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of Canaan, he not only did not spare their cities and families for the sake of their infants, nor took care that they should not be involved in the destruction; but he often repeated his express commands, that their infants should not be spared, but should be utterly destroyed, without any pity; while Rahab the harlot (who had been far from innocence, though she expressed her faith in entertaining, and safely dismissing the spies) was preserved, and all her friends for her sake. And when God executed his wrath on the Egyptians by slaying their first born-though the children of Israel, who were most of them wicked men, as was before shewn, were wonderfully spared by the destroying angel, yet-the Egyptian infants were not spared. They not only were not rescued by the angel, and no miracle wrought to save them (as was observed in the case of the infants of Sodom) but the angel destroyed them by his own immediate hand, and a miracle was wrought to kill them.

Not to be particular concerning the command by Moses, respecting the destruction of the infants of the Midianites; (Numb. xxxi. 17.) And that given to Saul to destroy all the infants of the Amalekites ; (1 Sam. xv. 3.) and what is said concerning Edom, (Psal. cxxxvii. 9.) Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones; I proceed to take notice of something remarkable concerning the destruction of Jerusalem, represented in Ezek. ix. when command was given to destroy the inhabitants, ver. 1-8. And this reason is given for it, that their iniquity required it, and it was a just recompence of their sin, (ver. 9, 10.) God, at the same time was most particular and exact in his care, that such as had proved by their behaviour, that they were not partakers in the abominations of the city, should by no means be involved in the slaughter. Command was given to the angel to go through the city, and set a mark upon their foreheads, and the destroying angel had a strict charge not to come near any man on whom was the mark; yet the infants were not marked, nor a word said of sparing them: On the contrary, infants were expressly mentioned as those that should be utterly destroyed, without pity, (ver. 5, 6.) Go through the city and smite: Let not your eye spare, neither have ye pity. Slay utterly old and YOUNG, both maids and LITTLE CHILDREN: But come not near any man upon whom is the mark.

And if any should suspect that such instances as these were peculiar to a more severe dispensation, under the Old Testament, let us consider a remarkable instance in the days of the glorious gospel of the grace of God; even the last destruction of Jerusalem. This was far more terrible, and with greater testimonies of God's wrath and indignation, than the destruction of Sodom, or of Jerusalem in Nebuchadnezzar's time, or any

thing that ever had happened to any city or people from the beginning of the world to that time. (Agreeable to Matt. xxiv. 21, and Luke xxi. 22, 23.) At that time particular care was taken to distinguish and to deliver God's people; as foretold Dan. xii. 1. And we have in the New Testament a particular account of the care Christ took for the preservation of his followers: He gave them a sign by which they might know when the desolation of the city was nigh, that they who were in Jerusalem might flee to the mountains and escape. And, as history relates, the Christians followed the directions given, and escaped to a place in the mountains called Pella, and were preserved. Yet no care was taken to preserve the infants of the city, in general; but according to the predictions of that event, they were involved with others in that great destruction. So heavily did the calamity fall upon them, that those words were verified, Luke xxiii. 29. Behold the days are coming in which they shall say, Blessed are the barren, and the womb that never bare, and the paps which never gave suck: And that prophecy in Deut. xxxii. 21-25. which has undoubtedly a special respect to this very time, and is so applied by the best commentators;-I will provoke them to jealousy, with those that are not a people: For a fire is kindled in mine anger,-and it shall burn to the lowest hell. I will heap mischiefs upon them: I will spend mine arrows upon them. They shall be burnt with hunger, and devoured with burning heat, and bitter destruction. The sword without, and terror within, shall destroy both the young man, and the virgin, the SUCKLING also, with the man of grey hairs. And by the history of that destruction it appears, that then was a remarkable fulfilment of Deut. xxviii. 53-57. concerning parents eating their children in the siege,-und the tender and delicate woman eating her new-born child. And here it must be remembered, that these very destructions of that city and land are spoken of as clear evidences of God's wrath, to all nations who shall behold them. And if so, they were evidences of God's wrath towards infants; who, equally with the rest, were the subject of the destruction. If a particular kind or rank of persons, which made a very considerable part of the inhabitants, were from time to time partakers of the overthrow, without any distinction made in divine Providence, and yet this was no evidence at all of God's displeasure with any of them; then being the subjects of such a calamity could not be an evidence of God's wrath against any of the inhabitants, to the reason of all nations, or any nation, or so much as one person.

PART II.

CONTAINING OBSERVATIONS ON PARTICULAR PARTS OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURE, WHICH PROVE THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN.

CHAPTER I.

Observations relating to Things contained in the three first Chapters of Genesis, with Reference to the Doctrine of Original Sin.

SECT. I.

Concerning Original Righteousness; and whether our first Parents were created with Righteousness, or moral Rectitude of heart?

THE doctrine of Original Righteousness, or the creation of our first parents with holy principles and dispositions, has a close connection, in several respects, with the doctrine of original sin. Dr. T. was sensible of this; and accordingly he strenuously opposes this doctrine, in his book against original sin. And therefore in handling the subject, I would in the first place, remove this author's main objection against this doctrine, and then shew how it may be inferred from the account which Moses gives us in the three first chapters of Genesis.

Dr. T.'s grand objection against this doctrine, which he abundantly insists on, is this: That it is utterly inconsistent with the nature of virtue, that it should be concreated with any person; because, if so, it must be by an act of God's absolute power, without our knowledge or concurrence; and that moral virtue, in its very nature, implieth the choice and consent of the moral agent, without which it cannot be virtue and holi

ness: That a necessary holiness is no holiness. So p. 180, where he observes, "That Adam must exist, he must be created, yea he must exercise thought and reflection, before he was righteous." (See also p. 250, 251.) In p. 161, S. he says, "To say that God not only endowed Adam with a capacity of being righteous, but moreover that righteousness and true holiness were created with him, or wrought into his nature, at the same time he was made, is to affirm a contradiction, or what is inconsistent with the very nature of righteousness." And in like manner Dr. TURNBULL in many places insists upon it, that it is necessary to the very being of virtue, that it be owing to our own choice and diligent culture.

With respect to this I would observe, that it consists in a notion of virtue quite inconsistent with the nature of things, and the common notions of mankind; and also inconsistent with Dr. T.'s own notions of virtue. Therefore, if to affirm that to be virtue or holiness, which is not the fruit of preceding thought, reflection, and choice, is to affirm a contradiction, I shall shew plainly, that for him to affirm otherwise, is a contradiction to himself.

In the first place, I think it a contradiction to the nature of things, as judged of by the common sense of mankind. It is agreeable to the sense of men, in all nations and ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but that the good choice itself from whence that effect proceeds, is so; yea, also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or affection of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, is virtuous. This is the general notion-not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but-that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed; so that the act of choosing what is good is no further virtuous, than it proceeds from a good principle, or virtuous disposition of mind. Which supposes that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice; and that, therefore, it is not necessary there should first be thought, reflection, and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before the existence of a good disposition of heart, what is the character of that choice? There can according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere self-love, ambition, or some animal appetites; therefore, a virtuous temper of mind may be before a good act of choice, as a tree may be before the fruit, and the fountain before the stream which proceeds from it.

The following things, in Mr. HUTCHESON's inquiry concerning moral good and evil, are evidently agreeable to the nature of things, and the voice of human sense and reason. (Sec II. p. 132, 133.) 66 "Every action which we apprchend

as either morally good or evil, is always supposed to FLOW FROM some affections towards sensitive natures. And whatever we call virtue or vice, is either some such affection, or some action CONSEQUENT UPON IT.-All the actions counted religious in any country, are supposed by those who count them so, to FLOW FROM Some affections towards the Deity: And whatever we call social virtue, we still suppose to FLOW FROM affections towards our fellow creatures.-Prudence, if it is only employed in promoting private interest, is never imagined to be a virtue." In these things Dr. TURNBULL expressly agrees with Mr. HUTCHESON, his admired author.*

If a virtuous disposition or affection is before its acts, then they are before those virtuous acts of choice which proceed from it. Therefore there is no necessity that all virtuous dispositions or affections should be the effect of choice: And so, no such supposed necessity can be a good objection against such a disposition being natural, or from a kind of instinct, implanted in the mind in its creation. Agreeably to this Mr. HUTCHESON says, (Ibid. sect. III. p. 196, 197.) "1 know not for what reason some will not allow that to be virtue, which flows from instinct or passions. But how do they help themselves? They say, virtue arises from reason. What is reason, but the sagacity we have in prosecuting any end? The ultimate end proposed by common moralists, is the happiness of the agent himself. And this certainly he is determi ned to pursue from instinct. Now may not another instinct towards the public, or the good of others, be as proper a principle of virtue as the instinct towards private happiness? If it be said, that actions from instinct are not the effect of prudence and choice, this objection will hold full as strongly against the actions which flow from self-love."

And if we consider what Dr. T. declares, as his own notion of the essence of virtue, and which he so confidently and often affirms, that it should follow choice, and proceed from it, we shall find it is no less repugnant to that sentiment, than it is to the nature of things and the general notions of mankind. For it is his notion, as well as Mr. HUTCHESON's, that the essence of virtue lies in good affection, and particularly in benevolence or love: As he very fully declares in these words in his Key,t" That the word that signifies goodness and mercy should also signify moral rectitude in general, will not seem strange, if we consider that love is the fulfilling of the law. Goodness, according to the sense of scripture, and the nature of things, includes all moral rectitude; which, I reckon, may every part of it, where it is true and genuine, be resolved into

* Mor. Phil. p. 112–115. p. 142. et alibi passim. † Marginal Note annexed

10 & 358.

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