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Well might Stewart say: "The only chance of success is to adopt stern measures, and show the officers that it is more dangerous to retreat than to advance."

Stewart was constantly urging the Governor to concentrate his troops, and try to raise the courage of his men, by obtaining some success in the open; and then to attempt the relief of Bara and Obeid. But Abd el-Kader had no officer in whom he could trust. The brigadiers sent to him were worthless; the officers were ignorant; and quite onee-third of the men arriving from Egypt had never handled a rifle. Early in January 1883, however, serious reports came in from the districts round Sennár, and Abd el-Kader, at Stewart's instigation, determined to take the field in person. He was rewarded by gaining two substantial successes over the Mahdists.

Stewart's letters contain many allusions to the evils of the civil administration, the venality and incompetence of the officials, the robbery and oppression of the Bashi Bazúks, and the constant interference from Cairo, due chiefly to intrigues in in the Khedive's harem. His conclusion was that the Egyptians were morally and physically unfit to govern the country. "I assure you," he writes, "I sometimes think I am dreaming; everything seems turned upside down." On the 8th March, four days after the arrival of General Hicks and his staff, he left Khartúm, and travelling by Sennár, Gedarif, Kassala, and Massowa, reached Cairo on the 30th April 1883. His mission had been successful, and when Bara and Obeid surrendered to the Mahdi in January, his presence in Khartúm had averted a panic.

After a brief period of leave in England, Stewart joined his regi

soon

ment at Leeds; and was afterwards offered the command of a regiment in India, which he declined. In December, whilst in Spain with one of his sisters, he heard of the destruction of Hicks' army by the Mahdi, and wrote at once that Khartúm ought to be held at all costs. He proposed the despatch of a force from India to relieve Khartúm and hold the country on the right bank of the White Nile.

On the 12th of December Stewart, having returned to England, was consulted by Government. He tried to impress upon Ministers the true significance of the Mahdi's victory. He pointed out that the Mahdi, from his claims and position, must push on; that it was hopeless to attempt to stop him with Egyptian troops; and that his unchecked advance would probably lead to risings in Egypt and Arabia. The expediency of employing Zobeir in the Súdán was apparently discussed, but Stewart considered that it would be very imprudent to employ him. He held that Zobeir was a shrewd, able man, and that, if sent to the Súdán, "he would probably play his own game." The impression produced upon Stewart by his interviews with Ministers was that matters would "be allowed to slide, at any rate for the present." He was, therefore, not surprised to hear early in January that Government, having decided to abandon the Súdán, had ordered the evacuation of Khartúm.

About the middle of January 1884 Stewart is again in London preparing a report for Government on the best way of evacuating Khartúm. On the 16th January he writes: "The more one looks at this Khartúm relief or retreat the more difficult it seems. I feel sure that without some for

ward movement on the part of a relieving force, a retreat from Khartúm will practically mean the dissolution of the retiring force." He held strongly that "without fighting - men it was hopeless to expect to do anything," and advocated the despatch of a force from India to Kassala to secure the Khartúm-KassalaMassowa road, and overawe the Eastern Súdán.

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On the 17th, Stewart felt so certain that nothing would be done that he accepted a delicate mission from Government which was expected to last about two months. "Ministers," he writes, appear to stand shivering on the brink, afraid to take the responsibility of ordering the retreat of the garrison for fear they should be massacred on the homeward march, and on the other hand afraid to take measures to hold the Eastern Súdán."

The next day was to see a complete change in the situation. General Gordon reached London in the morning, and afterwards had an interview with Ministers. "I was asked," he writes, "if I would go to Súdán to carry out evacuation of Súdán which Government had decided upon. I said, Yes, if Government were decided on it; so it was settled, and I left that night." One of his first acts was to apply for Stewart's services. At 3.30 P.M. Stewart was moned to the War Office and introduced to Gordon. He was then told that Government wished him to accompany that officer to the Súdán, and that they were to start by the Indian mail at 8 P.M. that night. The two men had never met before. "I had never seen Stewart," Gordon writes from Port Said, "but asked for him,

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for his reports seemed so good, and I am truly glad to have such a splendid fellow."

Before leaving Stewart received written instructions to accompany Gordon. His position, which has been often misunderstood, was that of staff-officer to a British general ordered to Egypt on Imperial service. One who saw him at this time writes: "I shall never forget his simple, frank, soldierlike, dutiful acceptance of the orders given him. I have a strong personal feeling of admiration for a man who did his duty without exalted (if I may so term them) feelings." Stewart, throughout his brief career, attached the greatest importance to implicit obedience to orders. When he received an order he considered it his duty to carry it out to the best of his ability, without question and without regard to personal risk. Knowing the state of the Súdán, he was doubtful of success; but, having once received his orders from Government, he devoted his whole energies to the work, and served his chief, often under trying circumstances, with a loyalty beyond all praise.

On the evening of the 18th, with kindly good wishes from the Duke of Cambridge and Lord Wolseley, who were at Charing Cross to bid them what proved to be a last farewell, Gordon and Stewart started on their perilous mission. The two men who were thus speeding to their fate were in some respects much alike, in others widely different. Both were animated by the highest sense of honour and duty; both were fearless in the face of danger, and had the same contempt of death; both disliked carrying arms; both had the kindliest feelings towards na

1 Stewart, when remonstrated with, used to compromise matters by putting a small empty pistol into his pocket.

tives, the same horror of oppression and cruelty, the same determination to see justice done at all hazards. Gordon was hasty, impelled by his active mind and imagination to be always doing something, quick of temper, prone to take offence at any fancied slight, open to the verge of indiscretion, a man who sought guidance from above, and earnestly tried to follow, in great matters and small, what he believed to be the path indicated by the Almighty in answer to his prayers. "This is my strength," he writes from Khartúm, "because I am a born idiot God will work by me." Stewart, on the other hand, was calm, with with an evenly balanced mind capable of seeing the true proportion of things, not easily stirred to wrath, discreet without undue reticence, methodical yet quick. He believed others to be as honest and straightforward as himself,1 considered his religious opinions as a matter that did not concern the public, and had none of the crusading or missionary spirit of his chief. He was rather animated by love of country, and a desire for distinction. "If," he once said, "I could make myself a name by doing something that would be of service to my country, I should die happy."

On one point, the relations of Gordon to the Government, they differed widely in their views; and, though in none of Stewart's letters is there a single disloyal word, it is easy to see that, on several occasions, he was far from approving the line taken by his chief. When Gordon tried to bring pressure on the Government through Mr Power, the 'Times' correspondent, there was appar

1

ently a sharp discussion. Stewart held that an officer who had accepted a special mission from Government should on all occasions state his views openly and fearlessly, and loyally accept their decision. He was prepared to act on his own responsibility, but he did not think it right for an officer to employ the Press to force his views upon Ministers who might be guided by knowledge which he did not possess, or by motives of Imperial policy. Gordon strongly dissented from this view. In a letter written soon after the discussion he expresses his fondness of Stewart, but considers him to be deeply imbued with official reserve. He thinks that if any one sees Government taking a vicious course, he is bound to warn them, and if they will not listen, then to utilise the Press.

Stewart kept a journal of the progress of the mission, and wrote openly to friends and relations. The journal, as we have it, ends on the 11th March 1884. The continuation, which fell into the hands of the Mahdi, is described by Gordon as a "gem." The impression produced by Stewart's correspondence, no less than by that of Gordon, is that the two men, differing as they sometimes did in regard to the policy to be pursued, thoroughly understood and appreciated each other. There were at times heated discussions, but Stewart was ever loyal in thought and deed, and Gordon had a high regard for the sterling qualities of his gifted staff-officer.

When Gordon left England, his policy was to restore the Súdán to the representatives of the petty sultans who had been dispossessed by Muhammad Ali, and he in

"Stewart was a man who did not chew the cud-he never thought of danger in perspective; he was not a bit suspicious (while I am made up of it)." Gordon's Journal, p. 281.

tended to proceed direct to Sawákin. Once there he proposed to reopen the Sawákin-Berber road through Sheikh Músa of the Hadendoa, and Músa Akkad, a Súdán merchant of great ability, who had been implicated in the Arábi rebellion, and exiled. In this policy Stewart thoroughly concurred. On the 20th Gordon suggested that Zobeir should be sent to Cyprus, and asked Sir E. Baring to meet him at Suez. On the 22d, whilst "at sea," he explained in a memorandum the policy he proposed to pursue, and his objections to the employment of Zobeir. On this

and on subsequent occasions he paid Stewart the high compliment of asking him to record his independent views. Stewart cordially agreed with the memorandum, and also suggested that steps should be taken to prevent any interference by the Cairo Ministers with Gordon's mission. Both wrote in strong terms against the employment of Zobeir, believing that if sent to the Súdán he would consolidate a vast State and become a formidable power. Both distrusted the Khedive, and dreaded intrigues at Cairo more than the open hostility of the Súdánis. Stewart even thought that some of the Egyptian officials would not be sorry to hear that Gordon had been made away with; and he evidently watched over the safety of his chief, who wrote from Khartúm, "You have a wife to look over your shoulder and see there is no treachery: Stewart is as good for me here."

On the 24th Gordon and Stewart reached Port Said, and were met by Sir Evelyn Wood and Colonel Watson. Here they heard that Government wished Gordon to go to Cairo, and that Zobeir could not be sent to Cyprus. At Ismailiya they learned that Sheikh Músa of the Hadendoa was dead,

and that a large section of the tribe was in rebellion under Osman Digna. There was now no question of going to Sawákin, and on the 25th a council was held at the British Agency, Cairo, to decide upon the action that should be taken with regard to the Súdán. The evening of the same day Gordon met Zobeir at the house of Sherif Pasha, and afterwards wrote that when he saw him he felt a "mystic feeling" that he could trust him, and that he would willingly undertake the responsibility of taking him up to Khartúm.

On the 26th the council again met, and Gordon's instructions, which had been prepared at his own request, and with his fullest approval, were read over to him. Then followed a remarkable interview between Gordon and Zobeir, during which the latter displayed so much animus against Gordon that those who were present considered that it would not be desirable to allow Zobeir to go up to the Súdán. In the evening Gordon and Stewart left Cairo.

Gordon took with him two firmans appointing him GovernorGeneral of the Súdán, and two proclamations from the Khedive to the Súdánis. In one set the evacuation of the Súdán was specifically mentioned, in the other there was no allusion to it. At Gordon's request the British Government was not mentioned, and he and Stewart thus became in the eyes of the natives Englishmen in the service of the Khedive. As a consequence it was decided that they were to wear the tarbúsh, and a few days later Stewart was made a pasha. What Stewart's feelings were may well be imagined. He had the strongest objection to service under an oriental Government, and less than a year previously he had

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tives, the same horror of oppression and cruelty, the same determination to see justice done at all hazards. Gordon was hasty, impelled by his active mind and imagination to be always doing something, quick of temper, prone to take offence at any fancied slight, open to the verge of indiscretion, a man who sought guidance from above, and earnestly tried to follow, in great matters and small, what he believed to be the path indicated by the Almighty in answer to his prayers. "This is my strength," he writes from Khartúm, "because I am a born idiot God will work by me.' Stewart, on the other hand, was calm, with an evenly balanced mind capable of seeing the true proportion of things, not easily stirred to wrath, discreet without undue reticence, methodical yet quick. He believed others to be as honest and straightforward as himself,1 considered his religious opinions as a matter that did not concern the public, and had none of the crusading or missionary spirit of his chief. He was rather animated by love of country, and a desire for distinction. "If," he once said, "I could make myself a name by doing something that would be of service to my country, I should die happy."

On one point, the relations of Gordon to the Government, they differed widely in their views; and, though in none of Stewart's letters is there a single disloyal word, it is easy to see that, on several occasions, he was far from approving the line taken by his chief. When Gordon tried to bring pressure on the Government through Mr Power, the 'Times' correspondent, there was appar

ently a sharp discussion. Stewart held that an officer who had accepted a special mission from Government should on all occasions state his views openly and fearlessly, and loyally accept their decision. He was prepared to act on his own responsibility, but he did not think it right for an officer to employ the Press to force his views upon Ministers who might be guided by knowledge which he did not possess, or by motives of Imperial policy. Gordon strongly dissented from this view. In a letter written soon after the discussion he expresses his fondness of Stewart, but considers him to be deeply imbued with official reserve. He thinks that if any one sees Government taking a vicious course, he is bound to warn them, and if they will not listen, then to utilise the Press.

The

Stewart kept a journal of the progress of the mission, and wrote openly to friends and relations. The journal, as we have it, ends on the 11th March 1884. continuation, which fell into the hands of the Mahdi, is described by Gordon as a "gem." The impression produced by Stewart's correspondence, no less than by that of Gordon, is that the two men, differing as they sometimes did in regard to the policy to be pursued, thoroughly understood and appreciated each other. There were at times heated discussions, but Stewart was ever loyal in thought and deed, and Gordon had a high regard for the sterling qualities of his gifted staff-officer.

When Gordon left England, his policy was to restore the Súdán to the representatives of the petty sultans who had been dispossessed by Muhammad Ali, and he in

1 "Stewart was a man who did not chew the cud-he never thought of danger in perspective; he was not a bit suspicious (while I am made up of it)."Gordon's Journal, p. 281.

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