strictly by any evidence, without proving or assuming the latter." In this sentence there is such a confusion of distinct principles, that it would take more space to disentangle them than we can afford. But we here cite it merely as the enunciation of a proposition, and pass to the particular proof: for this his lordship grants the assumption of the facts of the Redeemer's history, the miracles and pretensions of divine mission; and then observes, that such testimony of this pretension is insufficient to establish it, as supernatural power "does not of necessity exclude fraud or malice, and that therefore these pretensions rest "only on the messenger's assertion. But the doctrines of the existence of a Deity, and of his attributes, which natural religion teaches, preclude the possibility of such ambiguities and remove all difficulties." We fear this is something worse than the mere error of ignotum per ignotius; it is the groping into the uncertainties of crude speculation for that which is before our eyes. Had our Lord come to earth for the purpose of establishing a religion professedly sensual-tyranDical-favourable to pride-indifferent as to truth, meekness, humility, goodness, holiness, and the supremacy of the Creator-we might say with the stubborn Jew," he hath a devil," or with Lord Brougham, who has rather strangely adopted their error, and passed over the obvious answer, "This messenger might have come from an evil as well as from a good being." One answer may serve for both "If Satan also be divided against himself, how shall his kingdom stand?" (Luke, ii. 18.) The supernatural power of our Lord was proved by miracle; and, waving the argument that his divine power was proved by the nature of these miracles; his goodness, truth, and all the attributes which natural theology, on much less evidence, assigns to God, are proved by his precepts, doctrines, and the history of his life. The jealous authority of Rome acquitted him expressly of ambition or any other crime-"I find no fault in this man." Lord Brougham is a lawyer; let him carefully peruse the trial before Pilate; let him impartially weigh the accusation of the Jews, the solemn disclaimer of the Roman judge--"I wash my hands out of the blood of this righteous man, see ye to it"-the calm 66 and unimpassioned self-devotion of the victim, breathing the prayer of mercy on the cross, Father, forgive them, they know not what they do," the voice of human nature itself speaking in the centurion-" Truly this was the Son of God"-and let his lordship then decide whether the feeble testimony of an obscure and unsettled logic (for such it is) could have been absolutely required to give conclusiveness to this impressive collection of facts. If the life and doctrines of our Lord are insufficient to prove the truth of his pretension, (first admitted to be preternatural,) we must tell Lord Brougham that he will find it a hard task to establish the divinity (in the implied sense) of the Creator of this world against the Manichean system, which is more justly to be maintained than any system his lordship can reason out, until he has recourse to revealed religion for the key which reason has not found. His lordship has yet a further task than the mere proof of a creator before he has done with the atheist; he must meet the enormous difficulties of the question of natural evil before he can, with logical accuracy, "exclude either fraud or malice" from his creed; he must prove that unity of design cannot result from a combination of minds; he must prove that wisdom is consistent with the assumption of a moral system full of error and obscurity unenlightened by revelation, or unaccounted for by the known fact that we "see but in part." In truth, natural theology cannot subsist but as a consequence of revelation, and has no value independent of it. It may, perhaps, form an elevating exercise to a philosophic mind; but it cannot in possibility throw the faintest gleam of light upon the tumultuous waters of the world. Virtues which the actual belief in revelation has but a very limited power to impress, which even prudential feeling is insufficient to guard, will scarcely be enforced by logic. Let the noble author search his own heart, and ask himself what his religion can effect. A second objection of his lordship's (for as such he must state it) is as follows: Were our whole knowledge of the Deity drawn from revelation, its foundation must become weaker and weaker as the distance in point of time increases from the actual interposi tion." This objection, which proceeds from a misconception of the law of probable reasoning, has frequently been resorted to. We cannot here afford sufficient space to rectify the logical error in principle. Fortunately a special answer will be sufficient for the noble lord's statement. Time is altogether unconcerned in the evidence of revelation, as it actually stands upon the inductive laws of testimony and the evidence of consequences. It must be here observed, that the objection actually applies as much (though not in the same way) to the actual time as to any subsequent time. All who have believed without seeing believe upon testimony alone. In the first place, the oral testimony fulfilled the general law of evidence, which is founded on the induction of facts which ascertains the probability of a certain given accord of witnesses. Of this question, the only real elements are, their number, character, possible designs, and the possibilities of illusion. This will be conceded in our favour by the noble lord; and the question becomes as to the subsequent evidence to posterity. Suppose, now, a historical fact, without written documents, and without monuments, consequence, and continuity of existence; and we would concur with the noble lord in resolving the question into time. The laws of documentary evidence are liable to varied objections and difficulties, which we are not called upon to discuss further than to say that even of these there may be a degree of number, variety, unbroken continuity of tradition and universality of unquestioned reception, such as to amount to sufficient proof; and that when forgery, up to a very ascertainable period, can be disproved, the law of printed and published evidence is from that time totally independent of time, it becomes maintainable by all authority, and defies rational doubt. We simply assert this as rather evident to common sense; but it is not the fact that Christianity relies on documentary evidence: it relies on the existence of monuments: that is to say, doctrines and systems of belief, the whole body of religion and the entire frame of society, presenting effects for which (in probability) there can be found no other origin or cause; and last, the great argument of continuity. This argument we humbly offer to the consideration of the noble lord. "The whole history of Christianity implies, in each period, the precise events of that which went before it, until we are conducted to the beginning; with inevitable force of inference that this beginning cannot be any other than that pretended to by the Christian. The continued existence of Christianity may thus be found to present, of itself, the most unanswerable evidence."+ In fine, the "truths of revelation," we must contend against the noble lord, borrow no "proofs" from Natural Theology. The existence and attributes of God, even if we were to admit his lordship's theory, are not familiarly proved by every thing around us; and if they were, we must say that his lordship has wonderfully obscured this familiar proof. The great truth of religion was originally revealed; but nature never taught it. Nature taught idolatry and witchcraft. The record of the firmament was read amiss, and the Gentile world was convicted by the apostle of so misinterpreting it as to mistake the creature for the creator; from which he proves the necessity of some other source of light by an argument which we humbly beg to recommend to the noble lord. For that, in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God, by the foolishness of preaching, to save them which believe.”§ 66 Lord Brougham has, we suspect, felt in this last chapter the weakness of his own reasons, a consciousness often manifested by the appearance of such feeble special pleading as is not otherwise usual with the noble lord. He quotes Mr. Locke in support of the use of reason; "he that takes away reason to make way for revelation, Here the noble lord abandons his own positions. Having overrated the certainty of the inductive method, to apply it to God he underrates or altogether rejects it to assail the testimony of man. + Letters on the Philosophy of Unbelief. Romans, i. 20, 25. Fellowes, London. § Cor. i. 21. puts out the light of both." There are many ways of putting out the light of reason of these, his lordship has exemplified two, viz., looking for it where it is not, and denying it where it is. If ever there were wanting a practical proof of the apostolic doctrine "the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God"-it would be abundantly found in the whole class of writings to which this very clever book belongs. The vain, speculative search upon a field which the search of ages has proved to be barren. The uncertain, difficult, and circuitous path after that knowledge which is confessedly revealed the attempt to prove the certain by the uncertain-to sanction, by that which must be for ever doubtful, that which is established on the simplest proofs, beyond the sophistry of all time to shake. These are con tradictions which it would require more than Lord Brougham's philosophy to reconcile. We have no feelings of unkindness or asperity towards the noble author; we rejoice to see his very considerable powers turned to so useful a purpose: and while we assure him that he must not expect to cultivate a field so new to his pen, without committing errors and finding opposition; yet we sincerely hope that he will be led on by the course which he has entered, to correcter and sounder views. If he would for a time lay aside the Natural Theology, and look to the actual evidences of revealed religion, we have so much trust in the clearness of his judgment as to predict, that he will relinquish the enormous notion, that Christianity stands in need of proof from speculative Theology. We The above article had been two days in the course of printing when we received another essay on the same subject. It has not been in our power, therefore, to notice this little work as we should have desired; and we much regret it. We cannot, among our recollections of modern essay writers, recall a happier example of the soundest thinking, seasoned to the highest taste by pointed, but not poisoned wit, playful fancy, and elegant learning. On some points, too, the writer is preeminently happy in seizing at once upon the important point. specify one instance for its infinite importance—the absurd inconsistency of those who, admitting Christianity to be the revealed truth of God, would still set its authority aside where it comes in contact with human reasoning. The nonsensical sophism-"philosophy deals with human evidence and its results,”— that discovers that to be false in a doubtful philosophy, which it calls true in a certain revelation, is exposed by a few clear and masterly observations. Upon the material question, the reader of this little essay will also find all that is, perhaps, to be said, well said. Our perusal has, of necessity, been glancing and cursory; but all that we have read is worth reading, either for its wit or truth; and we earnestly recommend it to out readers. The infidelity of the day has assumed philosophy for its menstruum; books of this kind convert the same dangerous medium into an antidote. Metaphysic Rambles. By Warner Christian Search. Dublin. Fellowes, London. Milliken and Son, POST-SESSIONAL REFLECTIONS. BY TERENCE O'RUARK, A.M. DEAR ANTHONY-The Session is over, and the chatterers have gone to chatter elsewhere-as to holding their peace, that is out of their nature-you might as well expect modesty and silence from a company of sparrows. But the doors of the House of Commons are closed fast, and for some time to come we shall not be pestered with records of the deliberative wisdom of that assembly, matutinally calling for our disgust in all the newspapers. Every human creature had become exceedingly sick of this little long parliament. In my sight it was the loathsomest thing in nature. It seemed too contemptible to be hated, and too mischievous to be forgotten: but it is done with for the present, and even the Tail must be glad that it is, for did not they want to go home to assist in digging out the potatoes? To be sure they did, and a much more fit and wholesome employment it is for them than sitting twelve hours a day in the House of Commons, afraid even to go out now and then for a glass of gin, lest they should meet with the scowling eye, and the growling reproach of their tyrant Dan. My worthy neighbours, the hodmen in St. Giles's are much better off, except that they tumble off scaffolds now and then, and break their bones. Perhaps the Tail gentry may have something of that too, just before they die: when they do, they will be hurt past all surgery, I can promise them, and in England there will be an uncommon quantity of dry eyes at the catastrophe. I said every human creature was tired of the sitting of the house; but there are some creatures in the house who imitate humanity so abominably that I do not think they come within the class of human creatures. There are Roebuck, and Hume, and Buckingham, and Warburton, and Wakley, and Bowring, and Aglionby, for example, who would rather, I am sure, have the respectable house always sitting. While they are there they keep up a perpetual fizzing, and fuming, and spitting, like a bit of unsound wood thrown on the fire. They have a sensation of being of some consequence, once a day, as they march up the lobby, but parliament being prorogued their occupation is gone. They have to pay additionally for their lodgings, on account of being at home in the evening; and even their franks, which pass in a crowd, are shunned when there are but few members in town, as rather dis-respectable and notorious. The session is ended, and what is to be said of it? Why this, that it is well it was no worse, but what has been done is mischief. It is melancholy to see people who ought to know better, going about, and chuckling with a silly air of triumph at the result in the affair of the Corporation Bill.* Because the Lords manfully stood out against the radicals in the Commons, and, as they always will, beat them upon the points in which they had the unanimity and firmness to stand out, people forget that this bill is in every part a democratic bill, and that even as the Lords have passed it, it is another step in the revolutionay, and a most important step. Such a measure ought not to have been passed by King, Lords, and Commons; for any man may discern, that with such republican forms of government in the towns, there never can be harmony and sympathy with King, Lords, and Commons. The operation of this bill will be to create a number of municipal revolutionary batteries throughout the kingdom, against the nobles, the church, and the throne. If the King's ministers were so stupid as not to see this, when they proposed the measure, they should be sent to some asylum for idiots; if they did see this, they deserve to be sent to the tower. But how is it that this session also should have passed away without anything being done to turn back the tide of revolution? How is it that notwithstanding the great additional strength which the Conservative party gained by the general election in the beginning of the year, it has enabled us to gain so little for the Conservative cause to do so little damage to the enemy? How is it, in fine, that with a majority of the English representatives on our side-with two-thirds of the nobility devotedly in our favourwith the universities-the churchesthe greater part of the landlords, and the whole of the respectable part of the press ranged on our side: how is it that with such a force as this, a paltry despicable majority of some thirty nominees of Mr. O'Connell have been able to make such head against us, to thwart every attempt at rational legislation, and to overthrow the ancient. corporations of England and Wales? Assuredly there has been something very wrong, or very defective in our generalship, that under such circumstances, such results should have taken place. I do not hesitate to say, that we have been lamentably deficient in courage, spirit, and activity, during *We need not say that from this we totally dissent. the past session. Our forces have not been marshalled as they should have been; their several duties have not been appropriated to each; nor has there been that cordial understanding and constant communication between the chiefs, and the body at large, which is necessary for keeping up a lively and general interest throughout the party. Our chiefs continue to act in opposition, as if they were ministers, and had all the responsibility of government upon their shoulders; while they who are really responsible, and enjoy the advantages appertaining to the position of responsibility, do not allow it to interfere in the least with their party views on political experiments. We confine ourselves merely to defence, and appear quite satisfied with doing that which ought to be the duty of the government side of the house. They are continually making assaults, not only upon our party, but even upon our personal interests. Why do we leave them thus unmolested to pursue their mischief? It is true that the ministerial party is in the anomalous position of being at once the nominal support of the crown, and the actual enemy of every monarchical institution. It is true that being in this position-a position which no set of honest men could be in-it is necessary that the opposition should take care of the interests of the monarchy, which ministers have so basely deserted; but there is no reason that the man who deserts these interests, should be spared. The Conservative opposition has a double duty to perform-it should preserve as much as it can from the destructive rapacity of the revolutionary ministers, but it should also assail them. This has not been done. On the contrary, there is an absurd fashion prevails of helping them to a certain extent-of admitting that thus much, or thus, of what they propose, is needful or expedient. If a compliment can be paid them, our leaders fail not to avail themselves of the opportunity, and are ever ready to protest, how happy they are to give their opponents their support, when they possibly can. All this is perfectly sickening to honest men, who are disgusted with the palpable profligacy of the ministerial party, and desire to see that party always treated as criminals, with whom it is disreputable to be on terms of courtesy. What avails it that our leaders tell us to form registration societies, and to busy ourselves incessantly in laying the foundation of a strong numerical force in the House of Commons? We have increased that force, and what has it done for us? Look at the Whig-radical side of the house, and we not only find the members of the government proposing their destructive measures, and calling their supporters around them to explain what they mean to do, and to earnestly solicit their со-орегаtion, but we also find the individual members of the party, each with his separate grievance to bring forward against the interests of our party, or against some individual connected with it. Is it because the Whig radicals are so pure, that we have no weapons of annoyance to use against them? Night after night we have Mr. Hume, or Mr. Harvey, or Mr. Warburton, or Mr. O'Connell, or Mr. Bulwer, or Mr. Wallace, coming forward with some attack upon a Conservative interest, or a Conservative individual; and the government leaders seldom fail to give them efficient support, for they know they shall want the support of these grievance-mongers in return. But this sort of warfare, which an opposition ought more particularly to attend to, is by our chiefs wholly neglected. They will not condescend to it themselves, and they look with a coldness, which amounts almost to disdain, upon any thing that any of their own party, save themselves, brings forward. This is miserable generalship. If any subordinate member of the Whig-radical party brings forward a grievance, his whole party back him up :-if any subordinate member of the Conservative party attempts the like, he finds himself with a minority of perhaps fortyseven, though he knows that the leaders of his party are all within ten minutes' walk of the house, and that had they taken the trouble to issue their request upon the subject, two hundred might easily have been brought to the opposition benches. But why do the leaders themselves leave the ministers so completely at rest to concoct, and to carry forward, their iniquitous schemes? While Sir Robert Peel's ministry existed, did the |