Lieven) knew his imperial majesty had much at heart, believing it equally for the interest of both powers and also for that of his own empire. The chancellor said that as this despatch would refer to what I had verbally stated to him in our preceding conversation, he wished before submitting to the emperor, that I should peruse it to satisfy himself that he had connectedly represented the purport of my communication to him, and he desired me, if I should find any inaccuracy or variation from what I had said to him, to point it out to him, that he might make the despatch perfectly correspond with what I had said. I did accordingly notice several particulars in which the exact purport of what I had said might be expressed with more precision. He immediately struck out the passages which I noticed in this manner from the draught, and altered them to an exact conformity with the ideas I had intended to convey. The changes were inconsiderable, and were no otherwise material than as I was desirous of the utmost accuracy in the relation of what I had said under the authority of your despatch.

This communication of the settled determination of the American government not to contract any more intimate engagements with France, will thus be made to the British ministry with my full consent. The chancellor's despatch does not say that he was authorised by me to make it. It merely relates the substance of that part of my conversation with him, and directs count Lieven to use it with a view to promote the purpose of pacification. The chancellor understands that my consent was merely my own act, without authority from vou; my motive in giving it was the same with that of his instruction to count Lieven, because I believed its tendency would be to promote the spirit of pacification in the British cabinet. I told the chancellor I was aware that its effect might be different. That the very certainty that we should not seek or even accept a community of cause with their most dreaded enemy might make them more indifferent to a peace with us. But in calculating the operation of a generous purpose, even upon the mind of an inveterate enemy, I feel an irresistible impulse to the conclusion that it will be generous like itself. I asked the chancellor whether he had received an answer from England upon the proposal of the emperor's mediation. He said that without accepting or rejecting it, they had intimated the belief that it would not be acceptable in America.

I am, with great respect, sir, your very humble and obedient

servant,

(Signed)

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Adams to the Secretary of State, dated St. Petersburg, 26th June, 1813.

"On the 15th instant, I had an interview with the chancellor, count Romanzoff, at his request, when he informed me that he had received answers from Mr. Daschkoff to the despatches of which Mr. Harris was the bearer. That the president had accepted the emperor's offer of mediation, and that Mr. Daschkoff had sent him a copy of your answer to him, expressive of that acceptance. He then put into my hands your letter to Mr. Daschkoff of March 11, with the tenor of which he appeared to be much gratified; and which he said he should immediately transmit to the emperor. At the same time English newspapers had been received here, mentioning the appointment of Messieurs Gallatin and Bayard, but intimating strongly the determination of the British government to reject the mediation. A few days after, I received from a friend the National Intelligencer of 15th April, containing an editorial paragraph concerning the appointment of those gentlemen, which I communicated to the court on the 22d. I observed to him, that however the British government might think proper to act on this occasion, that of the United States would at least have manifested in a signal manner, at once its earnest and constant desire for a just and honourable peace, and its sense of the motives which had induced the emperor's offer. That the president could not have adopted a measure better adapted to do honour to his majesty's proposal, than by the appointment of two persons among the most distinguished of our citizens, to co-operate on the part of the United States, in accomplishing the emperor's friendly and benevolent purpose; and that if it should eventually fail of being successful, at least the true and only source of its failure would be known. That he had received, since he saw me last, despatches from count Lieven. That the British minister, in terms of much politeness, had intimated to him, that there was no sovereign whose mediation they should more readily accept than that of the emperor, but that their differences with the United States were of a nature involving principles of the internal government of the British nation, and which it was thought were not susceptible of being committed to the discussion of any mediation. The count added, that it would remain to be considered, whether after this, and after the solemn step taken by the government of the United States, it would be advisable to renew the offer to the British ministry, and give them an opportunity for a re-consideration. It was possible that further reflection

might lead to a different resolution, and he should submit the question to the emperor's determination. Different circumstances furnished other materials for deliberations."

Message from the President of the United States, transmitting a Letter from the Secretary of War, accompanied with sundry Documents; in obedience to a Resolution of the 31st of December last, requesting such Information as may tend to explain the Causes of the Failure of the Arms of the United States on the Northern Frontier.

To the House of Representatives of the United States.

I transmit to the house of representatives a report of the secretary of war, complying with their resolution of the 31st of December last.

January 31st 1814.

Sir,

JAMES MADISON.

REPORT.

War Department, January 25, 1814. In compliance with the resolution of the house of representatives of the 31st of December last, requesting such information, (not improper to be communicated) as may tend to explain the causes of the failure of the arms of the United States, on the northern frontier, I have the honour to submit the following documents, and to offer to you, sir, the assurance of the very high respect with which I am your most obedient and very humble servant,

The President.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Correspondence between the Secretary of War and Major General Dearborn, &c.

Note presented to the Cabinet on the 8th February, 1813, by the Secretary of War.

The enemy's force at Montreal and its dependencies has been stated at 16,000 effectives. It more probably does not exceed 10 or 12,000. The militia part of it may amount to one-sixth of the whole. Is it probable that we shall be able to open the campaign on lake Champlain with a force competent to meet and dislodge this army before the 15th of May? I put the question on this date, because it is not to be

doubted but that the enemy will then be reinforced, and, of course, that new relations in point of strength will be established between us. Our present regular force on both sides of lake Champlain does not exceed 2400 men. The addition made to it must necessarilyonsist of recruits, who, for a time, will not be better than militia; and when we consider that the recruiting service is but beginning, and that we now approach the middle of February, the conclusion is, I think, safe, that we cannot move in this direction and thus early (say 1st of May), with effect.

It then remains to choose between a course of entire inaction, because incompetent to the main attack, or one having a secondary but still an important object; such would be the reduction of that part of Upper Canada lying between the town of Prescott, on the St. Lawrence and lake Erie, including the towns of Kingston and York, and the forts George and Erie.

On this line of frontier the enemy have,

Making a total (of regular troops) of 2100

Kingston and Prescott, and the destruction of the British ships at the former, would present the first object; York and the frigates said to be building there, the second; George and Erie the third.

The force to be employed on this service should not be less than 6000 effective regular troops, because in this first enterprise of a second campaign nothing must, if possible, be left to chance.

The time for giving execution to this plan is clearly indicated by the following facts:

1st, The river St. Lawrence is not open to the purposes of navigation before the 15th of May: And

2d, Lake Ontario is free from all obstruction arising from ice by the 1st day of April.

Under these circumstances we shall have six weeks for the expedition before it be possible for sir George Prevost to give it any disturbance.

Should this outline be approved, the details for the service can be made and expedited in forty-eight hours.

Extract of a Letter from the Secretary at War to MajorGeneral Dearborn, duted

War Department, February 10, 1813.

"I have the president's orders to communicate to you, as expeditiously as possible, the outline of campaign which you will immediately institute and pursue against Upper Canada: "1st, 4000 troops will be assembled at Sackett's Harbour. 66 2d, 3000 will be brought together at Buffaloe and its vicinity.

"3d, The former of these corps will be embarked and transported under convoy of the fleet to Kingston, where they will be landed. Kingston, its garrison, and the British ships wintering in the harbour of that place will be its first object. Its second object will be York, (the capital of Upper Canada,) the stores collected and the two frigates building there. Its third object, forts George and Erie, and their dependencies. In the attainment of this last, there will be a co-operation between the two corps. The composition of these will be as follows:

"The time for executing the enterprise will be governed by the opening of lake Ontario, which usually takes place about the first of April.

"The adjutant-general has orders to put the more southern detachments in march as expeditiously as possible. The two brigades on lake Champlain you will move so as to give them full time to reach their place of destination by the 25th of March. The route by Elizabeth will, I think, be the shortest and best. They will be replaced by some new-raised regiments from the east.