distance, or, more correctly, as all understood by the plain EngAdmiral Fitzgerald explains, fail- lishman. Probably it is hardly ing to double it on account of understood even now; but with both columns turning in wards one instructors like those before us it towards the other. There are two is the plain Englishman's own fault circumstances, he adds, “which if he still dwells in error. For are apt to act as traps and snares this enlightenment we are indebted to our memory and our mental perhaps in equal measure to Caparithmetic in estimating the tain Mahan and to Admiral Colomb space required for ships to turn. —to the first for showing us the One is confusion between diameter overmastering influence of seaand radius of turning circles; the power on all warfare, and to the other, confusion between cables second for explaining how this inand distances of one hundred fluence is exerted The theory has yards. Each is double the other. been briefly hinted at in considerNo doubt Tryon fell into some ing Admiral Tryon's connection such snare. The most infallible with naval

maneuvres. It is of us, as our author says, have briefly this. The

is comdone the same again and again in manded—not, as was once curiously matters with which we are per- believed, by land positions in or fectly familiar. This, the most

This, the most upon it, but—by a dominant fleet simple explanation of the tragedy, upon it. This fleet may either have is also the most plausible. All defeated and crushed its enemy or men may err so. But it is not its enemy may have recognised his given to all men to do what Tryon inferiority. In the latter case, he did for the Navy and for the coun- shuts himself up in some friendly try. In his death he lost us a port, and it is the business of the battleship. In his life he gave us commanding fleet to keep him an example and a tradition worth there. He may get out; but if a squadron.

he is watched and followed he will The three remaining books of be powerless to injure the party our five deal rather with the theory which commands the sea. Either than the practice of naval war. he must be driven to an action or We said at the beginning that it he must be driven ingloriously into is a significant phenomenon that port again. Meanwhile his enemy, five books dealing with naval possessing the sea as an occupying affairs should be published and army possesses territory, possesses read within six months. It is therewith the resources of the sea still more significant that these its commerce—and can also dethree should all be informed and liver attacks over sea at any point inspired by the same strategical desired. The application of this ideas. We find throughout the theory to our own country is simple. three of them what may now be We need a force to gain command called the authorised version of Brit- of the sea if an enemy disputes it, ish naval policy. Its fundamental to enforce it if he does not. This principles were discerned, as Sir force, therefore, must in the first George Clarke and Mr Thursfield place be superior in fighting ability repeatedly point out, by the great to any enemy that may assail us. seamen and thinkers of the Eliza. Secondly, it must be able to keep bethan

age. But only in very touch with the enemy, so that he recent times has the doctrine of may never attempt any enterprise the command of the sea been at without bringing a superior fleet


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upon his back.

So long as we of some really better qualified to have this, our trade and our coasts deal with it. Moreover, whether are secure against any but isolated he be right or wrong, he is always raids, which can never fatally hurt candid. He puts his facts before us. Our territory is secure from the reader so clearly that it is invasion unless our enemy should perfectly possible for him, if he be so mad as to plant a force on dislikes Mr Steevens's conclusions, our shores without the ability to to draw others of his own, He maintain communication with it. begins at the very beginning of And in that case invasion would the subject, and ends with a useful inevitably turn to his greater dis- catalogue of the chief navies. One advantage.

very ingenious feature of the book This view is vigorously pressed is a chapter on “RelativeStrength," from different sides by Mr Steevens, wherein the author gives a series Major Callwell, and thejoint authors of tables comparing the principal of "The Navy and the Nation.' navies in respect of various deMr Steevens's book is in essence grees in the several elements a pamphlet, devoting itself to the of force-gun-power, protection, consideration of the navies of the speed, and coal-capacity. It would world at the present moment and be easy to pick holes in the figures the policy which this country should –indeed their compiler admits that follow having respect to these. He these must needs be somewhat aris plainly the least expert of our bitrary; but the presentation is not authors, and yet, perhaps from this only exceedingly effective, but also very reason, he will probably be less misleading, because more fully the most useful. 'Naval Policy,' in explained and reasoned, than most short, as its author freely admits, of its kind. For the rest, Mr is an attempt to popularise its Steevens is an uncompromising subject, and we think that in advocate of additions to the Navy, some measure it will be success- both in ships and men, together ful. It is not at all free from with a certain limited amount of blunders. Port Darwin, to take fortification and garrison for our an example, is not in Queensland; stations abroad. At one point be while the attribution to Sir George reduces us to numb horror by the Clarke of a desire to evacuate the suggestion that we need sixtyMediterranean is especially un- seven new battleships to be fit happy in view of the fact that for war on this year's figures and he has republished in The Navy ninety by 1899. Presently, howand the Nation' an essay which ever, he relents, and lets us off severely condemns that project with fourteen. This he claims as

. It must also be said that the a moderate figure, and so, indeed, book — though perhaps for the we think it.

At any rate, the same reason that makes some of

reasoning which leads up to it is us talk nineteen to the dozen very plain, and its basis is indiwhen we are especially shy—some- cated at each step. In his final what belies its bashful preface by chapter Mr Steevens seems to a very confident tone throughout. touch the heart of the matter On the other hand, Mr Steevens when he asks, “Are we ready for writes always with ease and point, war?” The answer, of course, is sometimes with humour. He is that we are most unready. And able to make his subject interest- though at times he seems to overing, which cannot always be said state his case, it is difficult to dis


sent from his final conclusions. two struggles between Germany We are, no doubt, unready, and and Denmark for the possession this book may be of considerable of Schleswig and Holstein. In use in conveying the fact to the the war of 1848 Denmark poscitizen, on whose initiative most of sessed maritime command and the recent increases in our naval used it. The German Confederapreparations have been made. tion was prodigiously superior on

Major Callwell's rather cum- land. The Danes were decisively brously entitled book is in essence beaten at the battle of Schleswig. a continuation of Captain Mahan. But when they retired to their That eminent historian carries his islands, or to the lines of Düppel, narrative to the battle of Water- where they rested on the sea, they loo; Major Callwell takes up the were not only invulnerable, but story at that period and brings it were able to concentrate sudden down to the year before last. The attacks on the weak points of the campaigns he considers are for the enemy. The most brilliant exmost part less attractive to the ample of this was the relief of imagination than the great struggle Fredericia. A large German army which ended in 1815 ; but to the was besieging this coast - fortress. student of modern military history The Danes landed troops both they are sometimes even more in- north and south of them, and structive. The introduction of then, with the garrison, executed steam, to take only one case, has a sudden and combined attack. enormously altered the conditions The Germans lost all their siegeattaching to the transport of troops guns and 3000 men, whereon they by sea. The advance in the de- abandoned the war. In the war structiveness of weapons has mod- of 1864 the story is very different. ified these conditions almost to During the early part of the caman equal extent. Major Callwell paign the Danes made little use of takes in these and all other condi- their superiority at sea; during tions of strategy with rich know- the later the advent of Tegethoff's ledge and a thorough grasp of the Austrian squadron put that supeprinciples of his subject. The riority in doubt. Instead of using necessary historical retrospects are sea-command to deliver bold atmarked by discretion and the rare tacks at critical points, the Danes power of omitting all but the wasted it in what the modern essential. As for the principles French writers call a guerre des laid down they are now widely côtes et de course-attacking coastrecognised, and may in time attain towns and merchantmen, whose to the Nirvana of the commonplace. loss was not felt by Prussia. Their Every leader-writer can explain to firmest stands they chose to make you how the defeat of Balmaceda in positions where sea-power could during the last Chilian war was not help them; they had neglected directly traceable to the maritime the strategic points of the former power exerted by the Congression war where it could. Therefore alists. Even in wars from which they were defeated. The contrast unthinking criticism eliminates between the two wars—in one of naval influence altogether, Major which maritime command neutralCallwell has no difficulty in point- ised an enormous inferiority on ing out and estimating its weight. land; in the other of which it was The most interesting and pointed not put into effect, and then disof these is found, perhaps, in the appeared altogether—could hardly



be bettered as an example of the sion in that quarter it paralysed value of sea-power if it had been many legions whose influence might invented for the purpose.

have turned the fortune of war in On this point Major Callwell's the Crimea. In the very Francoessay finds a parallel in a similar German war, where nobody could deduction from the first Danish pretend that sea-power had much war, to be found in Mr Spenser weight — where the French fleet Wilkinson's " The Command of the only kept a German corps in the Sea. In another of his examples maritime provinces during the

-the Crimea-he unconsciously time there was not transport to doubles an interesting passage of send them to the front Mr Thursfield's from The Navy here Major Callwell still and the Nation.' These coinci- award its due influence to maridences are of interest, not as sug- time command. For if France gesting any hint of plagiarism on made little use of the supremacy one side or the other, but because in the North Sea, she enjoyed --if we may quote what the joint- that of the Mediterranean to the authors of The Navy and the full. She was able to bring over Nation’ say of themselves—“the seasoned troops from Algiers and lack of co-operation emphasises the Rome, and these played no inconessential unity of purpose which siderable part in stiffening the pervades them.”

The theory of desperate resistance which the the command of the sea has be- Germans had to break down after come, as we said above, a kind Sedan. Briefly, we may say that of authorised version. Its vital Major Callwell demonstrates with influence on the Crimean cam- cogency that naval power has expaign is well brought out by erted its influence in nearly all the both Major Callwell and Mr wars of the century, and that in Thursfield. This war, says the many of them that influence has latter, has been paradoxically been decisive. taken by some not unintelligent There is one point of controversy people “as a convincing proof that upon which this author embarks, the days of naval warfare are over. which, as it is also emphatically What did the Navy do for us, argued in The Navy and the they ask, in the Black Sea or in Nation,' will perhaps repay a short the Baltic ? It could not destroy examination. This is the doctrine Cronstadt, and it could not take of “the fleet in being.” The phrase Sebastopol.” Yet, as both authors is taken from Torrington's defence urge, it was the British and of himself after his defeat at French fleets, and they alone, Beachy Head in 1690. Adwhich made the expedition to miral Colomb has taken it up the Crimea possible at all. It and elevated it into a technical was the fleets, and they alone, term, and Mr Thursfield follows which made the reduction of Se- him. We quote his succinct statebastopol possible. Had the Sea ment of the theory which underlies of Azov been occupied earlier, the phrase: “A fleet in being, too Major Callwell acutely suggests, so large to be treated as a negligible much the earlier would the place quantity by an adversary opposed have fallen. The Baltic fleet, to it, is an absolute bar to all which has been taken as an es- serious enterprise, maritime or pecial indication of naval impo- territorial, on the part of that tence, did inestimable service. By adversary.” “ Command of the the threat of a new Allied inva- sea,” he says elsewhere, “and a

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fleet in being are mutually ex- of Torrington may be called a clusive terms." Certainly it so negative one. Tourville was deproved in Torrington's case. After terred from his purpose of invadhis defeat he withdrew his fleet, ing England, and there was an end which, though beaten, was far of it. A good case, when the fleet from being shattered, into the in being was neglected with disasmouth of the Thames. Thereon trous results, he quotes from the De Tourville, the French admiral, First Punic War. In 249 B.C. the not daring to risk any important Romans attacked the fortress of operations while this fleet still Lilybæum although the Carthathreatened him, made a wholly ginians had a fleet in being: they unimportant raid on the coast of sustained a smashing defeat, and Devonshire, and so bore away for only thirty ships were saved out France. It is true that this one of over two hundred. Another instance hardly constitutes a rule case was Napoleon's invasion of of strategy, and Major Callwell Egypt, hard on the top of which does not believe in the rule. He Nelson's fleet in being asserted itpoints out that on two occasions self at the Nile, and the expediduring the present century—the tionary army was ruined. The descent of Ibrahim Pasha on instance from the Chino-Japanese the Morea in 1825 and the in- war Mr Thursfield meets with the vasion of the Crimea—this rule reply that had Admiral Ting been was neglected. On both occasions a Nelson the Japanese invaders there was a fleet in being, yet both must have been ruined. No doubt. enterprises were carried to a suc- Only we are not all Nelsons; incessful issue. In the first case the deed, Nelsons are very rare. But Greek admiral, Miaulis, had a gen- Mr Thursfield is not really begging eral command of the sea, but he the question, though he seems to loitered inactive in the Cyclades be. He appears to us to put the while Ibrahim's transports were matter on its right footing when at sea.

In the second, the Allies he says that "a temporary evasion invaded the Crimea while the of the fleet in being is always posRussian fleet was still unbroken. sible - perhaps in some rare and The French and Turkish warships exceptional cases it may be justiwere used as transports, leaving fied... by a sound estimate of the only the British to convoy them, relative forces engaged.” And he and the Russians had in Sebasto- points out with great force that the pol a squadron equal in strength battle of the Yalu and Ting's subto the convoying force. However, sequent retreat prove that Admiral they made no move, and, in spite Ito had rightly estimated the value of the fleet in being, the landing of the Chinese fleet in being. The successfully accomplished.

accomplished. truth is that the difference beMajor Callwell adduces a third tween Major Callwell and Mr instance in the recent invasion of Thursfield is much less than it Korea by the Japanese, although appears. It is a difference rather the Chinese fleet was still un

in statement than in principle. beaten and at large.

The former takes the maxim to be Mr Thursfield, who takes the absolute and unconditioned, that a other side, is able to bring to bear fleet in being must in all cases an equal, indeed a greater, numberdebar operations while it remains of instances, in which the fleet in in being. So stated, no doubt it being has succeeded in preventing can be proved incorrect. Mr serious enterprise. The example Thursfield takes the maxim to


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