ney

the

in

ave

pa-'

em

ing

ords

wn

rm.

bel,

ibel,

hood of the libel are ipoken of indifference; but the m rious, and feditious defign of

be confidered as an object of

jury.

A

THE general practice of i term FALSE, in indictments tions for libels, feems fufficie that it was the opinion of that falfehood was neceffary. libel. Nor is it eafy to co confcientious jury can retur oaths, that a man has publish

26 State Trials, vol. IX.

MALICIOUS libel, which they must do when they convict a public libeller, if they are not in their own minds convinced of the FALSEHOOD and the MALICE. With respect to private libels, their truth or falfehood has always been confidered as a matter of fo much importance, that it has been laid down as a rule in the court of King's Bench, that the court will not grant an information for a private libel charging a particular offence, unless the profecutor will deny the charge upon oath 27

Ir has been faid, that juries are not to judge of the INTENTION of a libeller, becaufe INTENTION in this cafe is incapable of proof. But upon this it has been justly remarked, that Criminal intention in the * publication of a libel may be proved by * two forts of evidence; one INTERNAL,

27

" Douglas's Reports of Cafes argued and determined

in the Court of King's Bench, p. 271.

⚫ arifing

* arifing from the nature of the paper; the • other EXTERNAL, from the circumstances

6

accompanying the act of publication 28" And of the whole of this the jury are the true and proper judges. It was certainly the opinion of lord chief juftice Holt, that the intention of the writer was a proper fubject for the jury in matter of libel. In the case of the King against Brown, that judge faid, An information will be for

speaking ironically. And Mr. Attorney faid, 'twas laid to be wrote IRONICE, and

he ought to have fhewed at the trial that • he did not intend to fcandalize them; and the jury are judges QUO ANIMO this was

• done, and they have found the ill in• tent 29.' It is also faid in Viner of a libel,

p. 14.

Letter to the Jurors of Great Britain, 8vo. 1771.

19 Lutwyche's Reports of Cases adjudged in the Court of King's Bench, in the reign' of Queen Anne, p.

86.

that

(

that "the mind with which it was made "is to be respected 30."

To be regardless of the intention with which an act was done, is not confonant to the maxims of English law. " Omne "actum ab agentis intentione eft judican"dum." Every act is to be judged from the intention of the agent. Mr. Justice Holloway, one of the judges of the court of King's Bench, in the cafe of the feven bifhops, evidently confidered the jury as judges of INTENTION, and that they should attend to the evidence of SEDITION, in a trial for matter of libel. For he faid to the jury, If you are satisfied there was an ILL

INTENTION OF SEDITION, or the like, you ought to find them guilty. And Mr. Juftice Powell, in the fame cause, said to the jury, Gentlemen, to make it a libel,

General Abridgment of Law and Equity, vol. XV.

P.85.