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ture we must be indebted for the production of eminent beauties.

From what has been faid, we are enabled to form a judgment concerning thofe complaints, which it has been long fashionable for petty authors to make, against critics and criticifm. Critics have been reprefented as the great abridgers of the native liberty of genius-as the impofers of unnatural fhackles and bonds upon writers, from whofe cruel perfecution they must fly to the public and implore its protection. Such fupplicatory prefaces are not calculated to give very favourable ideas of the genius of the author. For every good writer will be pleased to have his work examined by the principles of found understanding and true taste. The declamations against criticifm commonly proceed upon this fuppofition, that critics are fuch as judge by rule, not by feeling; which is fo far from being true, that they who judge after this manner are pedants, not critics. For all the rules of genuine criticifm I have fhown to be ultimately founded on feeling; and tafte and feeling are neceffary to guide us in the application of thefe rules to every particular inftance. As there is nothing in which all forts of perfons more readily affect to be judges, than in works of tafte, there is no doubt, that the number of incompetent critics will always be great. But this affords no more foundation for a general invective against criticifin, than the number of bad philofophers or reafoners affords against reafon and philofophy.

An objection more plaufible may be formed againft criticifm,from the applaufe that fome perform. ances have received from the public, which, when accurately confidered, are found to contradict the rules eftablished by criticism. Now, according to the principles laid down in the laft lecture, the public is the fupreme judge to whom the laft ap

peal must be made in every work of tafte; as the ftandard of tafte is founded on the fentiments that are natural and common to all men.' But with refpect to this, we are to obferve, that the fenfe of the public is often too haftily judged of. The genuine public tafte does not always appear in the first applaufe given upon the publication of any new work. There are both a great vulgar and a fmall, apt to be catched and dazzled by very fuperficial beauties, the admiration of which, in a little time, paffes away: and fometimes a writer may acquire great temporary reputation merely by his compliance with the paffions or prejudices, with the party-spirit or fuperftitious notions, that may chance to rule for a time almost a whole nation. In fuch cafes, though the public may feem to praife, true criticifm may with reafon condemų; and it will in progrefs of time gain the afcendant : for the judgment of true criticifm, and the voice of the public, when once become unprejudiced and difpaffionate, will ever coincide at laft.

Inftances, I admit, there are, of fome works that contain grofs tranfgreffions of the laws of critici fin, acquiring, nevertheiefs, a general, and even a lafting admiration. Such are the plays of Shakespeare, which, confidered as dramatic poems, are irregular in the highest degree. But then we are to remark, that they have gained the public admiration, not by their being irregular, not by their tranfgreffions of the rules of art, but in fpite of fuch tranfgrefions. They poffefs other beauties which are conformable to juft rules; and the force of thefe beauties has been fo great, as to overpower all cenfure, and to give the public a degree of fatisfaction fuperior to the difguft arifing from their blemishes. Shakespeare pleafes, not by his bringing the tranfactions of many years into one play-not by his grotefque mixtures of tra

gedy and comedy in one piece-nor by the ftrained thoughts, and affected witticifms, which he fometimes employs. These we confider as blemishes, and impute them to the groffness of the age in which he lived. But he pleafes by his animated and mafterly reprefentations of characters, by the liveliness of his defcriptions, the force of his fentiments, and his poffeffing, beyond all writers, the natural language of pallion beauties which true criticism no leís teaches us to place in the higheft rank, than nature teaches us to feel.

I proceed next to explain the meaning of another term, which there will be frequent occafion to employ in thefe lectures; that is, genius.

Tafte and genius are two words frequently joined together; and therefore, by inaccurate thinkers confounded. They fignify, however, twe quite different things. The difference between them can be clearly pointed out; and it is of importance to remember it. Tafte confifts in the power of judging genius, in the power of executing. One may have a confiderable degree of tafte in poetry, eloquence, or any of the fine arts, who has little or hardly any genius for compofition or execution in any of thefe arts: but genius cannot be found without including tafte alfo. Genius, therefore, deferves to be confidered as a higher power of the mind than tafte. Genius always imports fomething inventive or creative; which does not reft in mere fenfibility to beauty where it is perceived, but which can, moreover, produce new beautics, and exhibit them in fuch a manner as ftrongly to imprefs the minds of others. Refined tafte forms a good critic; but genius is farther neceffary to form the poet or the orator.

It is proper alfo to obferve, that genius is a word, which, in common acceptation, extends much farther than to the objects of tafte. It is ufed to fignify

that talent or aptitude which we receive from nature, for excelling in any one thing whatever. Thus we speak of a genius for mathematics, as well as a genius for poetry-of a genius for war, for politics, or for any mechanical employment.

This talent or aptitude for excelling in fome one particular, is, I have faid, what we receive from nature. By art and study, no doubt, it may be greatly improved; but by them alone it cannot be acquired. As genius is a higher faculty than tafte, it is ever, according to the ufual frugality of nature, more limited in the fphere of its operations. It is not uncommon to meet with perfons who have an excellent tafte in feveral of the polite arts, fuch as mufic, poetry, painting, and eloquence, all together but, to find one who is an excellent performer in all thefe arts, is much more rare; or rather, indeed, fuch an one is not to be looked for. A fort of univerfal genius, or one who is equally and indifferently turnéd towards feveral different profeffions and arts, is not likely to excel in any. Although there may be fome few exceptions, yet in general it holds, that when the bent of the mind is wholly directed towards fome one object, exclufive, in a manner, of others, there is the fairest profpect of eminence in that, whatever it be. The rays must converge to a point, in order to glow intenfely. This remark I here choofe to make, on account of its great importance to young people; in leading them to examine with care, and to purfue with ardour, the current and pointing of nature towards thofe exertions of genius in which they are moft likely to excel.

A genius for any of the fine arts, as I before obferved, always fuppofes tafte; and it is clear, that the improvement of taste will ferve both to forward and to correct the operations of genius. In proportion as the taste of a poct, or orator, be

comes more refined with refpect to the beauties of compofition, it will certainly affift him to produce the more finifhed beauties in his work. Genius, however, in a poet or orator, may fometimes exift in a higher degree than tafte; that is, genius may be bold and ftrong, when tafte is neither very delicate, nor very correct. This is often the cafe in the infancy of arts; a period when genius frequently exerts itself with great vigour, and executes with much warmth; while taste, which requires experience, and improves by flower degrees, hath not yet attained to its full growth. Homer, and Shakespeare are proofs of what I now affert; in whofe admirable writings are found inftances of rudeness and indelicacy, which the more refined taste of later writers, who had far inferior genius to them, would have taught them to avoid. As all human perfection is limited, this may very probably be the law of our nature, that it is not given to one man to execute with vigour and fire, and, at the fame time, to attend to all the leffer, and more refined graces that belong to the exact perfection of his work while, on the other hand, a thorough tafte for thofe inferior graces, is, for the most part, accompanied with a diminution of fublimity and force.

Having thus explained the nature of tafte, the nature and importance of criticifn, and the diftincon between taste and genius; I am now to confider the fources of the pleasures of tafte. Here opens a very extenfive field; no lefs than all the pleafures of the imagination, as they are commonly called, whether afforded us by natural objects, or by the imitations and deferiptions of them. But it is not neceffary to the purpose of my lectures, that all thefe fhould be examined fully; the pleafure which we receive from difcourfe, or writing, being the main object of them. All that I propofe, is