good; a pofition, which, though it may pafs unnoticed in flight matters, and when we fpeak of the leffer differences among the taftes of men, yet when we apply it to the extremes, prefently shows its abfurdity. For is there any one who will ferioufly maintain that the taste of a Hottentot or a Laplander is as delicate and as correct as that of a Longinus or an Addifon? or, that he can be charged with no defect or incapacity who thinks a common news-writer as excellent an hiftorian as Tacitus? As it would be held downright extravagance to talk in this manner, we are led unavoidably to this conclufion, that there is fome foundation for the preference of one man's tafte to that of another; or, that there is a good and a bad, a right and a wrong in tafte, as in other things.

But to prevent mistakes on this fubject, it is neceffary to obferve, next, that the diverfity of taftes which prevails among mankind, does not in every cafe infer corruption of taste, or oblige us to feek for fome ftandard in order to determine who are in the right. The taftes of men may differ very confiderably as to their object, and yet none of them be wrong. One man relishes poetry moft; another takes pleafurc in nothing but hiftory. One prefers comedy; another, tragedy. One admires the fimple; another, the ornamented ftyle. The young are amused with gay and sprightly compofitions. The elderly are more entertained with thofe of a graver caft. Some nations delight in bold pictures of manners, and ftrong reprefentations of paffion. Others incline to more correct and regular elegance both in dcfcription and fentiment. Though all differ, yet all pitch upon fome one beauty which peculiarly fuits their turn of mind; and therefore no one has a title to condemn the reft. It is not in matters of taste, as in queftions of mere reafon, where there is but one conclufion that can be true, and all the

reft are erroneous. Truth, which is the object of reafon, is one; beauty, which is the object of tafte, is manifold. Tafte therefore admits of latitude and diversity of objects, in fufficient confiftency with goodness or juftnefs of tafte.

But then, to explain this matter thoroughly, I muft obferve farther, that this admiffible diversity of taftes can only have place where the objects of taste are different. Where it is with refpect to the fame object that men difagree, when one condemns that as ugly, which another admires as highly beautiful; then it is no longer diversity, but direct oppofition of taste that takes place; and therefore one must be in the right and another in the wrong, unless that abfurd paradox were allowed to hold, that all taftes are equally good and true. One man prefers Virgil to Homer. Suppofe that I, on the other hand, admire Homer more than Virgil. I have as yet no reafon to fay that our taftes are contradictory. The other person is most struck with the elegance and tenderness which are the characteristics of Virgil; I, with the fimplicity and fire of Homer. As long as neither of us deny that both Homer and Virgil have great beauties, our difference falls within the compass of that diversity of taftes, which I have fhowed to be natural and allowable. But if the other man fhall affert that Homer has no beauties whatever; that he holds him to be a dull and spiritlefs writer, and that he would as foon perufe any old legend of knight-errantry as the Iliad; then I exclaim, that my antagonist either is void of all taste, or that his tafte is corrupted in a miferable degree; and I appeal to whatever I think the standard of tafte, to show him that he is in the wrong.

What that standard is, to which, in fuch oppofition of tastes, we are obliged to have recourse, remains to be traced. A ftandard properly fignifies, that which is of fuch undoubted authority as to be Vol. I.

E

the test of other things of the fame kind. Thus a Aftandard weight or meafure, is that which is appointed by law to regulate all other meafures and weights. Thus the court is faid to be the ftandard of good breeding; and the fcripture, of theological truth.

When we say that nature is the standard of tafte, we lay down a principle very true and juft, as far as it can be applied. There is no doubt, that in all. cafes where an imitation is intended of fome object that exists in nature, as in reprefenting human characters or actions, conformity to nature affords a full and diftinct criterion of what is truly beautiful. Reason hath in fuch cafes full fcope for exerting its authority, for approving or condemning; by comparing the copy with the original. But there are innumerable cafes in which this rule cannot be at all applied; and conformity to nature, is an expreffion frequently used, without any diftinct or determinate meaning. We must therefore fearch for fomewhat that can be rendered more clear and precife, to be the ftandard of tafte.

Tafte, as I before explained it, is ultimately founded on an internal fenfe of beauty, which is natural to men, and which, in its application to particular objects, is capable of being guided and enlightened by reafon. Now, were there any one perfon who poffeffed in full perfection all the powers of human nature, whofe internal fenfes were in every inftance exquifite and juft, and whofe reafon was unerring and fure, the determinations of fuch a perfon concerning beauty, would, beyond doubt, be a perfect ftandard for the taste of all others. Wherever their tafte differed from his, it could be imputed only to fome imperfection in their natural powers. But as there is no fuch living standard, no one perfon to whom all mankind will allow fuch fubmiffion to be due, what is there of fufficient authority to be the

standard of the various and oppofite taftes of men? Most certainly there is nothing but the taste, as far as it can be gathered, of human nature. That which men concur the most in admiring, must be held to be beautiful. His tafte must be esteemed juft and true, which coincides with the general fentiments of men. In this ftandard we must reft. To the fenfe of mankind the ultimate appeal muft ever lie, in all works of tafte. If any one fhould maintain that fugar was bitter and tobacco was fweet, no reafonings could avail to prove it. The tafte of fuch a person would infallibly be held to be difeafed, merely because it differed fo widely from the tafte of the fpecies to which he belongs. In like manner, with regard to the objects of fentiment or internal tafte, the common feelings of men carry the fame authority, and have a title to regulate the tafte of every individual.

But have we then, it will be faid, no other crite-rion of what is beautiful, than the approbation of the majority? Muft we collect the voices of others, before we form any judgment for ourselves, of what deferves applaufe in eloquence or poetry? By no means; there are principles of reafon and found judgment which can be applied to matters of taste as well as to the fubjects of fcience and philofophy. He who admires or cenfures any work of genius, is always ready, if his tafte be in any degree improved, to affign fome reafons of his decifion. He appeals to principles, and points out the grounds on which he proceeds. Tafte is a fort of compound power, in which the light of the understanding always mingles, more or lefs, with the feelings of fentiment.

But, though reafon can carry us a certain length in judging concerning works of tafte, it is not to be forgotten that the ultimate conclufions to which our reafonings lead, refer at last to sense and perception. We may fpeculate and argue concerning pro

priety of conduct in a tragedy, or an epic poem. Juft reafonings on the fubject will correct the caprice of unenlightened taste, and establish principles for judging of what deferves praise. But, at the fame tims, these reasonings appeal always, in the last refort, to feeling. The foundation upon which they rest, is what has been found from experience to please mankind univerfally. Upon this ground we prefer a fimple and natural, to an artificial and affected style; a regular and well-connected story, to loose and scattered narratives; a catastrophe which is tender and pathetic, to one which leaves us unmoved. It is from confulting our own imagination and heart, and from attending to the feelings of others, that any principles are formed which acquire authority in matters of tafte.

When we refer to the concurring fentiments of men, as the ultimate teft of what is to be accounted beautiful in the arts, this is to be always understood

*The difference between the authors who found the standard of tafte upon the common feelings of human nature, afcertained by general approbation, and thofe who found it upon eftablished principles, which can be afcertained by reason, is inore an apparent than a real difference. Like many other literary controve fies, it turns chiefly on modes of expression. For they who lay the greatest stress on feptiment and feeling, make no fcruple of applying argument and reafon to matters of tafte. They appeal, like other writers, to established principles, in judging of the excellencies of eloquence or poetry; and plainly fhow, that the general approbation, to which they ultimately recur, is an approbation refuking from difcuffion as well as from fentiment. They, on the other hand, who, in order to vindicate tafte from any fufpicion of being arbitrary, maintain that it is afcertainable by the standard of reafon, admit, nevertheless, that what pleafes univerfally, muft, on that account, be held to be truly beautiful, and that no rules or conclufions, concerning objects of taste, can have any juft authority, if they be found to contradict the general fentiments of men. Thefe two fyftems, therefore, differ in reality very little from one another. Sentiment and reafon enter into both; and by allow ing to each of thefe powers its due place, both fyftems may be rendered confiftent. Accordingly, it is in this light that I have endeavoured to place the fubject.