sparingly in adverse criticism, the main points to which it has been directed down to this date being the unpreparedness and the inefficiency of the too elderly officers in command of various stations at the outbreak of the Mutiny, that attention cannot fail to be aroused by the severe remarks made on the demoralised condition of the garrison at Kandahar. The general bearing of the troops reminded him, he says, of the people at Agra in 1857. They seemed to consider themselves hopelessly defeated, and were utterly despondent they never even hoisted the union-jack until the relieving force was close at hand." Yet the walls of Kandahar were so high and thick as to render the city absolutely impregnable to any army not equipped with a regular siegetrain. "For British soldiers," he says, "to have contemplated the possibility of Kandahar being taken by an Afghan army showed what a miserable state of depression and demoralisation they were in." The next morning, September 1, Roberts assumed the command of the army in Southern Afghanistan, the troops at Kandahar consisting of 3800 British and 11,000 natives, with 36 guns; and at six o'clock in the evening of the same day, after a tremendous conflict, telegraphed the total defeat and complete dispersion of Ayub Khan's army with comparatively slight loss on our side. This closed the Afghan war. Roberts left Kandahar for Quetta in search of health after his attack of fever, and was shortly afterwards created Commander-in-Chief of the Madras army. Stewart, after installing Abdur Rahman as Ameer of Kabul, marched the whole British force out of that city on their return to India, one brigade alone being left as a temporary measure in the Khyber Pass.

Lord Roberts pays, as well he might, a glowing tribute to the unflagging energy and perseverance of his "splendid troops," both British and native, from whom he finally parted at the Bolan Pass :

"As I parted with each corps in turn its band played 'Auld Lang Syne,' and I have never since heard that memory-stirring air without its bringing before my mind's eye the last view I had of the Kabul-Kan

dahar Field Force. I fancy myself crossing and recrossing the river hear the martial beat of drums and which winds through the pass; I plaintive music of the pipes; and I see Riflemen and Gurkhas, Highlanders and Sikhs, guns and horses, camels and mules, with the endless following of an Indian army, winding through the narrow gorges, or over the passage of the Bolan so difficult and wearisome to man and beast. I shall never forget the feeling of sadness with which I said good-bye to the men who had done so much for me. I looked upon them all, native friends. And well I might, for never as well as British, as my valued

the interminable boulders which made

had a commander been better served."

Here ends the long tale of Lord Roberts' active service in the field, which began with the movable column of the Punjab, and ended with this splendid march from Kabul to Kandahar, with the complete overthrow of the Afghan army at the end of it. It was this latter exploit which chiefly arrested the attention of his countrymen, and gained for him the enthusiastic reception which awaited him on his return to England. He himself, and probably his readers will concur with him, considered his march from Kuram to Kabul the previous autumn in reality the greater military achievement, in every particular more difficult, more dangerous, and more responsible. In this lastmentioned operation his force was little more than half the strength

with which he marched to Kandahar. During the latter part of it, after crossing the Shutargardan, he was in the midst of quite as hostile tribes, " entirely dependent on the country for supplies, heavily handicapped by want of transport, and practically as completely cut off from communication with India as I was a year later on the march to Kandahar." Before him was Kabul, with its large and wellequipped arsenal and a highly organised army; around him were tribesmen hurrying to defend its approaches; within his camp a traitor in the form of the Ameer, posing as the friend to the British Government and a refugee seeking our protection, while in reality he was a deadly foe.

The destruction of the British force in 1842 brought home to the English mind the perils of Afghan warfare. Lord Roberts' successes ought not to diminish the caution with which military operations in that country should be attempted. They give one the impression of being hazardous to the last degree, not to be undertaken without the utmost precautions to ensure success, or without the most urgent requirements of political necessity. Lord Roberts cannot be suspected of unduly magnifying their difficulties. But the desperateness of the whole proceeding, the peril of annihilation in case of hesitation, are shown by his remark with regard to the prospects of his small force when surrounded by foes and approaching Kabul: "Had there been on our part the smallest hesitation or delay, we should have found ourselves opposed by as formidable a combination as we had to deal with two months later at Sherpur. Nothing could then have saved the force, not one man of which, I firmly believe, would have ever returned to tell the tale in India." From the fall of Delhi

to the fall of Kabul and the relief of Kandahar there is compressed within a quarter of a century enough of daring achievement and determined conflict with overpowering numbers of brave and resolute enemies to convince the world that a nation which can produce such men has not entered yet on the period of its decline, has not yet had its energies and spirit sapped by peace and prosperity, but is still capable of vindicating its empire in all parts of the globe. Amongst the many heroes which that space of time brought to the front, Lord Roberts has won a foremost place, and every one must rejoice at the honours which have been showered upon him, and which he has so richly deserved.

There is an amusing glimpse of the way in which our Indian heroes regarded the actions of their country and compatriots in South Africa. Lord Roberts, after the Afghan campaigns, went home more or less invalided before entering upon his duties in Madras. "Six weeks out of these precious months of leave," Lord Roberts says, 66 were spent in a wild-goose chase to the Cape of Good Hope and back, upon my being nominated by Mr Gladstone's Government Governor of Natal and Commander of the Forces in South Africa, on the death of Sir George Colley, and the receipt of the news of the disaster at Majuba Hill." Naturally enough, he expected a brisk business, having usually up to that time been selected for command when some dangerous and desperate enterprise was on foot. Matters on this occasion took a turn to which he was not accustomed. "While I was on my way out to take up my command peace was made with the Boers in the most marvellously rapid and unexpected manner." A peace without honour or the semblance of honour! Lord

Roberts does not seem, from the tone of his allusion to the whole remarkable business, to have regarded his selection for this particular command as being in the nature of a distinguished compliment worthy of his acceptance. His stay at Cape Town lasted twenty-four hours, "the Government being apparently as anxious to get me away from Africa as they had been to hurry me out there."

After a stay in Madras, Lord Roberts again visited Calcutta in March 1885, while Lord Dufferin was Viceroy. It was shortly before the affair at Panjdeh, which so nearly led to war with Russia, and which was the immediate occasion of a vote of credit of several millions by the House of Commons. Public affairs were unsettled. Russia was very active in the valley of the Oxus, Skobeleff's victories having given her Merv and Sarakhs, thus making the Caspian the base of any future operations, Turkestan being also in direct communication by rail and steamer with St Petersburg. The army in the Caucasus was now easily transportable to the boundaries of Afghanistan, and accordingly Russia was dictating terms to the Boundary Commission, and ejecting an Afghan garrison from Panjdeh under the eyes of British officers. Meetings took place between Lord Dufferin and Abdur Rahman at Rawul Pindi. The former declared that England was resolved that a Russian advance on Herat should be met by a declaration of war, and the latter was required to choose finally which of his two powerful neighbours he would have for his ally. As far as words went the Ameer chose Great Britain. The Viceroy ratified Lord Ripon's promise to defend his kingdom against foreign aggression, and presented him with

money, arms, and ammunition. Everything was in readiness for war. "A change of Government, however," says Lord Roberts, "took place just in time to prevent the war. Lord Salisbury's determined attitude convinced Russia that no further encroachments on the Afghan frontier would be permitted: she ceased the 'game of brag' she had been allowed to play, and the Boundary Commission were enabled to proceed with the work of delimitation." The most satisfactory incident of the whole of these proceedings was the loyalty of the native chiefs who were present, and their profuse promises of help in case a recourse to arms became necessary. Similar demonstrations of loyalty were made by distant native rulers. Lord Roberts says that the greatest enthusiasm prevailed, and the various camps at Rawul Pindi were crowded with men desirous of joining the ranks of our army. We were able in the height of the Mutiny to rely on the firm support of many of the most prominent native races, and it seems highly probable that that support would be still more general and even more enthusiastic in the defence of their country against a foreign invader. And every ten years that pass over our heads tend to consolidate the empire, and to confirm the acquiescence of native feudatories and allies in a rule to which they have become accustomed, and which gives them security without impairing their dignity and independence.

In 1885 Lord Roberts succeeded Sir Donald Stewart as Commanderin-Chief in India. He went with Lord Dufferin to Rangoon, and then to Mandalay, where the Viceroy formally announced the annexation by England of all that part of Upper Burmah over which King Thebaw had held sway. The chief

independent States. But having fought side by side with natives, he had gained confidence in their desire to co-operate with us and in their unmistakable loyalty. But for the saving clause, so long as our Government continues just and sympathetic," we should infer that he had at the close of his career fallen a victim to that excessive trust in the natives which he found so rife when he first landed, and which was the prime cause of the Mutiny. The chiefs of course cordially responded to proposals of this kind, and steadily improved their armies under the guidance of carefully selected British officers. It is a policy which we must take on trust, confiding in our experts. Sub. stantial results are said to have been already obtained, the Chitral expedition having had valuable help from the transport trains organised by the rulers of Gwalior and Jeypoor, and by the troops of the Maharajah of Kashmir. Still for our part we rely with greater confidence in regard to the future on this circumstance, that instead of British troops being in the proportion of less than I to 6, as they were in the days before the Mutiny, we have now, or had in 1885 (vol. ii. p. 390), 70,000 British with 414 guns, and 128,636 natives, a proportion of more than 1 to 2. So long as our trust in native loyalty and professions does not lead us to tamper with this proportion, and to take all the securities which a position, precarious in spite of all our efforts, requires, there can be no political unwisdom in cultivating friendship and inspiring confidence in

native States, a policy which we hope will, before many generations have passed away, lead to the introduction of friendly sentiments and civilising agencies even amongst the hostile tribes who hang like a dark cloud over our North-Western frontier.

We lay down these volumes with the feeling that they are the record of the life not only of a brave and capable soldier, but of a loyal friend and of a very kindly and modest-hearted gentleman. When he succeeds, it is his "luck," when others fail, it is their "misfortune." There is not an unkind word from beginning to end, and when an adverse criticism is inevitable, it is free from bitterness, and names are withheld as far as possible. Those who served under him in later life were made to feel that his eye was on them, and that their actions would be appraised in an ungrudging and appreciative spirit. The record of his young days is fresh and full of charm, recalling the bright young officer whose sobriquet of "Bobs throughout the service was the Indian unerring sign of genial manners and personal popularity. And throughout the book, from the day when he "found his fate to the hour when he penned its dedication, we have occasional glimpses of the domestic sentiment which Englishmen recognise as the basis of national greatness, and without whose gilding this life of strenuous activity of Fortyone Years in India' could not be the happy retrospect it is. By such men our Indian empire was won, and by such men it must be held.