. The first question that occurs, concerning it, is, whether it is to be confidered as an internal fenfe, or as an exertion of reafon? Reafon is a very general term; but if we understand by it, that power of the mind which in fpeculative matters difcovers truth, and in practical matters judges of the fitness of means to an end, I apprehend the question may be eafily anfwered. For nothing can be more clear, than that tafte is not refolvable into any fuch operation of reafon. It is not merely through a difcovery of the understanding, or a deduction of argument, that the mind receives pleasure from a beautiful prospect or a fine poem. Such objects often strike us intuitively, and make a strong impreffion, when we are unable to affign the reasons of our being pleased. They fometimes ftrike in the fame manner the philofopher and the peafant-the boy and the man. Hence the faculty, by which we relish fuch beauties, feems more nearly allied to a feeling of fenfe, than to a procefs of the understanding and accordingly, from an external fenfe it has borrowed its name; that fenfe by which we receive and diftinguish the pleasures of food, having, in feveral languages, given rife to the word taste, in the metaphorical meaning under which we now confider it. However, as, in all fubjects which regard the operations of the mind, the inaccurate ufe of words is to be carefully avoided, it must not be inferred from what I have faid, that reafon is entirely excluded from the exertions of taste. Though tafte, beyond doubt, be ultimately founded on a certain natural and instinctive fenfibility to beauty, yet reason, as I fhall fhow hereafter, affists taste in many of its operations, and ferves to enlarge its power*, : * See dr. Gerard's Eflay on Tafte-D'Alembert's Reflexions on the Ufe and Abufe of Philofophy in matters which relate to Tafte-Reflexions Critiques fur la Poefie et fur la Peinture, tome ii. ch. 22-31-Elements of Criticifm, chap. 25-Mr. Tafte, in the sense in which I have explained it, is a faculty common in fome degree to all men. No-: thing, that belongs to human nature, is more general than the relish of beauty of one kind or other-of what is orderly, proportioned, grand, harmonious, new, or fprightly. In children, the rudiments of taste discover themselves very early in a thousand inftances; in their fondness for regular bodies, their admiration of pictures and ftatues, and imitations of all kinds; and their strong attachment to whatever is new or marvellous. The most ignorant peafants are delighted with ballads and tales, and are ftruck with the beautiful appearances of nature, in the carth and heavens. Even in the deferts of America, where human nature fhows itfelf in its moft uncultivated ftate, the favages have their ornaments of drefs, their war and their death fongs, their harangues, and their orators. We muft, therefore, conclude the principles of tafte to be deeply founded in the human mind. It is no lefs effential to man, to have fome difcernment of beauty, than it is to poffefs the attributes of reafon and of fpeech*. Hume's Eflay on the Standard of Tafte-Introduction to the Efy on the Sublime and Beautiful. * On the fubject of taste, confidered as a power or faculty of the mind, much lefs is to be found among the ancient, than among the modern rhetorical and critical writers. The following remarkable paffage in Cicero ferves however to show, that his ideas on this fubject agree perfectly with what has been faid above. He is fpeaking of the beauties of ftyle and numbers. "Illud autem nequis admiretur quonam modo hæc vulgus im"peritorum in audiendo, notet; cum in omni genere, tum in "hoc ipfo, magna quædam eft vis, incredibilifque naturæ. Om. "nes enim tacito quodam fenfu, fine ulla arte aut ratione, quæ "fint in artibus de rationibus recta et prava dijudicant: idque "cum faciunt in picturis, et in fignis, et in aliis operibus, ad "quorum intelligentiam a natura minus habent inftrumenti, "tum multo oftendunt magis in verborum, numerorum, vocumque judicio; quod ea funt in communibus infixa fenfibus ; neque earum rerum quenquam funditus natura voluit esse But although none be wholly devoid of this faculty, yet the degrees in which it is poffeffed are widely different. In fome men only the feeble glimmerings of taste appear; the beauties which they relish, are of the coarsest kind; and of these they have but a weak and confufed impreffion: while in others, taste rises to an acute difcernment, and a lively enjoyment of the most refined beauties. In general, we may obferve, that in the powers and pleasures of tafte, there is a more remarkable inequality among men, than is ufually found, in point of common fenfe, reafon, and judgment. The conftitution of our nature in this, as in all other refpects, difcovers admirable wifdom. In the diftribution of thofe talents which are neceffary for man's well-being, nature hath made lefs diftinction among her children. But in the diftribution of thofe which belong only to the ornamental part of life, she hath bestowed her favours with more frugality. She hath both fown the feeds more sparingly; and rendered a higher culture requifite, for bringing them to perfection. This inequality of taste among men, is owing, without doubt, in part, to the different frame of their natures-to nicer organs, and finer internal powers, with which fome are endowed beyond others. But, if it be owing in part to nature, it is owing to education and culture ftill more. The illuftration of this leads to my next remark on this "expertem." Cic. de Orat. lib. iii. cap. 50. edit. Gruteri.Quinctilian feems to include tafte (for which, in the fenfe which we now give to that word, the ancients appear to have had no diftinct name) under what he calls judicium. "Locus de judi"cio, mea quidem opinione adeo partibus hujus operis omni"bus connectus ac miftus eft, ut ne a fentontiis quidem aut verbis faltem fingulis poffit feparari, nec magis arte traditur "quam guftus aut odor. Ut contraria vitemus et communia, ne "quid in eloquendo corruptum obfcurumque fit, referatur "oportet ad fenfus qui non docentur." Inftitut. lib. vi. cap. 3. edit. Obrechti. fubject, that tafte is a most improvable faculty, if there be any fuch in human nature; a remark which gives great encouragement to fuch a courfe of ftudy: as we are now propofing to purfue, Of the truth of this affertion we may easily be convinced, by only reflecting on that immenfe fuperiority which education and improvement give to civilized, above barbarous nations, in refinement of taste; and on the fuperiority which they give in the fame nation, to those who have ftudied the liberal arts, above the rude and untaught vulgar. The difference is fo great that there is perhaps no one particular, in which thefe two claffes of men are fo far removed from each other, as in refpect of the powers and the pleafures of tafte: and affuredly for this difference no other general caufe can be affigned, but culture and education. I fhall now proceed to fhow what the means are, by which taste becomes fo remarkably fufceptible of cultivation and progress. Reflect, firft, upon that great law of our nature, that exercise is the chief fource of improvement in all our faculties. This holds both in our bodily, and in our mental powers. It holds even in our external fenfes, although these be less the fubject of cultivation, than any of our other faculties. We fee how acute the fenfes become, in persons whofe trade or bu→ finefs leads to nice exertions of them. Touch, for inftance, becomes infinitely more exquifite in men whofe employment requires them to examine the polifh of bodies, than it is in others. They who deal in microfcopical obfervations, or are accustomed to engrave on precious ftones, acquire furprising accuracy of fight, in difcerning the minuteft objects: and practice, in attending to different flavours and taftes of liquors, wonderfully improves the power of diftinguishing them, and of tracing their compofition. Placing internal tafte, therefore, on the footing of a fimple fenfe, it cannot be doubted, that frequent ex-Vol. I. D ercife, and curious attention to its proper objects muft greatly heighten its power. Of this we have one clear proof in that part of tafte, which is called an ear for mufic. Experience every day shows, that nothing is more improvable. Only the fimpleft and plaineft compofitions are relifhed at firft; ufe and practice extend our pleasure; teach us to relish finer melody; and by degrees enable us to enter into the intricate and compounded pleasures of harmony. So an eye for the beauties of painting is never all at once acquired. It is gradually formed by being converfant among pictures, and studying the works of the best masters. Precifely in the fame manner, with respect to the beauty of compofition and discourse, attention to the most approved models, ftudy of the best authors, comparisons of lower and higher degrees of the fame beauties, operate towards the refinement of tafte. When one is only beginning his acquaintance with works of genius, the fentiment which attends them is obfcure and confufed. He cannot point out the feveral excellencies or blemishes of a performance which he perufes; he is at a lofs on what to reft his judgment; all that can be expected is, that he fhould tell in general whether he be pleafed or not. But allow him more experience in works of this kind, and his tafte becomes by degrees more exact and enlightened. He begins to perceive not only the character of the whole, but the beauties and defects of each part; and is able to defcribe the peculiar qualities which he praises or blames. The mist is diffipated, which feemed formerly to hang over the object; and he can at length pronounce firmly, and without hesitation, concerning it. Thus in taste, confidered as mere fenfibility, exercife opens a great fource of improvement. But although tafte be ultimately founded on fenfibility, it must not be confidered as inftinctive fenfibility alone. Reafon and good fenfe, as I before |