1

sufficient force could be raised and disciplined, or one having a secondary but still an important object, viz. the reduction of that part of Upper Canada lying between the town of Prescott and Lake Erie.

The latter was the course determined on by the cabinet, and orders were accordingly issued for the collection of 4000 troops at Sackett's Harbour, and 3000 at Buffalo and its vicinity, which were placed under the command of general Dearborn. His instructions were, to transport the troops at Sackett's Harbour under convoy of the fleet to Kingston, the capture of which was to form the first object of the campaign. York was to be the next object of attack, and then forts George and Erie, the corps at Buffalo co-operating in the latter. By the advice of commodore Chauncey and general Dearborn, however, an alteration in the order of this plan was finally adopted, by which York was to constitute the first object, and after the capture of forts George and Erie, the whole American force was to be collected for the attack on Kingston.

The opening of the campaign was eminently successful. York fell an easy prey, the British stores and naval force there were captured or destroyed, and the whole line of the Niagara frontier surrendered to the American arms. This success, however, was but short-lived. The operations against York and Fort George had consumed much more time than was expected, owing to a long series of contrary winds and bad weather, which had rendered naval operations extremely tedious and uncertain, and considerably affected the health of the troops; and the enemy's fleet having meanwhile received an accession of strength, which gave it a decided superiority on the lake, Chauncey was compelled to remain at Sackett's Harbour until his new ship should be ready for sea. This of course rendered the proposed attack on Kingston impracticable for the present. The land forces of the enemy, too, though beaten, had been allowed to escape unbroken; and a series of consequent disasters in the neighbourhood of Fort George, with the ill health of the commanding general, produced an order from government that he should retire from the command. His successor was ordered to remain on the defensive until Chauncey could once more gain the command of the lake.

The plan of operations laid down for the left division of the army, under general Harrison, was, to make occasional demonstrations against Malden, so as to keep up the enemy's alarm for the safety of that post, but to remain on the defensive until the command of the lake could be obtained by the naval force building at Presque Isle. The army was then to be transported

by water to Malden. This plan was crowned with the most complete success, by the capture of the whole British force in this quarter, both naval and military.

Meantime general Wilkinson was appointed to the command of the main body of the army, and general Hampton, under his orders, to the command of the right division, on Lake Champlain. Towards the end of July, Chauncey being again enabled to contend for the ascendancy on Lake Ontario, by the addition of the General Pike to his fleet, there was a considerable probability that Wilkinson would be soon enabled to resume offensive operations.

A new plan of campaign was accordingly submitted to the president by the secretary of war, which was approved and adopted on the 23d of July. This was, to concentrate the forces on Lake Ontario at Sackett's Harbour, and thence either to make a direct attack upon Kingston; or, moving down the St. Lawrence, to secure a position upon that river which would cut off the communication between Montreal and the upper country, and then march against Montreal in concert with Hampton's army.

General Wilkinson arrived at Sackett's Harbour on the 20th of August, and at Fort George on the 4th of September. From his correspondence at this time it appears, that his principal object was to draw the attention and force of the enemy as much as possible from Kingston and Montreal to the neighbourhood of Fort George, whence it was intended to make a rapid movement against one of the former places, by the assistance of the fleet. At this critical period, however, nearly a whole month was lost by the tantalizing manœuvres of commodore Yeo, who by the superior sailing of his squadron, was enabled to avoid an action, while he kept Chauncey almost constantly in pursuit. By this means the embarkation of the troops at Fort George was delayed till the 30th of September, and owing to a series of contrary winds and calms, they did not arrive at Sackett's Harbour till the 18th of October. The army was then moved to Grenadier Island. Meantime the opportunity of attacking Kingston to advantage was lost. The dilatory movements of the American army had enabled the British to reinforce the garrison, and the fleet was now in the harbour. These with other unfavourable circumstances induced the determination to leave Kingston unmolested, and descend the St. Lawrence against Montreal.

Meanwhile general Hampton, agreeably to his instructions, had put his army in motion against Montreal. On the evening of the 19th of September, he dropped down with the army from Cumberland Head, and landed them near Little Chazy at 12

o'clock the same night. The following day the army advanced a short distance, but were forced to return, owing to an uncommon drought which had prevailed, having dried up all the streams and springs upon this route.

It was now necessary to fix on another route to Cognawauga, the present object of the army, and that by Chateaugay river was adopted. Though circuitous, it afforded water, and was considered to be practicable in less time, all obstructions in the other considered. The head quarters were accordingly moved to Chateaugay, where Hampton was informed of the delays in the movements of the central army, and was ordered to hold fast his present position till further orders. On the 16th of October orders were sent from Sackett's Harbour by the secretary of war, for Hampton's army to march. His instructions were to approach the mouth of the Chateaugay, or any other point which should better favour the junction with Wilkinson, and hold the enemy in check.

On the 21st of October the army commenced its movement down the Chateaugay river, and by the 24th it had advanced and completed a road through 24 miles of the most difficult part of the route, and had in front seven miles of open country; but at the end of that distance commenced a wood of some miles in extent, which had been formed into an entire abbatis, and filled by a succession of wooden breast-works, the rearmost of which had been supplied with ordnance. In front of these defences were placed the Indian force and light corps of the enemy, and in the rear all his disposable force, amounting, by the information of deserters, to between two or three thousand men.

No information had yet been received of any movement down the St. Lawrence; but as it was believed that the enemy was hourly adding to his strength in the position in front of Hampton's army, an effort was judged necessary to dislodge him, as, if it succeeded, the army would be in possession of a position which it could hold as long as any doubts remained of what was passing above, and of the real part to be assigned it. Accordingly, the guides having mentioned a shoal and practicable fording-place, opposite the lower flank of the enemy's defences, and that the wood on the opposite side of the river, a distance of seven or eight miles, was practicable for the passage of the troops, colonel Purdy, with the light corps, and a strong body of infantry of the line, was detached at an early hour of the night of the 25th to gain this ford by the morning, with instructions to commence an attack in rear, which was to be the signal for the army to fall on in front.

The main body of the army was put in motion in the morning, but on advancing near the enemy, it was found that the column on the opposite side was not so far advanced as was anticipated. The guides had misled it, and finally failed in finding the ford. The army, however, having no communication with Purdy's column, waited until two o'clock, when, a firing being heard, the troops advanced rapidly to the attack, and drove the light troops of the enemy behind their defences.

It was now learned that the firing which had been heard was on the opposite side of the river, and not in the rear of the enemy's position, and that Purdy had failed in finding the ford. His troops, being excessively fatigued, were therefore ordered to return, and the whole army retired to a position three miles in the rear, to which place the baggage had been ordered forward. Here they remained two days*.

Meanwhile information was received from deserters that sir George Prevost had arrived with the whole of his disposable force, and lay in the rear of these defences. Information was also received from Ogdensburg, with which a line of communication had been established, that no movements of the army down the St. Lawrence had been heard of. A council of war was therefore held, at which it was unanimously determined, that it was necessary for the preservation of the army, and for the fulfilment of the ostensible views of government, to return to Chateaugay till advices were received of the advance of the grand army down the St. Lawrence. They accordingly returned thither by slow marches, without annoyance by the enemy.

Previous to the commencement of this expedition, the forage at Chateaugay had been nearly consumed, and on the return of the army, enough only could be found to subsist the horses and teams two or three days. As all accounts, therefore, concurred in the report that no descent down the river was intended by Wilkinson's army, the cavalry, artillery, and provision teams were dispatched to Plattsburg for subsistence.

Affairs were in this state when Hampton received the orders of Wilkinson, dated November 6, seven miles above Ogdensburg, directing him to meet him with his army at St. Regis on the 9th or 10th. The result is already known. Hampton declined the junction. His means of transportation having been sent to Plattsburg, rendered it impossible for him to have taken more provision than each man could have carried on his back,

In colonel Purdy's report of this transaction to Wilkinson, very serious charges are brought forward against Hampton, not only as respects the failure of this expedition, but as to his general conduct while in command of the army. See the report, p. [161.

and he conceived that in throwing his army upon Wilkinson's scanty means he should weaken him in his most vulnerable point. After consulting the general officers, therefore, Hampton determined to throw himself back on his main depot at Plattsburg, and strain every effort to open a communication thence to Cognawauga, by which he conceived he should more effectually contribute to the success of the expedition than by the junction at St. Regis. This resolution of Hampton's was considered by Wilkinson as totally defeating the great object of the campaign, and his troops were according placed in winter quarters at French Mills. His example was necessarily followed by Hampton, and thus the campaign was put an end to in this quarter*.

The message and documents were ordered to lie on the table, and be printed.

§3. On the last day of the session, Mr. Miller, of New York, moved, that a committee be appointed to enquire into the causes of the failure of our arms on the northern and north-western frontier, and that said committee have leave to sit during the recess of the house, and that they have power to send for persons and papers.

This motion was negatived, 68 to 29.

§4. On the 2d of February, Mr. Dana, in the senate, submitted the following resolution for consideration:

Resolved, That the president of the United States be requested to cause to be laid before the senate, a statement of the names of the individuals selected from American prisoners of war, and sent to Great Britain for trial, as mentioned in his message at the commencement of the present session of congress; and also their respective places of residence in the United States; with the times when, and the courts where they were admitted to become citizens of the United States; and the regiments or corps to which they belonged, in the service of the United States, when taken by the enemy, and the times and places of their being so taken; together with copies of any official correspondence respecting the treatment of prisoners of war, and any orders for retaliation on either side, which the president may judge proper to be communicated.

*The above statement is believed to be a correct summary of the facts embraced in the voluminous documents reported by the secretary of war, which were not already before the public. It may be proper to notice, however, in addition, that it appears from the orders of the secretary to general M'Clure, that the destruction of Newark was not authorized by him, unless it should be rendered necessary for the defence of Fort George. The whole report will be found among the congressional documents at the end of this volume.