that, feeble in fentiment, he is studying to fupport himself by mere expreffion.

The fame unfavourable judgment we muft pafs, on all that laboured apparatus with which fome writers introduce a paffage, or defcription, which they intend shall be fublime; calling on their readers to attend, invoking their mufe, or breaking forth into general unmeaning exclamations, concerning the greatness, terribleness, or majefty of the object, which they are to defcribe. Mr. Addifon, in his Campaign, has fallen into an error of this kind, when about to defcribe the battle of Blenheim.

But O! my mufe! what numbers wilt thou find
To fing the furious troops in battle join'd?
Methinks, I hear the drum's tumultuous found,
The victor's fhouts, and dying groans, confound, &c.

Introductions of this kind, are a forced attempt in a writer, to fpur up himself, and his reader, when he finds his imagination begin to flag. It is like taking artificial fpirits, in order to fupply the want of fuch as are natural. By this obfervation, however, I do not mean to pass a general cenfure on mr. Addifon's Campaign, which, in feveral places, is far from wanting merit; and, in particular, the noted comparison of his hero to the angel who rides in the whirlwind and directs the storm, is a truly fublime image.

The faults oppofite to the fublime are chiefy two; the frigid, and the bombaft. The frigid confifts, in degrading an object, or fentiment, which is fublime in itself, by our mean conception of it; or by our weak, low, and childish description of it. This betrays entire abfence, or at leaft great poverty of genius. Of this, there are abundance of examples, and thefe commented upon with much humour, in the treatife on the art of finking, in dean Swift's works; the inftances taken chiefly from

fir Richard Blackmore. One of these, I had occafion already to give, in relation to mount Etna, and it were needlefs to produce any more. The bombast lies, in forcing an ordinary or trivial object out of its rank, and endeavouring to raife it into the fublime; or, in attempting to exalt a fublime objec beyond all natural and reafonable bounds. Into this error, which is but too common, writers of genius may fometimes fall, by unluckily lofing fight of the true point of the fublime. This is alfo called fuftian, or rant. Shakespeare, a great, but incorrect genius, is not unexceptionable here. Dryden and Lee, in their tragedies, abound with it.

Thus far of the fublime; of which I have treated fully, because it is fo capital an excellency in fine writing, and because clear and precife ideas on this head are, as far as I know, not to be met with in critical writers.

Before I conclude this lecture, there is one observation which I choose to make at this time; I fhall make it once for all, and hope it will be afterwards remembered. It is with respect to the inftances of faults, or rather blemishes and imperfections, which, as I have done in this lecture, I fhall hereafter continue to take, when I can, from writers of reputation. I have not the leaft intention thereby to difparage their character in the general. I fhall have other occafions of doing equal juftice to their beauties. But it is no reflexion on any human performance, that it is not abfolutely perfect. The task would be much easier for me, to collect inftances of faults from bad writers. But they would draw no attention, when quoted from books which nobody reads. And I conceive, that the method which I follow, will contribute more to make the best authors be read with pleasure, when one properly diftinguithes their beauties from their faults; and is led to imitate and admire only what is worthy of imitation and admiration.

LECTURE V.

BEAUTY AND OTHER PLEASURES OF TASTE.

S fublimity conftitutes a particular character of compofition, and forms one of the highest excellencies of eloquence and of poetry, it was proper to treat of it at fome length. It will not be neceffary to difcufs fo particularly all the other pleasures that arife from tafte, as fome of them have lefs relation to our main fubject. On beauty only I fhall make several observations, both as the fubject is curious, and as it tends to improve Itafte, and to discover the foundation of several of the graces of defcription and of poetry*.

Beauty, next to fublimity, affords, beyond doubt, the highest pleasure to the imagination. The emotion which it raises, is very diftinguishable from that of fublimity. It is of a calmer kind; more gentle and foothing; does not elevate the mind fo much, but produces an agreeable ferenity. Sublimity raises a feeling, too violent, as I fhowed,

*See Hutchinfon's enquiry concerning beauty and virtueGerard on tafte, chap. iii.-Enquiry into the origin of our ideas of the fublime and beautiful-Elements of criticifin, hap. iii.-Spectator, vol. vi.—Eflay on the pleasures of taste.

C

to be lafting; the pleasure arifing from beauty admits of longer continuance. It extends alfo to a much greater variety of objects than fublimity; to a variety indeed fo great, that the feelings which beautiful objects produce, differ confiderably, not in degree only, but also in kind, from one another. Hence, no word in the language is used in a more vague fignification than beauty. It is applied to almost every external object that pleases the eye, or the ear; to a great number of the graces of writing; to many difpofitions of the mind; nay, to feveral objects of mere abftract fcience. We talk currently of a beautiful tree or flower; a beautiful poem; a beautiful character; and a beautiful theorem in mathematics.

Hence we may eafily perceive, that, among fo great a variety of objects, to find out fome one quality in which they all agree, and which is the foundation of that agreeable fenfation they all raife, must be a very difficult, if not, more probably, a vain attempt. Objects, denominated beautiful, are fo different, as to pleafe, not in virtue of any one quality common to them all, but by means of feveral different principles in human nature. The agreeable emotion which they all raise, is fomewhat of the fame nature; and, therefore, has the common name of beauty given to it; but it is raised by different caufes.

Hypotheses, however, have been framed by ingenious men, for affigning the fundamental quality of beauty in all objects. In particular, uniformity amidst variety, has been infifted on as this fundamental quality. For the beauty of many figures, I admit that this accounts in a fatisfactory manner. But when we endeavour to apply this principle to beautiful objects of fome other kind, as to colour, for inftance, or motion, we shall foon find that it has no place. And even in exter

nal figured objects, it does not hold, that their beauty is in proportion to their mixture of variety with uniformity; feeing many pleafe us, as highly beautiful, which have almost no variety at all; and others, which are various to a degree of intricacy. Laying fyftems of this kind, therefore, afide, what I now propofe is, to give an enumeration of feveral of thofe claffes of objects in which beauty moft remarkably appears; and to point out, as far as I can, the feparate principles of beauty in each of them.

Colour affords, perhaps, the fimpleft inftance of beauty, and therefore the fittest to begin with. Here, neither variety, nor un formity, nor any other principle, that I know, can be affigned, as the foundation of beauty. We can refer it to no other caufe but the ftructure of the eye, which determines us to receive certain modifications of the rays of light with more pleasure than others. And we fee, accordingly, that, as the organ of fenfation varies in different perfons, they have their different favourite colours. It is probable, that af fociation of ideas has influence, in fome cafes, on the pleasure which we receive from colours. Green, for instance, may appear more beautiful, by being connected in our ideas with rural prospects and fcenes; white, with innocence; blue, with the ferenity of the fky. Independent of affociations of this kind, all that we can farther obferve, concerning colours, is, that thofe chofen for beauty are, generally, delicate, rather than glaring. Such are thofe paintings with which nature hath ornamented fome of her works, and which art ftrives in vain to imitate; as the feathers of feveral kinds of birds, the leaves of flowers, and the fine varia tion of colours exhibited by the fky at the rifing and fetting of the fun. These present to us the higheft inftances of the beauty of colouring; and have Vol. I.

L