Great as have

also probably accede to the Confederacy. already been the Pecuniary Efforts which His Majesty has made for the Common Cause, He is ready still to extend them to such a farther Amount as may enable those Powers to bring forward an active Force of from Two Hundred to Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Men; and his Majesty has no doubt of being enabled Himself to augment His own Active Force, to be employed, either in co-operation on the Continent, or in Offensive Maritime operations against France, by the next Season, to not less than Sixty Thousand Men. The Cordial union and United Exertions of the Great Powers of Europe1 cannot fail of ultimate success, and of the final establishment of a better order of Things, of General Tranquillity and of permanent Security in Europe. With so great and necessary an object in view, with such vast and extensive means in Reserve, His Majesty is persuaded that the antient Spirit of Austria would still remain unshaken and undismayed, though the Common Enemy of Europe should for a moment effect his declared purpose, and establish his Standard on the Walls of Vienna. Should he, contrary to expectations possess himself of the Capital of the Austrian Empire, he would there have to encounter the concentrated Energy of a great and loyal Nation, and the United Efforts of powerful Allies, all deeply interested in the Destruction of his Power, which he would also be less capable of maintaining in proportion as success shall have carried him to a distance from the source whence that Power must derive its Augmentation and Support. These are considerations too obvious to have escaped the Wisdom of the Court of Vienna, and they have doubtless already produced the determination which will naturally result from them.

The principal object of this Dispatch is to authorise you to express in the strongest Terms, the lively Interest which His Majesty takes in the Security and Success of Austria, and His determination to second the Efforts of that Power in every way that may most effectually conduce to their early and entire

success.

110. THE BERLIN DECREE (1806).

In 1805 Napoleon entered upon his first imperial campaign, not having commanded in any action since the battle of Marengo. (1800). Against him were allied England, Austria and Russia.

1" of Europe "crossed out in Draft.

T

Prussia made the fatal mistake of remaining neutral instead of striking at a moment when her assistance would have been worth something. Between the declaration of hostilities and the issue of the Berlin Decree, the military landmarks are Trafalgar, Austerlitz and Jena. The two latter battles left Napoleon as supreme in Central Europe as England was on the seas after Trafalgar. Jena was fought October 14th, 1806, and Napoleon entered Berlin thirteen days later. There he drafted the edict which he hoped would ensure the ruin of England's commerce and cause her speedy overthrow. It proved a twoedged sword, and in the end did him grievous damage. Quite apart from England's retaliation through the Orders in Council, continental trade was damaged to such an extent that hatred of this measure became a distinct factor in the final uprising of Europe against French ascendency.

SOURCE.-The Berlin Decree. Napoleon (1769-1821). Text trans. by J. H. Robinson. Philadelphia, 1897. (The Univ. Translations and Reprints. Vol. ii., No. 2.)

The Berlin Decree.

From our Imperial Camp at Berlin, November 21, 1806.

Napoleon, Emperor of the French and King of Italy, in consideration of the fact :

1. That England does not recognise the system of international law universally observed by all civilised nations.

2. That she regards as an enemy every individual belonging to the enemy's state, and consequently makes prisoners of war not only of the crews of armed ships of war but of the crews of ships of commerce and merchantmen and even of commercial agents and of merchants travelling on business.

3. That she extends to the vessels and commercial wares and to the property of individuals the right of conquest, which is applicable only to the possessions of the belligerent power.

4. That she extends to unfortified towns and commercial ports, to harbours and the mouths of rivers, the right of blockade, which, in accordance with reason and the customs of all civilised nations, is applicable only to strong places. That she declares places in a state of blockade before which she has not even a single ship of war, although a place may not be blockaded except it be so completely guarded that no attempt to

approach it can be made without imminent danger. That she has declared districts in a state of blockade which all her united forces would be unable to blockade, such as entire coasts and the whole of an empire.

5. That this monstrous abuse of the right of blockade has no other aim than to prevent communication among the nations and to raise the commerce and the industry of England upon the ruins of that of the continent.

6. That, since this is the obvious aim of England, whoever deals of the continent in English goods, thereby favours and renders himself an accomplice of her designs.

7. That this policy of England, worthy of the earliest stages of barbarism, has profited that power to the detriment of every other nation.

8. That it is a natural right to oppose such arms against an enemy as he makes use of, and to combat in the same way as he combats. Since England has disregarded all ideas of justice and every high sentiment, due to the civilisation among mankind, we have resolved to apply to her the usages which she has ratified in her maritime legislation.

The provisions of the present decree shall continue to be looked upon as embodying the fundamental principles of the Empire until England shall recognise that the law of war is one and the same on land and sea, and that the rights of war cannot be extended so as to include private property of any kind or the persons of individuals unconnected with the profession of arms and that the right of blockade shall be restricted to fortified places actually invested by sufficient forces.

We have consequently decreed and do decree that which follows:

ARTICLE I.-The British Isles are declared to be in a state of blockade.

ART. II.—All commerce and all correspondence with the British Isles is forbidden. Consequently letters or packages directed to England or to an Englishman or written in the English language shall not pass through the mails and shall be seized.

ART. III.—Every individual who is an English subject, of whatever state or condition he may be, who shall be discovered in any country occupied by our troops or by those of our allies, shall be made a prisoner of war.

ART. IV.—All warehouses, merchandise or property of whatever kind belonging to a subject of England shall be regarded as a lawful prize.

ART. V. Trade in English goods is prohibited, and all goods belonging to England or coming from her factories or her colonies are declared a lawful prize.

ART. VI.-Half of the product resulting from the confiscation of the goods and possessions declared a lawful prize by the preceding articles shall be applied to indemnify the merchants for the losses they have experienced by the capture of merchant vessels taken by English cruisers.

ART. VII. No vessel coming directly from England or from the English colonies or which shall have visited these since the publication of the present decree shall be received in any port.

ART. VIII.-Any vessel contravening the above provision by a false declaration shall be seized, and the vessel and cargo shall be confiscated as if it were English property.

ART. IX. Our Court of Prizes at Paris shall pronounce final judgment in all cases arising in our Empire or in the countries occupied by the French Army relating to the execution of the present decree. Our Court of Prizes at Milan shall pronounce final judgment in the said cases which may arise within our Kingdom of Italy.

ART. X.-The present decree shall be communicated by our minister of foreign affairs to the King of Spain, of Naples, of Holland and of Etruria, and to our other allies whose subjects like ours are the victims of the unjust and barbarous maritime legislation of England.

ART. XI.-Our ministers of foreign affairs, of war, of the navy, of finance and of the police, and our Directors General of the port are charged with the execution of the present decree so far as it effects them.

Done by the Emperor,
HUGUE MARET,

(Signed)

NAPOLEON.

Ministerial Secretary of State.

111. THE PENINSULAR WAR (1808-13).

Napoleon's Spanish policy was beyond doubt a blunder, and British troops, after much mismanagement between 1793 and 1807, were at length given a chance to prove their metal in the Peninsular War. There they made Europe see that the French could be beaten, and in the person of Wellington they

developed a general of all but the highest class. The Peninsular War is a fine historical subject, and has been worthily treated by Sir William Napier, who fought in it with distinction. At the close of his work he offers some general considerations on the contest, and a quotation therefrom is reprinted because it brings out well the respective qualities of the troops engaged. Napier's comparison of Napoleon and Wellington is also a striking piece of composition, based on careful military observation. SOURCE.-History of the War in the Peninsula. Sir W. Napier (17851860). London, 1853. Vol. vi., p. 193.

Napoleon's system of war was admirably adapted to draw forth and augment the military excellence and to strengthen the weakness of the national character. His discipline, severe, but appealing to the feelings of hope and honour, wrought the quick temperament of the French soldiers to patience under hardships, and strong endurance under fire; he taught the generals to rely on their own talents, to look to the country wherein they made war for resources, and to dare everything even with the smallest numbers, that the impetuous valour of France might have full play hence the violence of their attacks. But he also taught them to combine all arms together, and to keep strong reserves that sudden disorders might be repaired and the discouraged troops have time to rally and recover their pristine spirit; certain that they would then renew the battle with the same confidence as before. He thus made his troops, not invincible indeed, nature had put a bar to that in the character of the British soldier; yet so terrible and sure in war that the number and greatness of their exploits surpassed those of all other nations, the Romans not excepted if regard be had to the shortness of the period, nor the Macedonians if the quality of their opponents be considered.

Look at their amazing toils in the Peninsular war alone, which though so great and important was but an episode in their military history. "In Spain large armies will starve and small armies will be beaten," was the saying of Henry IV. of France, and it was not the light phrase of an indolent king, but the profound conclusion of a sagacious general. Yet Napoleon's enormous armies were so wonderfully organized that they existed and fought in Spain for six years, and without cessation; for to them winters and summers were alike; they endured incredible toils and privations, yet were not starved out, nor