certainly improve us not a little in the moft valuable part of all philofophy, the philofophy of human nature. For fuch difquifitions are very intimately connected with the knowledge of ourfelves. They neceffarily lead us to reflect on the operations of the ima-i gination, and the movements of the heart; and increase our acquaintance with fome of the moft refined feelings which belong to our frame.

Logical and ethical difquifitions move in a higher fphere; and are converfant with objects of a more fevere kind; the progrefs of the understanding in its search after knowledge, and the direction of the will in the proper pursuit of good. They point out to man the improvements of his nature as an intelligent being; and his duties as the fubject of moral obligation. Belles lettres and criticifm chiefly confider him as a being endowed with those powers of taste and imagination, which were intended to embellish his mind, and to fupply him with rational and useful entertainment. They open a field of investigation peculiar to themselves. All that relates to beauty, harmony, grandeur, and elegance; all that can footh the mind, gratify the fancy, or move the affections, belongs to their province. They prefent human nature under a different afpect from that which it affumes when viewed by other sciences. They bring to light various springs of action, which, without their aid, might have paffed unobserved; and which, though of a delicate nature, frequently exert a powerful influence on feveral departments of human life.

Such ftudies have alfo this peculiar advantage, that they exercise our reafon without fatiguing it. They lead to enquiries acute, but not painful; profound, but not dry nor abftrufe. They ftrew flowers in the path of fcience; and while they keep the mind bent, in fome degree, and active, they relieve it at the fame time from that more toilfome labour Vol. I.

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to which it muft fubmit in the acquifition of neceffary erudition, or the investigation of abstract truth. ·

The cultivation of tafte is farther recommended by the happy effects which it naturally tends to produce on human life. The most busy man, in the most active sphere, cannot be always occupied by business. Men of ferious profeffions cannot always be on the ftretch of ferious thought. Neither can the most gay and flourishing fituations of fortune afford any man the power of filling all his hours with pleasure. Life must always languish in the hands of the idle. It will frequently languish even in the hands of the bufy, if they have not fome employment fubfidiary to that which forms their main purfuit. How then shall these vacant spaces, thofe unemployed intervals, which, more or lefs, occur in the life of every one, be filled up? How can we contrive to difpofe of them in any way that shall be more agreeable in itself, or more confonant to the dignity of the human mind, than in the entertainments of tafte, and the ftudy of polite literature? He who is fo happy as to have acquired a relifh for thefe, has always at hand an innocent and irreproachable amusement for his leifure hours, to fave him from the danger of many a pernicious paffion. He is not in hazard of being a burden to himself. He is not obliged to fly to low company, or to court the riot of loofe pleafures, in order to cure the tedioufnefs of exiftence.

Providence feems plainly to have pointed out this ufeful purpose to which the pleasures of taste may be applied, by interpofing them in a middle station between the pleafures of fenfe, and thofe of pure intellect. We were not defigned to grovel always among objects fo low as the former; nor are we capable of dwelling conftantly in fo high a region as the latter. The pleafures of tafte refresh the mind after the toils of the intellect, and the labours of abftract study; and they gradually raise it above the

attachments of fenfe, and prepare it for the enjoyments of virtue.

So confonant is this to experience, that, in the education of youth, no object has in every age appeared more important to wife men, than to tincture them early with a relifh for the entertainments of tafte. The tranfition is commonly made with ease from these to the discharge of the higher and more important duties of life. Good hopes may be entertained of those whofe minds have this liberal and elegant turn. It is favourable to many virtues.. Whereas, to be entirely devoid of relifh for eloquence, poetry, or any of the fine arts, is juftly conftrued to be an unpromifing fymptom of youth; and raises fufpicions of their being prone to low gratifications, or destined to drudge in the more vulgar and illiberal pursuits of life.

There are indeed few good difpofitions of any kind with which the improvement of tafte is not more or lefs connected. A cultivated tafte increases fenfibility to all the tender and humane paffions, by giving them frequent exercife; while it tends to weaken the more violent and fierce emotions.. Ingenuas didiciffe fideliter artes Emollit mores, nec finit efle feros.*

The elevated fentiments and high examples which poetry, eloquence and history are often bringing under our view, naturally tend to nourish in our minds public fpirit, the love of glory, contempt of external fortune, and the admiration of what is truly illuftrious and great.

I will not go fo far as to fay that the improvement of taste and of virtue is the fame; or that they may always be expected to co-exist in an equal degree.. More powerful correctives than tafte can apply, are

These polish'd arts have humaniz'd mankind,

Soften'd the rude, and calm'd the boift'rous mind..

neceffary for reforming the corrupt propensities which too frequently prevail among mankind. Elegant fpeculations are fometimes found to float on the furface of the mind, while bad paffions poffefs the interior regions of the heart. At the fame time, this cannot but be admitted, that the exercife of taste is, in its native tendency, moral and purifying. From reading the most admired productions of genius, whether in poetry or prose, almost every one rifes with fome good impreffions left on his mind; and though these may not always be durable, they are at least to be ranked among the means of difpofing the heart to virtue. One thing is certain, and I fhall hereafter have occafion to illuftrate it more fully, that, without poffeffing the virtuous affections in a ftrong degree, no man can attain eminence in the fublime parts of eloquence. He muft feel what a good man feels, if he expects greatly to move or to intereft mankind. They are the ardent fentiments of honour, virtue, magnanimity, and public spirit, that only can kindle that fire of genius, and call up into the mind thofe high ideas, which attract the admiration of ages and if this fpirit be neceffary to produce the most distinguished efforts of eloquence, it must be neceffary alfo to our relishing them with proper taste and feeling.

On thefe general topics I fhall dwell no longer; but proceed directly to the confideration of the fubjects which are to employ the following Lectures. They divide themselves into five parts. First, fome introductory differtations on the nature of taste, and upon the fources of its pleasures. Secondly, the confideration of language: Thirdly, of ftyle: Fourthly, of eloquence, properly fo called, or public speaking in its different kinds. Laftly, a critical examination of the moft diftinguifhed fpecies of compofition, both in profe and verfe.

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LECTURE II.

TASTE.

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HE nature of the prefent undertaking leads me to begin with fome enquiries concerning taste, as it is this faculty which is always appealed to, in difquifitions concerning the merit of difcourfe and writing.

There are few fubjects on which men talk more loofely and indiftinctly than on tafte; few, which it is more difficult to explain with precifion; and none, which in this course of lectures will appear more dry or abstract. What I have to fay on the fubject, fhall be in the following order. I fhall first explain the nature of taste, as a power or faculty in the human mind. I fhall next confider, how far it is an improveable faculty. I fhall fhow the fources of its improvement, and the characters of taste, in its most perfect state. I fhall then examine the various fluctuations to which it is liable, and enquire whether there be any ftandard, to which we can bring the different tastes of men, in order to distinguifh the corrupted from the true.

Taste may be defined, "The power of receiving "pleasure from the beauties of nature and of art."