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we are yet far distant, then will the pernicious | bered, that if you refuse the able-bodied pauper nature of these laws become more manifest and alarming; and then, too, will their removal be obstructed by many additional difficulties."

Actual experience has justified these expectations. The evils which a consideration of the general principles of our nature would teach us to expect, have, by the investigations of the poorlaw commissioners, been brought to light, and proved to be enormous in their extent. The situation of the labouring population is, at this moment, one of imminent danger: the evil is sapping the very foundations of their morality. Feelings of independence are fast disappearing from among large classes, chiefly of the rural population; the poor-rates are increasing, and we are driving on to the consummation which Mr. Ricardo dreaded, viz., "that the fund for the maintenance of the poor should progressively increase, till it has absorbed all the net revenue of the country."

For a proof of the evil effect of these laws upon the labourers themselves, we must refer the reader to the extracts published by the poorlaw commissioners.

The primary cause of the mischief is the conferring a legal right to a comfortable maintenance upon every person, whether he be idle or industrious.

The efficiency of this mischievous enactment has been enormously aggravated by the various modes in which relief has been granted: no pains having, in any case, or, at least, in very few cases, been taken to lessen the mischievous tendency of the original cause. General improvidence has not only been fostered, but a premium offered upon imprudent marriages; so that the mischief of a redundant and pauper population has not merely been sanctioned, but, to the utmost, favoured and aggravated by the existing system. For the proof of these various and dreadfully pernicious consequences of this system, we must again refer the reader, who may be ignorant of them, to the extracts of the poor-law commissioners.

Such being the evil, now comes the consideration of the remedy.

The first course which presents itself, is at once to do away with the law, and abolish the right to relief. If that right be the cause of the evil, surely, some will say, to abolish the right will be to remedy the mischief. "Cessante causa cessat etiam effectus." Unfortunately we cannot thus easily get rid of the difficulty, or legislate for mankind upon a lawyer's apothegm.

It is to be remembered, in the first place, that the notion respecting the justice of the right or claim being firmly riveted in the minds of the poor, any attempt to take it away would by them be deemed an act of spoliation—would be resisted and revenged. This peculiarity of the people's opinions would fearfully strengthen the potency of the next consideration, by which, under any circumstances, the necessity of some provision for the able-bodied pauper is incontestably established. In the second place, it must be remem

relief from the fund for the poor, you will have to provide for him from the fund dedicated to the maintenance of criminals. The pauper will not starve; and what you refuse to give, he will take;-for this you will send him to the house of correction. This house of correction is maintained at the public charge, and the prisoners must be fed. Do what you will, talk as you will, there is no escaping from this difficulty. What, then, is to be done? If relief be given, the morals of the poor, and their habits of industry, will be destroyed; and eventually every class rendered poor and wretched. If relief be not given, the whole pauper population will be converted into criminals.

Notwithstanding this apparently formidable dilemma, there may yet be safety in Israel.

Is it not possible so to administer relief, as, on the one hand, effectually to check the pernicious tendency of the law giving a right to public support; and, on the other, to avoid the equally pernicious tendency of destroying the right? Cannot we, in other words, so manage as not to foster imprudence by giving, and not to drive the people to crime by refusing to give? We think such a mode of relief can be devised.

In a well-organized state, the situation of the honest and industrious labourer would be one of far more comfort and happiness than that of the able-bodied pauper, while that of the able-bodied pauper would be more agreeable than that of the criminal. If their different conditions were thus determined, there would be a strong motive to abstain from crime, and an equally strong motive to obtain an independent subsistence.

Laying out of consideration, in the present case, the effect of punishment as a warning to others, and viewing only its influence on the criminal himself, it is evident that the objects to be obtained are,-1st, To make the criminal feel the punishment as an evil, and thus to frighten him from the future commission of crime; and, 2d, To reform his habits, if possible, and thus to make him unwilling to commit crime, even if he could do so with impunity. In order to attain these ends, pain is often directly inflicted; sometimes it is produced simply by withholding comforts. The prison is made "a house of care,” a place which men seek to avoid. They brave the toils and pains of industry, and labour rather than suffer the inflictions which the prison ensures.

Now, although poverty be not a crime, yet he who is unable to maintain himself, and claims assistance from the community in which he lives, must not be viewed in the same light as he who procures an independent subsistence. When the able-bodied pauper comes upon the community, and says, "I am unable to find work, and, consequently, need assistance," the community are justified in saying, in answer, "We are willing, certainly, to give you that aid,-you must not be allowed to starve; but lest others, not deserving, make the same demand, and thus a stimulus be given to idleness and vice, we cannot make the life which you are now to lead, while living upon

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our bounty, as happy as the life of the indepen. dent labourer. We do not, indeed, consider you in the light of a criminal; we are not, therefore, about to make your life as painful as the life of him who has violated the law. On the other hand, some motive must be made to act upon you, and all like you, so that you may seek again for that life of independence which you have lost. You shall have the means of wholesome subsistence; but nothing more: your living will not be better than that of the poor man not asking aid; it will, in fact, not be so good. You will not have the luxuries of life; and you must not eat the bread of idleness. You must labour; and, moreover, you must labour according to certain rules, and under a certain degree of restraint. The life of the able-bodied pauper will not be so happy a life as that of the independent poor man, while it will not be surrounded with those pungent evils with which the criminal is intentionally inflicted."

Up to this point, the practical difficulties of the subject have, in reality, been small. We cannot say as much for the remaining portion of the inquiry.

The questions that now occur, are-1st, What are the arrangements by which the life of the able-bodied pauper may be made to hold this due medium between that of the honest and independent labourer, and that of the criminal. 2d, By what authority shall these arrangements be superintended?

It is perhaps not very difficult to answer the first of these questions, the second will task both the Commissioners and the Ministry.

It is clear that the poor-house may easily be made a place more comfortable than a prison, and yet not so agreeable as the cottage of the independent poor man.

Although the cottage of the independent poor man be scantily furnished,-although his meals be homely, and even scant, still those meals are blessed by the knowledge that they have been gained by honest labour,-by voluntary toil. The poor man knows, in short, that poor though he be, still he is independent. This thought sweetens his hard fare, and makes his rest light and refreshing. It gives him gladness under his humble roof-tree, it makes him happy in spite of all his toil.

The poor-house, if properly regulated, will forcibly contrast with this. The fare ought to be still more homely than that of the independent labourer. The inmates should be strictly confined within the walls of the house, unless leave be given to go out; and no relief to the able-bodied should be given out of the house. The interior of a well-regulated poor-house has been admirably described by Miss Martineau in her Tale of the Hamlets. Very little is needed beyond what she has there suggested. All plans of out-door relief-the system of roundsmen, all notions of a labour rate, which are in fact only schemes for improperly shifting the burthen of the poor-rates, ought entirely to be abolished, and all classes compelled to pay according to

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their means. The mode which ought to be established of gaining a settlement, and of apportioning the burthen of the rate, cannot well be determined until we have settled the next question,-viz. By what authority are the poor laws to be administered?

As the law at present stands, every parish* is obliged to maintain its own poor; and, for administering relief, two classes of authorities exist. In the first class are overseers of the poor, assistant-overseers, guardians, governors, and visiters. In the second, the Justices of the Peace. The overseers are unpaid officers, and are appointed by the Justices, according to the direction of the 43d of Eliz. "It is usual for the magistrates to appoint the overseers out of a list selected by the parishioners assembled in vestry, and to take those placed at the head; and under the 59th Geo. III. c. 12. ss. 6 and 7., the inhabitants are to select non-resident, and assistant-overseers, whom the Justices must appoint." (See Chitty's Burn's Justice, art. Poor, p. 15.)†

Assistant-overseers are paid officers. It hav ing been found a great burthen to overlook the poor, and also that it was inadequately done by persons serving gratuitously, power was given by the above cited act to the inhabitants of a parish, in vestry assembled, to nominate and elect any discreet person, or persons, to this office of assistant-overseer; to specify their duties, and to fix their salaries; and the Justices are empowered and required to appoint persons thus nominated.

Guardians, governors, and visiters of the poor, are officers appointed by what are called incorporated districts, under various acts of Parliament. They are chosen by the inhabitants in public meeting assembled, and approved by the Justices. The provisions of these acts endeavour to introduce a somewhat modified system; and, by enabling parishes to unite, and have one poor-house and one set of officers, and employ paid officers, point really, though ineffectually, at the true sys

tem.

But the great power governing the poor, are their worships the Justices.

The Justices, in districts not incorporated, appoint the overseers.

An appeal lies from the Justices appointing, to the Justices in general Quarter Sessions ;-from Justices to Justices.

The Justices confirm the appointment of assistant-overseers, guardians, governors, and vi

siters.

The Court of King's Bench is in the last resort, the supervisor of the Justices; and every one knows the feeling of the Court on this subject. When was a Justice found to be worthy of reprehension?

In the government of the poor, the classes of powers are twofold,-1st, The power of raising

In a paper like the present, it would be impertinent and tiresome to allude to the distinctions between parish, vill, and township; or to speak of the enactments respecting the management of the poor in a vill, in the 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. s. 21. A general idea of the existing system is all we now wish to create.

+ Churchwardens are overseers, ex officio.

money; of taxation for the maintenance of the poor and 2d, The distribution of such monies among the persons needing aid.

By the 43 of Eliz. the overseers, by, and with the consent of the Justices, are to tax the people for the monies requisite to maintain the poor.

There is an appeal against the rate again to the Justices in Quarter Sessions,-a troublesome and expensive process; and when the Justices please, a case may be submitted to the Judges at Westminster.

In places not incorporated, the persons wanting relief apply first to the overseers; in incorporated districts, to the guardian and visiter; if they deem themselves aggrieved by these functionaries, they may appeal to the Justices : if the Justices are supposed to do wrong, again there is an appeal to the Quarter Sessions; and from thence to the King's Bench. The same song set to the old tune.

What does experience say respecting the conduct of these various functionaries? Were we to answer this question from our own experience, it might be thought, because we are known not much to favour their worships the Justices, whether acting in petty or in great sessions, that our reply was partial and unfair.

To preclude

all imputations of this class, let us appeal to an authority not likely to be hostile to any established power; we appeal to his Majesty's Commissioners. What say they respecting these worthy persons? Prefixed to the extracts published by them, laid on the table of the House of Commons, also sold at a cheap rate all over the kingdom, and in fact sent gratis to almost every newspaper in the kingdom,-prefixed to this report is an index ;-a very significant production. We quote some portions of this said index, and will refer to some of the places cited. The magistrates shall have the precedence, as their rank demands. Under the title MAGISTRATES, we have the following very pithy summaries :

1. Support persons of vicious habits, in opposition to the parochial authorities.

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And for this assertion we are referred to 66 cloud of witnesses;" no less than twenty different pages being cited in proof.

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At p. 108, we find the following statements :"The assistant-overseer and the other parish officers allowed that no attention whatever was ever paid to character; but that the most notorious drunkards, swearers, and thieves, with wives and families, were all duly relieved by the arithmetic of the magistrate's scale. I asked them if they never took these men before the bench for punishment. Their answer was, that they had so often been reprimanded, and triumphed over, (to use their own expression) that they had given it up in despair, and relieved all alike, bad and good, meritorious and profligate." * *

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"The rigid adherence to the scale, and the total disregard of character, have produced every evil of which they were capable. The overseers never appeal to the magistrates, knowing that they would be reprimanded, and the insolent

parties supported by the scale. Thus, with the appearance of no appeal to the magistrates, the magisterial influence is unbounded, complete, and, by tacit consent, always in exercise, and ever producing evils of the greatest magnitude and worst description."

The same history is repeated in every one of the twenty references.

2. Injurious effects of (magistrates') interference with parish authorities.-Four separate instances are given.

3. Overseers act mischievously, contrary to their conviction, knowing that the magistrates will otherwise compel them. The case already cited comes under this head: the index refers us to another.

4. (Magistrates) by their ill-advised measures demoralize the labourers. In this we have five separate authorities.

5. When they interfere, rates much higher, and parochial affairs worse managed.

6. Owing to little interference of (magistrates) the labourers in towns more industrious, and less vicious than in rural districts.

In Mr. Okeden's report, (and he was for a long period chairman of the Quarter Sessions in Dorsetshire,) he makes this general statement. "In the whole district that fell under my care, I do not hesitate to pronounce a decided opinion, that the poor of boroughs, where little or no magisterial interference takes place, are superior in moral character and appearance to the majority of country parishes. I have instanced Poole ; I could support it, by the cases of Bridport, Devizes, and Marlborough," p. 111.

Under the head OVERSEERS, and parochial officers, the index has, among others, the following assertions :—

"Frequently well-intentioned, but mischievous compassion for paupers.

"Mostly ignorant of the ways and habits of the working classes.

"If tradesmen, (overseers,) afraid of injury in their trades, by opposing magistrates.

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Unpaid generally give up the minimum of their time to parish affairs.

"Disgusting public duty, the only reward for which is either a broken head, or the chance of being burnt in his bed."

Two things very significantly appear from the evidence to which these statements refer the first, that the present machinery is exceedingly inefficient to any other end than the production of mischief; the second, that the Magistrates acquire a singular, and to them agreeable power, by means of the present poor laws. We feel confident that this power will not be willingly resigned that a very bitter opposition will arise against any attempt to take it from the Justices;

and as the Justices are all-powerful in the legislature, we acknowledge that the Ministers will have a difficult and disagreeable task, when they endeavour to remodel their system. But certain it is, that no good can be effected unless the magistrates be completely stripped of their present authority, in all that relates to the administration of the poor-laws.

The plan that ought to be, and we hope will be proposed, is to make the administration of relief to the poor, a general concern: to assign the powers now possessed by the magistrates to a central board, to be appointed by the Home Secretary; and to make the poor a charge, not upon each separate district or parish, but upon the general revenue. The benefits to result from such a plan are various.

The evils that now exist, result either from the manner of collecting the fund to supply the wants of the poor, or from the manner of distributing this fund, in other words, of giving relief. Among the evils resulting from the manner of collecting the fund, are, first, the excessive inequality of the tax. It not only falls differently on different places, but houses in the same place are differently taxed.* On this, it may, how ever, be remarked, that there is an advantage resulting from making each parish maintain its own poor, that ought not slightly to be foregone, viz. the motive thus created in each parish to keep down the number of the poor. As the burthen of an increase is immediately felt by the parish, so there is a strong and immediate interest to prevent it.

We believe this benefit to be much overrated. It is evident that the overseers, who, as parishioners, bear only a fraction of the expense, have much stronger motives influencing them to give than to withhold. Moreover, they have little or no motive to provide against an increase of the population; so that it is difficult to understand how the making each parish take care of its own poor, tends to prevent an increase of labourers. Compare with the strength of the motive as it now exists, that which would act upon the Home Secretary, to keep down his demands upon the House of Commons. Fancy that Minister coming to the House, and demanding some eight or ten millions for the support of the poor! The poor rates now are a direct tax only upon the possessors of certain sorts of property. Though they fall eventually on every body in some degree, still they fall in an indirect way. Thus every body has not a direct interest in keeping down the tax. Whereas if the tax were made direct and general, the amount would be seriously inquired into, and the Home Secretary, and all under him, would strive their utmost to lessen the number of claimants on the fund.

One pernicious effect of this mode of collection may be seen in farms entirely thrown out of cultivation, in consequence of the excessive pressure of the poor rates. In some cases, whole parishes have become unable to support their poor, and have been necessarily joined to neighbouring parishes.

The expenses of the poor last year nearly equalled

this sum.

But there is a second evil which should be borne in mind as resulting from the present mode of collection, viz.,—all the numerous mischiefs connected with the law of settlement, and levying rates; every one of which would be gotten rid of, if the fund for the maintenance of the poor were made a charge upon the general revenue. The whole of the expensive litigation between parishes would at once cease, and many millions be saved from this single source. If we consider, also, the immense sums that are annually expended in settling disputes connected with the poor rates, we shall at once understand the extent of good to be derived from the making the tax a general one. The single tax of the poor rate has caused more litigation than all the other taxes combined.

A third mischief from the same source is the enormous waste in collection. One system of collection would do for all, under the scheme proposed, while the various modes of unequally taxing the various inhabitants would be done away with. At present the roundsman system is a wasteful and unequal tax. The labourer thus employed is really useless, so that the farmer really pays double for the labour which is forced upon him. The sum that is actually expended annually for the maintenance of the poor, the real loss incurred, is not known; that which goes indirectly being seldom considered, though the evil must be enormous.

If once the system were adopted of a central board possessed of a general and complete authority, and at the same time the poor were made a charge upon the general revenue, very little ingenuity would be needed to frame the subordinate details. It would not be difficult so to arrange as to give the Board a complete and efficient control over all its officers in the country; while they themselves, being responsible to the Home Secretary, and he under the influence of a strong public opinion and the legislature, little danger need be apprehended of an imperfect performance of duty. The more efficient the Parliament, the more effective, indeed, would be the endeavours of the central Board. When framing plans for the superintendence of the interests of the people, we must assume that somewhere we shall find a power willing to do good. We must, in other words, assume the government to be a good one: if it be not, reform it; but do not cramp and ruin every department of the administration, because the supervising body is unfit for its office. This, however, has not been the usual custom with English politicians. They have formed to themselves the beau-ideal of a government, which really is no government at all. They do not endeavour to make the government really responsible to the people, and then give it sufficient power to be useful; but they set about to make a number of patchwork contrivances for restraining its power in particular cases, so that at length they find that they have carefully guarded against any possibility of evil; with this unlucky drawback, that they have success

fully prevented all possibility of good at the same time. This is by no means the policy we should recommend. Make the Government efficient, say we, and make it responsible.

The Ministers, we fear, will not be able to cope with the whole evil: that is, the power of the Justices in the Legislature, will, in their eyes, be so formidable, as to be beyond direct attack. To remedy entirely the abuses of the Poor Laws, these Justices ought entirely to be superseded,but we feel assured that the Government will not have courage to propose this sweeping and efficient reform. And, in good sooth, we cannot altogether blame them for their fears. This is in fact, a Justice-ridden land. We see clearly what will be attempted. A plan will be proposed of remedying such evils as arise from the modes of giving relief; while the evils resulting from the

modes of collecting the revenue needed, will be almost entirely passed by, or only attacked by a side wind. It is the business of the people then, to press forward, and support the Ministers on this occasion. They have the will to do good, we sincerely believe, in the present instance; but find the power of the Justices too formidable to be opposed; they will, therefore, propose a half measure, which, if the country be silent and contented, will pass into a law. Let the people, with one voice, demand a complete revision of the whole law; let them require the abolition of the power to interfere, now possessed by the unpaid magistracy; let them do this steadily and forcibly, and a real reform in the poor laws may be ef fected,-otherwise we shall have merely a miser. able piece of patchwork. J. A. R.

LONDON SIGHTS.
No. III. THE STREETS.

THERE be many a thousand indwellers of BA- | action, a narrative of portentous meaning, which, BYLON THE NEW, who may marvel much at being told that its streets are a 66 sight;" yet to strangers and thinkers, the fact is as plain as a pikestaff. Whether we take the chaos multitude that throng the city thoroughfares, all bustle and confusion, the subdued repose of patrician squares, the obscure filth-crowded alley, the princely terrace, the buildings, bridges, monumental superstructures, churches, halls, hells, markets, hospitals, shops; all is alike pregnant with matter meet for reflection and for wonderment, abounding in variety, contrast, novelty, and change.

London is veritably an extraordinary place, be it for its streets only. You shall not traverse them ten minutes of time, without meeting an incident; a view, a something, worthy of note. To an idler, a two hours' walk, will furnish food for sage rumination ; he must be of course, a thinker, if he have the philosophic taint, so much the better, then every man he meets, shall be a text for sermonizing on. But he must be a thinker; the veriest country yokel, (which being interpreted, means the most verdant of bipeds,) the most inveterate yokel, when first he crawls about the metropolis, becomes a thinker, though never previously detected in the perpetration of thought. Those who think not are blind; or he of the one idea-whether of sorrow, joy, or moneymaking, the only three incentives to human action -just as bad; such a creature's eye is too much busied about the matters that are passing within his own narrow carcass cranium. He merely sees the things around him, that he may avoid breaking his nose; he does not look at them to see is to behold, merely: to look is to examine. Let a shrewd dog have but the eyes of his mind in their proper place, and he shall discover wonders. An ocean of thought shall pass through his brain in each instant of time. Every creature, man,woman, or animal, that flits by him, carries, in his, her, or its face, features, figure, gait, look,

with unerring precision, shall at once and incontinently determine the springs of action in each. The unthinking are so shallow and selfish that they do not give credit, the blockheads! to their neighbours for possessing the same conscious importance that moves themselves. Each individual of them, is sensitively enough aware of the all-engrossing magnitude of his own affairs; but he rarely considers, that those whom he bustles by, have a notion that their, not his, business is, out and away, the most momentous in the world. Against how many hundreds a-day does not such a thing rub shoulders, who are one and all, buried in the vastness of their own cogitations on love, losses, legacies, dinners, deaths, merry-makings, misery, fun, folly, fame, honour, title, trouble, ties, vanities, vexations of spirit, and all the host of propulsives, which to name even would be to fill divers pages small pica; and yet never dream, forsooth, that this big green earth of ours was made for others' uses, as well as their own. Who would see any thing in life, then, as it ought to be seen, must be a thinker. Those, then, who would behold the streets of London as a sight, must make their minds up to think; it will be no inconsiderable effort to many, we are aware, but we say, as Fanny Kemble has immortalized herself in saying, "Do it!" They shall not be disappointed.

Let no man imagine that "by streets" we restrict our meaning to mere lines of houses, with their interspaces of foot and carriage-way. O fie, no! We mean them and the things that are therein, together and in connexion. To descant upon street buildings simply, their several names, altitudes, and variety, were but a bricklayer's job literally. Had he the skill-descriptive of Sir John Soane himself-and we will fling him in the pencil of our excellent friend Sammy Prout to boot, (no small aid by the way)-he would be incompetent so to depict the streets of London, as to convey to those who have not seen them, the

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