not with the former good for

tune.

The lofs of two fuch places as Schweidnitz and Colberg, at the two extremities of his dominions, were decifive against the king of Pruffia. It was now impoffible for him to make any movement by which the enemy could not profit to his almoft certain deftruction. To form fieges with an army like his, inferior in the field, was impoffible. The Ruffians, by poffeffing Colberg, poffeffed every thing. They were mafters of the Baltick; and they now acquired a port, by which their armies could be well provided, without the neceffity of tedious, uncertain, and expenfive convoys from Poland. The road lay almoft open into the heart of Brandenburg. Stetin alone stood in their way; but it was obvious that nothing but the advanced season could fave Stetin from the fate of Colberg. The Muscovites, now for the first time, took up their winter quarters in Pomerania.

It is remarkable, that this whole year paft without a regular battle between the king of Pruffia and any of his enemies, yet none of the most

unfortunate of his campaigns had been fo ruinous to him. He had fuffered four terrible defeats, without having ballanced them with á fingle advantage of confequence in the campaign of 1759. Yet in these circumstances it is almoft incredible how little he really loft. He was able to take the field again the enfuing year in a very respectable manner, and to make head against his enemies. In that year he loft a whole army near Landshut; ftill he was far from broken. Afterwards in that fame campaign, he gave his enemies two fignal defeats, and ended his operations advantageoufly, and with great glory. But in the year, of which we now write without fuffering any confiderable blow in the field, without any ftriking efforts on any fide, his power has gradually crumbled away. The moft calamitous defeats could not fink him lower. And in the fituation in which he stood after the taking of Colberg, we may fafely fay, that there was scarcely a poffibility that he could be preferved from deftructtion by any thing that lay within the reach of human endeavours.

A

FTER having been fo long detained on the theatre of war, it is time we should return to take a view of the negotiation for putting an end to the miferies it occafioned. In reality the view, even of this fcene, was very gloomy and unpromising. The confidence and good humour of the two courts

being fubverted, all that followed was rather an altercation than a treaty. It is true, that papers past backward and forward; and the pretenfions of each party, the points they agreed to cede, and those which they were determined to adhere to, grew more diftinct and explicit. But all that cordiality was [D]3 vanished

vanished, which is fo neceffary towards fmoothing and clearing a road, which a long hoftility had broken up, and fo many intricate topics had contributed to embarrass. Without involving ourfelves in the detail of the feveral momorials which were delivered in, and with out referring numerically to the feveral articles it will be fufficient that we briefly ftate thofe points which were, or feemed to be, in a fair way of adjustment between England and France; and afterwards thofe on which it should appear that the negotiation broke off. After fome difcuffions concerning its proper limits, it was agreed, that all Canada should be ceded to the English. This ceffion comprehended, on one fide, all the iflands and countries adjoining to the gulph of St. Lawrence. On the other, it took in all the great lakes, and the whole course of the Ohio, to its difcharge into the Miffifippi. A territory fufficient for the bafis of a great empire

In drawing this line of divifion, another question arofe concerning the bounds of Loufiana; and the ftate of the intermediate Indian nations between the lakes and the Miffifippi, who inhabit, or are rather fcattered over an immenfe country, that lies along the back of our colonies all the way from Penfylvania to Georgia. It was therefore very proper that something definitive fhould be fettled on this article, as it might otherwife eafily be made productive of a new war. England propofed, that all thofe nations fhould continue, as the contended they had heretofore been, under the protection of Great Britain, without faying any thing precife as to the dominion of the foil.

France controverted this propofition: fhe on her part proposed to divide these nations; that those to the northward of the line drawn to ascertain the limits of Canada should be independent, under the protection of England, but that those who were to the fouthward, fhould enjoy the fame independence, under the protection of France. Nothing was perfectly fettled in relation to this point; but it does not feem as if there could have been any material difagreement upon it, had the other matters in debate, been adjusted to their mutual fatisfaction.

The African conteft feemed to have been attended with ftill lefs difficulty. The French consented to give up both Senegal and Goree, provided Anamaboo and Acra were guarantied to them.

The momentous question of the fishery was likewise determined. The French gave up their claim to Cape Breton and St. John's, and were fatified to receive the little ifland of St. Pierre, on the coaft of Newfoundland; but even this they were to receive on conditions fuffi ciently humiliating. They were to erect no fort of fortification, nor to keep up any military establishment there. An English commiffary was to refide on the island, in order to fee that these ftipulations were adhered to. As to the reft, the French were to have the fame privileges on the coaft of Newfoundland, checked with the fame restrictions, which before the war they had enjoyed under the 15th article of the treaty of Utrecht. In conformity to another article of that treaty, and in compenfation for the privilege of the fishery, they confented that Dunkirk bould be demolished.

Con

Concerning the island of Guada loupe, Marigalante, Minorca, and Belleifle, no great controverfy had fubfifted from the beginning. It had all along been agreed, that thefe conquefts fhould be reciprocally restored. Neither did the French fcruple to adopt our propofal concerning the affairs of the Eaft Indies, nor to make fatisfactory declarations concerning Oftend and Neuport.

So many delicate and interefting points were fettled, that it does not at first appear what it was that could have retarded the peace. A difcuffion of the feparate interests of two powers only that are in earneft to agree, may be fettled without any very confiderable difficulty. The hard and almoft inextri cable part of the knot, is that wherin the croís concerns and interests of allies intervene. There were two points upon which, if we may form a judgment from appearances, this negotiation unfortunately broke off. The first was upon the manner in which England and France might be at liberty to affift their refpective allies; and on the reftitution of Wefel, Gueldres, and fuch other places, as the French had conquered from his Pruffian majesty.

On the first member of this principal point, the repeated proposals of France for a neutrality in Germany had been unifo mly and pofitively rejected by our adminiftration. They confidered therefore as fo many attacks upon national integri. ty. This fcheme therofore not being admitted, they would or could come to no agreement, and scarcely to an intelligible explanation either of the mode or the quantity of the affistance which they fhould be at li

berty mutually to impart to their German allies, or of the place. în which fuch fuccours should be employed. As to Wefel and Gueldres, { the French obftinately refused to restore thofe places. They des: clared that fuch a ceffion would be directly against the faith by which they were bound to the em prefs queen of Hungary, for whom they infifted that thefe places had been conquered, and in whose name alone they were governed, thought they had been reduced by the French arms, and were at that moment held by French garrifons.

As to the fecond point, namely, the reftitution of the captures made previous to the declaration of war, the negotiating powers were equally pofitive, the one to demand, the other to refufe it. The English argued, that this claim had no fort of foundation in the law of nations, neither was it grounded on any particular convention. That the right of all hoftile operations refults, not from a formal declaration of war, but from the hoftilities, which the aggreffor has firft offered; that the contrary of this propofition is at leaft extremely conteftible; and fince it can by no means be clearly established, it follows, that the de tainment of those captures must be confidered, on the fide of England, as part of the uti poffidetis, originally propofed as the basis of this treaty.

France, on the other hand, feemed as fully convinced of the justice of her pretenfions, and the deemed the arguments with which the fupported them to be fo unanswerable, that the offered to fubmit them to the justice of the English tribunals. They urged that this claim of reftitution was founded on the law of [D] 4 nations,

nations, and upon particular convention; on particular convention; by the 19th article of the peace of Utrecht; and by the fecond article of the treaty of commerce; and that this was ftrength ened by the 3d article of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, which renews and confirms thofe articles in the preceding treaties.

By thefe articles a protection is allowed to the refpective fubjects who may have ships in the ports of either of the powers, because having no opportunity of knowing that a rupture is fallen out, they failed under the fecurity of peace, and under the faith of treaties. By a parity of reafoning, the fhips not actually in thofe ports ought to enjoy the fame fecurity; elfe, as they are included in the fame parity of circumftances, it would follow, contrary to the principles of humanity and right reafon, that the fovereigns had provided for the prefervation of one part of their fubjects from the miseries of a fudden rupture, to which they expofe the reft. The particular conventions of thefe treaties, they faid, had their foundation in general equity, and the law of nations; fince, as it is impracticable for belligerent ftates to agree amongst themfelves which is the aggreffor, it is proper that the fubjects fhould receive previous notice of the rupture, in order that they may be able diftinctly to know when they are, or are not in fecurity, or when they may, or may not rely on the treaties which fub fift between their fovereigns.

These topics were, as ufual, bandied to and fro with great heat and little effect; and as in fuch difcuffiens the arguments on both fides are plaufible, and there can be no

authorised judge, the weight of the feveral pretenfions commonly depends upon the power of the parties to enforce them. On these two points therefore, the renunciation of German alliances, and the reftitution of captures, the negotiation from the beginning was at a ftand; and on thefe, at length, to all appearance, it finally broke off.

Not but we are fully fatisfied that the difagreement even on thefe points might have been only the often fible cause of the rupture. The true caufe of the breach feems to have been the unfeasonable interpofition of the Spanish claims. For could France be fuppofed in good carneft to defire peace, that is, to defire fuch a reasonable peace as her circumftances might demand, when the officiously mingled with our particular debate, the affairs of a foreign and neutral power, which had not the fmalleft connection with thofe that were at this time properly under deliberation. It was ridiculous to urge, that this was done from a prudent forefight, and to prevent a future war, which these difputes might poffibly occafion. The bufinefs was to put an end to the war, which then actually subfifted; and nothing could be farther from affifting this defign than to increafe the fubjects of debate. France must be fenfible of the weight of this argument, who herself propofed in the very beginning of this treaty, as a means almost neceffary for carrying it on with effect, that their particular difpute should be feparated from those of their German allies, with which it certainly had a more natural connection thane with thofe that fubfifted between England and Spain: as all the former parties were then engaged di

rectly

rectly or indirectly in the war, to which Spain had then no manner of relation.

The English miniftry finding the French immoveable on the two capital points above mentioned, and having no opinion of the fincerity of their procedure, fent directions to Mr. Stanley to return to England, and to defire that M.Buffy fhould, on the part of his court, re. 20th Sept. ceive the fame orders. An end was thus put to this negotiation, (from which Europe had conceived fuch fanguine hopes of the alleviation of her miferies) after it had continued near fix months. So far indeed was it from producing the happy effects that were propofed from it, fo far was it from appeafing the animofities of the powers originally engaged, or from ex. tinguishing the old war, that the par

ties feparated with intentions more hoftile, and opinions more adverse than ever; and the war was foon fpread to a much greater extent by the taking in of a new party, and may poffibly fpread, ftill more widely, by laying open new fources of contention which may gradually draw in other powers, and finally involve every part of Europe. It was also a means of producing changes in England, which at a time of lefs tranquility, and in circumftances of lefs internal ftrength, might have been productive of the moft fatal confequences. But these matters are referved for the subject of the enfuing chapter.

The leading negotiation in London and Paris being thus broken off, that which was propofed at Augsburg never took place.

in London, from whom no fort of intimation had been previously received of fuch a defign.

That propofal not only marked out a want of fincerity on the part of France, but it manifefted fo ftrange and irregular a partiality on the part of Spain, that it would very little have become the dignity of the king of Great Britain, or his attention to the fafety of his fubjects, to let it pafs without a full and fatisfactary explanation. Accordingly the Spanish ambaffador was called upon to difavow this irregular procedure; but he returned