland, and Ireland, in the peace before 1793, when there were no volunteers in England, or yeomanry or armed police in Ireland, when there was not a large body of marines ashore, nor any police in London; the same number of men, it would be reasonable to infer, ought to be sufficient now, when we have 21,821 volunteers and yeomanry; 7,367 armed police in Ireland; and 4,500 police in London. But although it may be true that this amount of force, namely, 22,903 men, would be quite sufficient, so much delusion and error generally prevail respecting some indistinct notion of a necessity to maintain a large military force, that it is not to be expected that a reduction in the first instance of our force at home, to what it was before 1793, would be any where approved of; and therefore, it will now be proposed to make the force to be kept at home, greater by about 10,000 men than it was during the former peace. This proposed force, namely, of 32,500 men, for home service, to be composed as follows: ---- Regular troops for reliefs of 22,000 infantry in the colonies, and 15,000 infantry in India, The Guards to be reduced from their present number, 4,500, to The Cavalry now at home to be reduced from their present number, 6,900, to Total at home, Rank and File. 24,000 3,500 5,000 32,500 Those persons who may be disposed to say that the present force at home does not admit of any diminution,-who contend that 21,383 men' must be kept in England, and 23,071 in Ireland, notwithstanding the number of volunteers, yeomanry, armed police, marines on shore, and artillery, cannot produce any reasons to establish the necessity of such an immense force. It is utterly impossible to do so, in consequence of this force being so wholly disproportionate to any existing danger. The only reason by which any military force can be justified, is some danger to be guarded against; and the force should always be in proportion to the danger. The danger, also, should be a distinct and intelligible danger, well considered, and its means of doing harm minutely estimated. Now, this danger can be of only two kinds,-one, that of hostile invasion of our territories by a foreign nation; the other, such a resistance at home to the execution of the laws, as cannot be overcome by the civil power. With respect to the first kind of danger, no one can, or does pretend to say, that, in the preSee Army Estimate, 1834. sent state of this country, with reference to foreign countries, there is the slightest probability of any invasion of any part of our territories. But, notwithstanding this is the case, it is said we must be prepared for war. To which statement, however, it may be replied,-There is no probability of war to justify preparation to be made on such a scale as to have 44,000 men kept at home, in addition to what we have abroad. The number proposed to be kept at home, of 32,000 men, is amply sufficient as a preparation for any future war,-or, in military language, to form a nucleus for a large army; for the principle on which our army is now composed, namely, that of having a number of regiments, each with a moderate number of men, admits of the army being increased with great rapidity and effect, whenever it may be necessary to increase it. With respect to the other kind of danger, namely, that of resistance at home, to the laws and the civil power, this will be greater or less according to the disposition of the people to produce disorder, and to seek to carry some particular object, by having recourse to physical force. But it is impossible to show that any such disposition prevails, in Great Britain, to such an extent as to render the civil power incapable of contending successfully against any disturbance of the peace which it may produce. Experience shows that, in almost all the worst cases that have occurred of open disturbance, the mere display of soldiers has had the effect of putting a stop to it. If 15,500 men of the force proposed to be kept at home were appointed to remain in Great Britain, this force, if properly distributed, would be much more than amply sufficient, with all the other various kinds of armed and civil forces, to make sure of preventing any successful resistance to the laws. It should also be remembered, that the carrying of the measure of Reform in Parliament, and other great concessions to public opinion, cannot have failed to diminish the danger to be guarded against, which is immediately under consideration. With respect to Ireland, the various measures which have been passed, and are likely to be passed, for improving the political condition of the great mass of the people, cannot fail of producing a great change, with respect to obedience to the laws, and internal tranquillity. It is extremely easy to show, that a vast deal of the commotion there has been altogether owing to the erroneous conduct of Government; and that there is not the least doubt that if Ireland were more wisely managed, she would become a quiet country. If no more than 17,000 men were kept up there, this force, with nearly 7000 armed police, 31,000 yeomanry, and the militia staff, would be able to do all that can be required to be done in giving assistance to the civil power in carrying the laws into execution. If the number of men to be kept up abroad and at home were fixed, as now proposed, the several parts of the army should be distributed as follows: According to this arrangement, the force in the colonies would be nearly as great as it was for some years together, previous to the year 1825. The force in India would be the same as it now is, and the force at home would be greater by 10,000 men than it was in the peace preceding the war of 1793. It would, at the same time, be less by 20,000 men than the force of the present army, (January, 1834.) That this proposed reduction of 20,000 men is by no means unreasonable, or impracticable, will appear from what the Duke of Wellington did when he was at the head of the Government. He found, on coming into office, as great a number of men in the army as there is now; but by putting a stop to recruiting, and not filling up the casualties, he reduced the number to 88,037, at the time he left office, towards the end of the year 1830. In support also of the proposed reduction of 20,000 men, the number of men of which the army consisted in the years 1822 and 1823, may be referred to. It will be seen by the Parliamentary Paper, No. 317 of the Session of 1832, page five, that the establishment of the army for the year 1822, was 82,054 men, and that the number of effectives in 1823, was 81,713 men; that is, nearly 15,000 men less than our present establishment, and only 5000 more than the number of men which is now proposed as the number of which the army ought to consist. In the year 1823, the army, as it appears from this same document, was distributed as follows: But as the number now proposed to be kept in India, is the number which is now there, and which is considered sufficient, the only substantial difference between the proposed number of men and the number in 1823, is the smaller numbers to be kept, of 440 men at home, and of 1831 men in the colonies. This difference is so small, as to be in reality no difference at all; and therefore if the reduction of the army, which is now proposed, were carried into execution, the effect of it would be nothing, more or less, than bringing back the army to what it was in 1823; when we know, by experience, it was quite large enough for all the services it could be called upon to perform in a state of peace. This would be the most effectual way; and there ought to be no hesitation about transferring some of them to other countries, and placing others under the East India Company. If this were done in a complete and perfect manner, and if also what has been suggested with respect to reducing the number of troops in our foreign possessions, and substituting a local police in the West Indies for part of the soldiers now employed, the number of rank and file to be voted annually for the army would on this plan be 65,000, instead of 95,791,-the number of the establishment of the army as it now exists." Staff and General Officers of the Army.-There is no part of our expenditure where profusion is more palpable, than in that part of it which belongs to what is paid for the service of commanding our army. There are 436 General Officers; of these, 135 are colonels of regiments, who receive annually, according to the Report of the Committee on Army Appointments, the following annual rates of pay :Colonel of 1st Life Guards, do. L.1,800 1,800 other Regiments of Cavalry, 1,255 each a Regiment of Cavalry in Do. 2d Do. Do. India, 1,516 Do. Grenadier Guards, 3,040 Do. Coldstream do. 2,135 Do. Those military statesmen who, in Parliament as well as out of it, are always endeavouring to keep up the army to the highest possible point, never cease asserting that it was too much reduced in 1822 and 1823; and they quote letters from general officers, acting as governors of colonies, in support of their asseverations. But nothing can be more silly than to give any credit to this kind of testimony. Every military governor considers his importance as vastly increased by the number of men he can produce in a review, and the number of red coats he can show at a levee or ball; and these governors never fail in finding specious excuses to send home, for an addition to the garrison or colony under their command. Our statesmen always take care, when they compare the present army with what it was in 1822 and 1823, to suppress the addition made to our marine force in 1823, by which 5000 men are always on shore, doing the duty of the garrisons of Portsmouth, Ply-employed on the Foreign Staff. 270 general offimouth, Chatham, and Woolwich; and, in so doing, relieving the regular army to that extent; or, in other words, adding 5000 men to it. They also suppress the fact of nearly 7000 armed and disciplined constables having been embodied in Ireland, under the command of half-pay officers, forming a force in point of effectiveness, for the purpose of enforcing submission to the laws in Ireland, superior to the same number of regular troops; so that between the two forces of Marines on shore, and the Irish constables, a virtual addition has been made to the army of 12,000 men, since 1822; a circumstance which proves, beyond all question, that if our army were now reduced to what it was in 1822 and 1823, it would be amply sufficient for every national purpose. In now proposing no greater reduction than 20,000 men, it is not by any means intended to convey an opinion that no greater reduction should hereafter be made. On the contrary, measures should be immediately taken for establishing a sufficient militia and police force in the West India Islands and Canada, so that in a short time the regular troops in our colonies may be reduced to 10,000 men; and if Ireland shall become tranquil, 5000 of the men in the army at home might also be reduced. Sir Henry Parnell says, in his work on Financial Reform: -"Another mode of reducing the army is by the getting rid of some of our foreign possessions. VOL. I. NO. III. A great number of other general officers are cers, who are not colonels of regiments or otherwise employed, receive amongst them L.114,000 a-year, in addition to their half-pay, under the warrant of 1814. The sinecure garrisons are held by general officers; and all the rest receive the half-pay of the rank they held when they were made Generals. The total sum received by the general officers, by one means or another, may be calculated at £424,000 a-year.* COMMANDER-IN CHIEF. The office of the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards is one that most particularly stands in need of reform. His salary is £9 a-day. Besides this the present Commander-in-Chief receives £1800 a-year as Colonel of a regiment of Life-Guards, £1221 as Governor of Plymouth, and £2000 from a pension charged on the Consolidated Fund,-in all, £8,497 a-year. He has four aides-de-camp, and is allowed forage for six teen horses. In addition to all this he has a Chief Secretary with a salary of £2000, who is a General in the army and a Colonel of a regiment; and two Assistant-Secretaries, with salaries of £1400 a-year. The charges for Clerks, Office- Keeper, Messengers, &c., amount to £3,300 a-year; making the whole annual charge of the office of Commander-in-Chief £12,512. Connected with the office of Commander-inChief, there is the office of Adjutant-General. | He has a salary of £1,383, with an allowance of £500 a-year, and forage for five horses. This officer is a General in the army, and a Colonel of a regiment, with forage for five horses. He has under him a Deputy-Adjutant General, with a salary of £840 a-year. This officer is also a General in the army and Colonel of a regiment. There are besides two Assistant-Adjutants General; also Clerks, Office- Keepers, Messengers, and other charges; making in all £8,393 for this office. But there is farther connected with the office of Commander-in-Chief the office of QuarterMaster-General. He has a salary of £1,583, with an allowance of £500 a-year, and forage for five horses. He is a General in the army, a Colonel of a regiment, and Governor of Chelsea Hospital. The Quarter-Master..General has under him three Deputy-Quarter-Masters. The salaries of this office, with the charges for Clerks, Office-Keepers, Messengers, &c. amount to £6,514 a-year; so that the total charge on the public for the office of Commander-in-Chief is £27,419 a-year. the consent of the Commander-in-Chief. All the world also knows how Mr. Wynn, Sir Henry Parnell, and Sir John Hobhouse, were successively defeated in various attempts which they made to reduce the expense of the Army; and at the present moment we see the Secretary-at-War unable to give effect to a strong recommendation of a Committee of the House of Commons. The proper remedy for all this is to bring back the office of the Commander-in-Chief to what it formerly was, and always ought to have been ; namely, only to perform the duty of commanding the army, as an Admiral commands the Channel Fleet; and to form a Board like the Admiralty Board to transact all the other business of the army, including promotion, and to discharge all the duties now performed by the Ordnance and the Commissariat departments. There exists no reason whatever for keeping up the office of a Commander of the Forces in Ireland. The army in Ireland could be more effectually managed and commanded by the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards, and with Generals of Districts acting under him. The establishing of steam post-office packets, and the expedition and certainty of communication in consequence of that and other post-office arrangements between London and Dublin, render the intermediate authority of an Irish Commander of the forces in Ireland unnecessary. The whole of the financial concerns of the army have been transferred from Dublin to the War Office; and the advantage which has been derived from this arrangement, and similar arrangements in other public affairs, makes it ex solidation should be acted upon with respect to the command of the army in Ireland. The Committee of last Session on Army Ap-tremely desirable that the same principle of conpointments made a recommendation in their Report, suggesting the propriety of reducing this expense; and this in a very decided manner, by referring to the evidence of a late Secretary at War, who had given an opinion that several thousand pounds might be saved. But when the present Secretary-at-War brought forward the Army Estimates this year, he informed the House he had not been able to give effect to the recommendation of the Committee. This circumstance makes it proper to remark, that the vast expense of the office of the Commander.in-Chief is not the only matter to be complained of, respecting it. What is of still greater injury to the public interest, is the influence of this office in controlling the Secretary-at-War, and preventing a number of reductions which ought to be made to bring down the expenditure on the Army to a proper point. Formerly, the Secretary-at-War was an officer of as uncontrolled authority over the Army, as the first Lord of the Admiralty is over the Navy. But the Duke of York put the Secretary-at-War, by a course of long overbearing influence, in a situation of being little better than a head clerk. All the world knows how he defeated Lord Palmerston in his attempt to maintain the proper powers of his office, by obtaining an order from the late King, prohibiting the Secretary-at. War from taking any step of a financial character, without Number of Officers in the Army. The number of officers in the army on 1st July, 1831, was 14,368; of these 5,842 were on full-pay, and 6,834 on half. pay. This inmense number of officers, being at the rate of one officer for every seven private soldiers, which costs the public so large a sum in half-pay, &c. is the result of the profuse and extravagant manner in which our military affairs have been conducted since the peace. If proper measures had then been taken, this number of officers would, by this time, have been reduced within a proper limit; but, instead of this, no less than 1,700 were appointed to commissions, without purchase, between 1815 and 1831;* and the system of filling up all death vacancies is still persevered in. A stop should be put to this practice altogether for three or four years, and afterwards only one death vacancy in five should be given away. Steps should also be taken to prevent officers who have obtained their commissions without purchase, from selling them. It is only by promptly taking these measures that the public can be relieved from the immense charge to which it is now subject for half-pay, pensions to officers* widows, and similar payments, which have their origin in our keeping up such an excessive num* See Parliamentary Return. |