of

pursuit after truth to the folitary exertion of his own abilities. To prove this remark fhortly, it will be only neceffary to fuggeft the almost infinite number and variety of propofitions, which are received generally among the learned part mankind, and form the bulk of human science, It will thence appear to those who investigate the subject, how fhort and inefficacious would be the unaffifted powers of the most fubtile or induftrious of men.

As human science is widely diffused, it will not be improper here to lead our recollection unto fome particular inftances. Among the great number that offer themselves, one, as I conceive, not ill chofen, is the study of the natural world or what is termed Natural Philofophy, on account of the confeffed propriety of the rules and method of its procedure. I trust that in this fcience it will occur how few of the individual facts, from which the induction is made unto general truths, are fuch as fall within any one perfon's knowledge; very few indeed comparatively with the number requifite to a legitimate inference, and still much less on all the parts of that extenfive fyftem, I may even be justified in faying that in no one inftance is a single perfon's experience fufficient to this end without the concurrence, in fome degree, of that of others, Some facts in particular might be mentioned,

tioned, as being most evidently beyond difpute; being neceffarily out of the reach of the generality of men in any one age or country of the world, as they happen in a different quarter of the globe, or have taken place at a different period of time. Among such, to name no more, are observations on many appearances of the heavenly bodies. It follows therefore that most of these facts are applicable only on belief of the testimony of others, and are matters of Faith: without which, as there would not be an adequate collection of Phænomena for obfervation to proceed on, fo we may also obferve that an appeal could not be made to the fimplicity and Analogy of nature; the aid of Geometry could not be called in to any purpofe; and, in fine, this fyftem of philofophy, the boaft of modern science, which has advanced the knowledge of man to fo wonderful a height, would not have been at all established.

To go yet farther: it may perhaps be quef tioned, whether even those sciences that are denominated purely abstract and unmixed can exist without a reference to teftimony. Such are, particularly, all mathematical ftudies. Thefe are undoubtedly the fyftems, wherein the human mind, if in any, has a free scope for its exertions, and a fair title to boast of its proper and fingle acquirements. All these theories are

well

At

well known to depend on a small number of fpeculative and practical axioms, which, once admitted, the propofitions deduced from them follow with indifputable certainty. But fuch axioms, although now immediately and without any doubt received on their enunciation, I prefume to fuppofe, fuch is the weakness of our nature, that no fingle understanding could originally on its own conviction fully and inflexibly determine to be felf-evident and infallible. leaft, fince fome have been denied to be fo, and others doubted, for even these a sceptic will difpute, it is plain that a most important acceffion of confidence, fuch as fills up the measure of our certainty, arifes from the generality of their reception. And then it is obvious, that the mean of communicating this general confent is the teftimony that men bear to their own conviction, and is thus matter of Faith.

From these instances, which are defigned to exemplify the cafe of all fcience, either purely theoretical, or blended with obfervation and experience, we might proceed to the confideration of that fpecies of knowledge which Faith claims as its own peculiar province; namely, that which is contained in History of all kinds, properly fo called, or the communication of facts and opinions removed from us by the distance of space and of time. But, as it is needless to prove that

Faith is here a neceffary principle, I fhall content myself with barely mentioning this topic, nor enlarge on it at prefent.

If the preceding obfervations fhould be juft, and are duly confidered and applied, I trust that the Neceffity of Faith to the attainment of truth will fully appear, and the wide extent of our reliance on the word of others, in the queft of that information which, fingly, we are not able to obtain,

After this Neceffity, we fhall be properly led next to weigh the Reasonableness of this belief, on the ground of its intrinfic worth as a medium of knowledge, This is obviously founded on the deference due to the Veracity and the Ability of men,

On the latter of these topics, it is at first fight obvious that general incredulity may be justly charged with arrogance and obftinacy. For every confiderate and fincere man must allow that there are some who exceed others and moft probably furpafs him, in natural powers of mind, or in the general means of information, or in both. In particular branches of literature it is evident that many muft excell him; for no man is able to rife to eminence in every part of literary

may

literary purfuit. Nay farther, it is equally certain that almost all men, perhaps I fhould fay all, must be capable of inftructing him in fome one point or other. In order to fhew this fully, it be fufficient to remind him, that, in all probability, every man is born with a capacity and inclination of giving a preference to some instances of application above others, however low and trifling they may fometimes chance to be, and of a confequent proficiency in such pursuits, And in whatever manner accident may affect this natural fitnefs, may forward or impede it, in fome of these particulars it generally has an opportunity to be exerted, and to lead a man on to a confiderable degree of skill. Again, in like manner, the deftination of men by incidental circumstances to their peculiar employments in life tends to produce a fimilar confequence, though it cannot advance them to the fame degree of eminence, as when natural ability and inclination confpire with affiduous diligence. Herein therefore these know more, and may boast of imparting knowledge to men poffeffed of far fuperior intellects, and more favourable opportunities of general information. In thus briefly stating these facts, by which it appears, that the greatest philofophers must be liable to receive inftruction from the meanest among mankind, it is needlefs to dwell on the many intermediate fituations of men in refpect to their literary