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this force would be of infinite service. At present they can only be employed to harass the enemy.

I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

JOHN P. BOYD, Brigadier-General commanding.

Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary at War.

Letters from the Secretary at War to Major General Lewis, commanding at Sackett's Harbour.

Extracts of a Letter from the Secretary of War to Major General Lewis, dated

War Department, July 9, 1813. "An order was expedited to general Dearborn yesterday, permitting him to retire from the command of the army and district. Another was sent to Boyd forbidding him to engage in any affair with the enemy that could be avoided, and subjecting him to the orders of major-general Hampton and of yourself. This last (for Hampton is now the oldest officer in the district) was intended to meet the contingency suggested in my last letter, viz. that if we regained the command of the lake, and Yeo retired under the guns of Kingston; that this moment of superiority must not be lost, and that bringing down Boyd's division, a blow might be struck at that place. To favour this enterprise, orders will be sent to general Hampton to push his head-quarters to the position held by our army the last campaign on lake Champlain; and a requisition for ten thousand militia from the states of New York and Vermont, in reinforcement of this part of the plan, will be superadded.

"The moment Chauncey goes out our stores along the south shore of the lake should be brought down to the harbour, and in that case, your small posts (consisting of regular troops) drawn into your main body.'

Sir,

War Department, July 3, 1813. It is not merely possible, but probable, that the British fleet in lake Ontario may, upon the fitting out the General Pike, refuse a battle and take shelter under the guns of Kingston until their new brig shall restore to them the superiority. A question of much importance arises on this supposed state of things. What will be the best possible employment of our force during the period we may be able to command the lake? Shall we reinforce the troops at fort George from Sackett's Harbour, and cut off Vincent, or shall

we bring from fort George the mass of the division there, and uniting them to your present command, attack the enemy at Kingston? If the latter part of the alternative be adopted, two things must be done. A heavy body of militia should be assembled at Ogdensburg to draw to that point the enemy's attention, and general Hampton should move rapidly and in force against Montreal. Our assembled force at Sackett's Harbour would amount to seven thousand men, independently of the naval means. The enemy's land force at Kingston is about four thousand. Could a successful attack be made here, the fate of the campaign is decided-perhaps that of the war. The object is great; but in proportion as it is so, the means of effecting it ought to be well considered. From the sketches I have been able to procure of Kingston and its vicinity, I have no doubt but that the attack should be made on the works which cover the battery on Navy Point. These gained, town, battery, and harbour, are all at your discretion. Beware of dividing your attack. Confine it to a single point, but let that point be a commanding one. Believe me, general, very respectfully and faithfully yours, JOHN ARMSTRONG. Major-Gen. Lewis, Sackett's Harbour.

Correspondence between the Secretary at War and Major

General Harrison.

Extract of a Letter from the Secretary at War, to MajorGeneral William H. Harrison, dated

War Department, March 5, 1813. "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches of the 11th and 20th ultimo.

"The suspension of your movement in advance appears to have been necessary; but though this may be the case, your demonstrations against Malden should not cease. These you will make in such way as shall be best calculated to keep up the enemy's alarm for the safety of that post, and of the ships of war wintering there. You will be more able to appreciate the value of this policy when I state, that we shall very soon be in motion on the Niagara and St. Lawrence.

"You did well in stopping the march of the two regiments. from Ohio. To have added to your force so long as your object is restricted to the maintenance of your present position, would have been a very useless expenditure of both public spirit and public money.

"As your campaign is now at an end, and yet nearly ap

proached to that which is coming, it may be proper to communicate to you the president's views in relation to your subsequent movements.

"It would appear that Malden can only be successfully approached by the route you are now upon, at two seasons of the year-mid-winter and mid-summer. The former is

gone, and to wait for the latter, would be hardly less disastrous than defeat itself. What remains for us to do is to keep our present ground till the lake opens, and then to approach our object by water, and under convoy of the vessels of war building at Presque isle. These will be afloat and ready to operate by the middle of May. By the same time. boats for the transportation of the troops, a train of artillery, baggage, &c. may be constructed. Cleveland is believed to be the place best fitted for this purpose. It will also be made the depot for the troops to be employed on the expedition, which will be the 24th regiment now at Massac; and three of the twenty new regiments provided by an act of the session of congress which closed yesterday. Two of these will be raised in the state of Ohio, and the third in that of Kentucky.

"Whatever these troops may fall short of the number and strength contemplated by the laws under which they shall be raised, must necessarily be made up from militia and volunteers; whence will arise the necessity of strictly attending to the progress of enlistments, so that in the event of their failure, which may be readily foreseen, time may be left for resorting to the other expedient."

Sir,

War Department, March 7, 1813. Your letter of the 18th of February was, from some cause, delayed much beyond the usual course of the mail, and even some days after the receipt of your despatch of the 20th.

You will find by my letter of the 5th instant, the plan prescribed for your part of the campaign; and to prevent any ill effect arising from its miscarriage, a second copy is herewith inclosed. It is probable that colonels M'Arthur and Cass will both be promoted to the rank of brigadier, and will be assigned to the command of the two brigades intended to form your division of the army. In the enumeration of corps making parts of this division, I did not mention the two regiments of the line, the 17th and 19th, parts of which are already with you. The filling up of these would be an important service, and you are requested to promote it. If you are at ease with regard to the safety of your pre

sent post, against the attacks of the enemy, and have secured to yourself the means of subsisting it, there can be no motive for either reinforcing it by new drafts from the militia, or retiring from it. If, on the other hand, your force should be so reduced as to make your stay perilous, without a further reinforcement, you may employ the two regiments raised in Ohio, or so many of them as may be necessary to your object. If again, the policy of adding to your force be forbid. den, by the difficulty of subsisting it, and there arises a combination of both facts, viz. a want of force to maintain your present position, and a want of means to subsist a larger one, in that case, and in that alone, you will retire to the frontier settlements, and interpose the wilderness between you and the enemy.

These directions have not grown out of any suggestions to be found in your letters, but have been produced by a circumspection which it is always proper to extend beyond the mere limits of existing circumstances.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant, JOHN ARMSTRONG. Major-General William H. Harrison, Franklinton, Ohio.

Sir, War Department, March 9, 1813. The government have the intention of building a number of boats on lake Erie, for the purpose of transporting troops on that lake. Cleveland is the point farthest west, where any portion of these can be made with sufficient expedition. If the whole could be made there the better. These boats will be of the kind known by the name of Schenectady boats, narrow, and sharp a-head, and flat-bottomed. They will carry from forty to fifty men each, with their baggage, arms, and accoutrements, and provision for the voyage. It is proposed to commit the superintendence of this service to you, and to bestow upon you, pro hac vice, the staff appointment of deputy quarter-master-general. If workmen cannot be found at Cleveland and other places on the lake you will take them from Pittsburg. Such materials as you may want, other than those produced by the country itself, you will provide at Pittsburg and have sent on without delay. Funds, for this purpose, will be put under your controul, and you will be careful to make reports weekly of your progress. Very respectfully, I am, sir, your obedient servant, JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Captain Jessup, Washington.

Extract of a Letter from Major General-William H. Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated

Head-Quarters, Chilicothe, March 17, 1813.

"The known candour of your character is a sufficient security for receiving your pardon for the liberty I take in making objections to the plan of operations communicated in your letter of the 5th instant. If there is a positive certainty of our getting the command of lake Erie, and having a regular force of three thousand five hundred, or even three thousand, well disciplined men, the proposed plan of setting out from Cleveland, and landing on the northern shore, below Malden, would perhaps be the one by which that place and its dependencies could be most easily reduced. I am unacquainted with the extent of the preparations that are making to obtain the naval superiority upon lake Erie; but, should they fail and the troops be assembled at Cleveland, it would be difficult to get again upon the proper track for making the attack round the head of the lake. The attempt to cross the lake from Cleveland should not be made with any other than well disciplined troops. A comparatively smaller number of men of this description could effect the object, and for those the means of conveyance might be obtained; but the means of transporting such an army as would be required of militia, or undisciplined regulars, could not be procured. I can see no reason why Cleveland should be preferred as the point of embarkation for the troops, or the deposit of provisions and stores. These are already accumulated at the rapids of Miami, or in situations to be easily sent thither to an amount nearly equal to the consumption of a protracted campaign. Although the expense and difficulty of transporting the provisions, artillery, and stores for an army, round the head of the lake, would be very considerable, the lake being possessed by our ships, and the heavy baggage taken in boats along its margin, the troops would find no difficulty in the land route. The force contemplated in your letter is, in my opinion, not sufficient to secure success. Admitting that the whole should be raised by the time pointed out, they would be very little superior to militia; the officers having, with scarcely an exception, to learn their duty before they could instruct their men; we have, therefore, no alternative but to make up by numbers the deficiency in discipline.

"I am well aware of the intolerable expense which attends the employment of a large militia force. We are now, however, in a situation to avoid those errors, which made that of the last campaign so peculiarly heavy. Our supplies are VOL. III.

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