power between ourselves and Native States Mahratta, Rajput, Sikh, or Mahomedan remained, they were prevented by their mutual jealousies and religious differences from combining against us. Lord Dalhousie's annexations, culminating in the seizure of Oudh, destroyed that balance, and rendered us in India what we now claim to be in South Africa, the predominant Power. Hostility to us had become a bond of union. The annexation of Oudh was justified at the time on much the same principle as coercive measures against the Sultan of Turkey are called for-namely, that "the British Government would be guilty in the sight of God and man if it were any longer to aid in sustaining by its countenance an administration fraught with suffering to millions." Such a doctrine is always more soothing to the despoiler than to the despoiled. The natives regarded it as an unprovoked usurpation, much as Europe would regard the application of a similar doctrine to the Turks. They did not believe in the purity and disinterestedness of our motives. We were inflated by our power and by the brilliant results of Lord Dalhousie's reign, and were proportionately more dogmatic than compromising in introducing Western reforms and curing Oriental practices by our views of what is sound, regardless of native ideas and tradition. We accordingly revelled in a sense of security at the very time when we were teaching all the lesser Powers to regard us with suspicion and dread. We were defying them to do their worst at the very time that we were practically trusting the native army with the military possession of the country. The third leader was Nana Sahib, the Rajah of Bithur. He was the adopted son and heir of the last

of the Peshwas, the chief of the Mahratta confederacy. He was looked upon by the British residents at Cawnpore as a perfectly harmless individual; but he was intriguing with the king of Delhi, the king of Oudh, and other great personages, disaffected by reason of the discontinuance of a pension to which he was not entitled, and by the refusal of a salute of guns.

The disgust of the wealthy and influential classes was fostered by our system of land revenue, and the consequent inquiries into rights of occupancy and ownership, the detection of numerous acts of spoliation and oppression, and their redress. Pillage and extortion had been practised from time immemorial. Restraints upon them disgusted the ruling families more than they conciliated the masses, whose support, moreover, would in no case have been of much political value. Assessments of land revenue, harsh sales on default of payment, the strict enforcement of the doctrine of the lapse of property in the absence of direct or collateral heirs, restrictions on the right of adoption, all tended to alienate the influential classes.

It was not difficult for these classes to act on the minds of the sepoys, who were mostly drawn from the agricultural community, and therefore directly interested in the very questions on which the sense of grievance was growing. Questions of religion and caste also interested them. They knew that railways and education were striking blows at caste, by compelling persons of all castes to travel and work together. The Brahmins were trembling for their influence and privileges, and all were in terror of being forced to embrace Christianity. The grievance of the greased cartridges, which roused to a white heat the anger of both

Hindu and Mussulman, was the match placed to a magazine of gunpowder. That was the contribution made by our own folly and supineness to the general convulsion. And a further contribution we offered in this way, that, owing to indifference and over-confidence, our army was not organised, disciplined, and officered in a satisfactory manner: there was too great a preponderance of native as compared with British troops, the arsenals and magazines had been allowed to fall under their control, the artillery had been too much intrusted to their hands. The disproportion between native and British troops was one of the main encouragements to the Mutiny, and one would think that the faintest instinct of self-preservation will prevent that disproportion from ever being repeated. Native troops had for years been levied in continually increasing numbers. During the thirteen years before 1857 a native army of 217,000 men and 176 guns was increased by 40,000 men and 40 guns, while no addition was made to the British force, doubtless from economical considerations, which consisted of little more than 40,000. Lord Dalhousie protested. He pointed out that his annexations and conquests necessitated a proportional increase of British soldiers. Nevertheless, with drawals were made to some slight extent for the Crimea and Persia. Thus, in spite of Lord Dalhousie's protest, the British force was rather diminished than increased; and when the Mutiny broke out we were left with 36,000 British against 257,000 native soldiers. It no doubt was believed that if the result of the Russian, Persian, and China wars had been to withdraw troops from India, there would remain for some time to come a lack of power to send rein

forcements. The hour and the opportunity had come; fortunately, or unfortunately for the natives, the man was conspicuous by his absence. Probably the Mutiny was an ordeal through which it was essential that the British should pass before they fully comprehended their real position in the country, and the necessity for consolidating their power on а durable basis, and of making India both in name and in reality an integral part of the dominion of the Queen.

Since the Mutiny that task has been taken in hand. India is no longer the appanage of a Company, the happy hunting - field of the nominees of a particular class. Most families of all classes are in one way or another connected with India, and greater interest is felt in its affairs. The proclamation of the Queen in 1858 was no idle ceremony. Since that time the authority of the Crown has been asserted in every direction. A viceroy has replaced the governorgeneral, the higher appointments proceed direct from the Crown, the higher courts of justice are created by the Crown under authority of Parliament, and its judges are appointed by the Queen. Much has been done to improve both the civil and the military administration. And, above all, our position has been materially strengthened by the provision of numerous lines of communication by road and railway, over and above the old trunkroads established by the Company. A great network of telegraphs now intersects the country. Canals have been constructed. The result is twofold. The area of land under cultivation has been increased, the prices of agricultural produce being equalised, and a considerable export trade created. And from a military point of view greater security has been attained

by the increased facilities for rapidly assembling troops at any centre of disturbance. Again, the number of British soldiers has been more than doubled, while the number of native soldiers has been materially reduced. We may take it for granted that the arsenals and magazines will henceforth be exclusively in possession of the British, and that the artillery and other more effective branches of military service will also be mainly in their hands. More rapid communication with England, and the greater interest felt in India as an integral portion of the empire, will also make themselves felt as factors of the utmost importance in checking any fresh outbreak. Lord Roberts expresses his belief that, "as regards the native equally with the British army of India, a better feeling never existed throughout all ranks than exists at present." It is remarkable that this book gives no account of the excesses which were inevitable in the suppression of a mutiny which had been stained by so much bloodshed, treachery, and cruel massacre of English women and children. Their effect in perpetuating a feud between European and native seems to have been slight. The clemency party, headed by Lord Canning in India, and by most leading statesmen at home, roused great animosity during the continuance of the fierce passions of 1857.

Perhaps their efforts were appreciated by the natives, who after their defeat found themselves exposed to all the strength of civilisation temporarily deprived of those feelings of mercy and humanity which are supposed to accompany it. Or possibly the natives yielded submissively to fate, and regarded revenge and resentment as beyond their reach, while severe retribution was the inevitable sequel of defeat. At all events,

the passions of that time died away. The sepoys were mostly exterminated or disappeared. Rebellious feudatories were severely punished; loyal supporters were duly rewarded with grants and titles. Caution and conciliation are still necessary in administrative and legislative matters; for it may be taken for granted that native soldiers will reflect the sentiments of the people generally, more particularly upon any subject which involves their religion or the continuance of ancient and cherished usages. The whole experiment of a Western democracy governing peoples of stereotyped Oriental habits and manners is unique in the history of the world. It is inevitable that blunders should be made, that what commends itself to the rulers as sound and just may arouse the utmost discontent and animosity on the part of the ruled. Doctrinaire politicians, with their one-sided views of life, are wholly out of place in India. The greatest men in that country have always been in favour of gradual reforms pursued with extreme caution and toleration, in sympathy with prejudices which, however alien to our own ideas, are deep-rooted in the native mind. Lord Roberts instances at the present day forest laws and sanitary regulations, our legislative and fiscal systems, as being all of them subjects requiring care and circumspection. In a former generation such questions as the burning, and later the remarriage, of widows created widespread consternation, and our handling of them was amongst the causes of disaffection to our rule. Only in 1892 the closing of the great Hurdwar Fair, on account of a serious outbreak of cholera, however obvious a measure in the eyes of Westerns, was keenly resented by the natives as a blow aimed at their religion and a vio

lation of the religious toleration proclaimed in 1858. To be robbed by officious sanitary inspectors of the privilege of bathing in sacred waters, after they have toiled over hundreds of miles and surmounted every degree of fatigue and privation, is to lose that which they value more than life, in obedience to Western sanitary ideas which they do not understand.

There will always be risk of causing political dissatisfaction. A free Press amongst the natives would be the best corrective, provided it is properly regulated. Lord Roberts draws attention to the licence allowed to that Press in vilifying the Government and its officials, and in persistently misrepresenting the motives and policy of the ruling Power. This always strikes us as a most indefensible proceeding, transplanting the free Press of the West into the East without any precaution against a seditious, hostile, and defiant spirit being openly indulged. However cautious and tolerant our proceedings, the goodwill and confidence of the natives cannot be gained in the face of persistent misrepresentation and calumny. Details of this kind are numerous, but from a military point of view the lesson of the Mutiny is that we must preserve a due proportion of British and native troops, retain in our own hands the possession of arsenals and the more effective branches of the service, and open up speedy communications both internally and with England.

Two great ceremonials are described in this book, which will have an enduring historical interest as long as our Indian army lasts-namely, the grand entry of Lord Canning into Lucknow on the 22d October 1859; and the proclamation of her Majesty as Empress of India on the 1st Jan

uary 1877. Lord Roberts took a prominent part in both of them. The political interest of the former lies in the meeting a few days later between Lord Canning and the 160 taluqdars of Oudh, whose estate and property he had confiscated by his summary proclamation of March 15, 1858. They had, many of them, angrily resisted the process of converting them into law-abiding subjects from having been feudal chiefs with unlimited power of oppression and usurpation. Confiscation was made general and sweeping. It extended to the whole soil of Oudh, and reminds one to some slight extent of the Duke of Alva's sentencing the whole population of the Netherlands to death. The object, however, was, besides punishing the guilty, to establish the revenue system on a new and satisfactory footing. Lord Canning now announced the virtual though partial repeal of confiscation. Taluqdars who submitted received back their possessions as a free gift from the Government. Those who had done good service were rewarded with grants of confiscated lands. A month later, at Cawnpore, great satisfaction was given to the assembled chiefs by the announcement that the estates of native princes would be scrupulously respected, and that the right of adoption was conceded to them. That meant that instead of their possessions lapsing to the British Government on failure of heirs, their right, which in many previous cases had been refused, would hereafter be recognised of adopting a son, who, according to Hindu notions, would as effectively continue his adoptive father's line as a natural-born son would do. This, says Lord Roberts, did more than any other measure to make the feudatory princes believe in the amnesty proclamation.

The other ceremonial was at Delhi, when Lord Lytton received in durbar 63 ruling chiefs and nearly 300 titular chiefs and persons of distinction, the assemblage being intended to emphasise and repeat the proclamation of the Queen in 1858 in her public assumption of the title of "Empress of India." Lord Roberts played a leading part in its arrangement and conduct. He conversed, he says, with every one of the princes and nobles, and each in turn repeated the same sentiments of loyalty as had been publicly expressed by the leading Maharajahs. The political object, which must have been to some extent furthered by this tremendous ceremonial, was to assure each potentate and prince, "not only of the close union between the throne of England and your loyal and princely house, but also of the earnest desire of the paramount Power to see your dynasty strong, prosperous, and permanent." In other words, they were no longer to fear annexation by what they regarded as the rapacity of a Company, but were to consider themselves as part and parcel of the British empire, enrolled amongst its feudatories, secure in their possessions whilst they continued in their loyalty.

The same year, 1877, which witnessed this final consummation of empire after more than a century of heroic achievement, also witnessed the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey, and the consequent unrest on the frontiers which looked in the direction of Russian power. The TransIndus tract of country was now removed from the Punjab Government, formed into a separate district, under the control of a Chief Commissioner who would be responsible direct to the Government of India for frontier

administration and trans-frontier relations. This post, with the command of the Punjab Frontier Force, was conferred on Roberts, who now had our relations with Afghanistan and Russia primarily in his hands.

Lord Roberts' account of the great historical occurrences which date from 1877 is as valuable as that of the still more stirring events of twenty years earlier. Of both series of events he is entitled to say, "Quorum pars magna fui." In the latter his responsibility was of course far the greater.

The dominant feature of the situation which now engrossed his attention was that both England and Russia were solicitous for the friendship of the Ameer of Afghanistan. His territories were conterminous with ours, while Russia in two centuries had expanded along nearly 4000 miles of territory which lay between her boundary of that date and the present border-line of our Indian Empire. Both Afghan wars have. been brought about by the presence of Russian officers in Kabul. In 1877 Russia's southern boundary was almost conterminous with the northern boundary of Afghanistan. The Ameer felt that Russia was in a position to crush him, while he was doubtful if we would protect him. In 1878 there was considerable risk of England having to go to war with Russia, and Indian troops had been brought to Malta with that view. At that moment the Ameer, at a council of his leading chiefs, decided to throw in his lot with Russia, and to receive at Kabul a Russian mission, headed by General Stolietoff. An offensive and defensive alliance between Russia and the Ameer was contemplated (Lord Roberts gives the proofs), had the Berlin Congress of that year failed