and to co-operate with external enemies; fo, on the other, the refources of power, though feparate, and at a great diftance from each other, may be of fuch a nature as to be eafily united, and not intercepted or cut off by any hoftile power. Compactnefs of dominion is determined not always, or only, by geographical fituation, but by other circumftances, that fecure the ro-operation of all its different members. The refources of British power are of fuch a nature, that, though remote from each other,in point of local fituation, they are approximated by facility of communication. The ocean, which divides the territories of the British empire, unites its different nerves in one cord of ftrength. The Cape of Good Hope is cur half-way houfe to India. The reduction of Ceylon, again completes the chain of connection between the British dominion in Europe and that in India, which now happily embraces the best part of that peninfala. Even the immenfe army that we are obliged to keep on foot in India is a fortunate circumftance; if we have regard, as we ought, not only to gain, but to the ftability of empire. It nourishes, in the British youth, a military fpirit: while mercantile habits, and the acquifition of fudden wealth, tend to enervation; the neceffity of maintaining the grand fpring of our commerce, by force of arms, breeds up a race of foldiers, Nor, to complete the felicity of our relative fituation to India, do our friends remain their for life, or plant colonies, in the procefs of time, to be eftranged from the parent country, but return with the fortunes to the places of their nativity. Add to this profperous situation of our affairs, to

wards the eaft, our fucceffes in the Weft Indies, our commercial treaty and alliance with North America, and our new fettlements on the south and weft continent of America: and the refult of the whole will be, that our commercial zone encircles the globe; that to the whole world we may bid defiance, and force the trade into our own channel. It is poffible, by a due attention to political economy, to every thing that may encourage navigation and trade, to manufactures, to agricul ture, which is the bafis of all, and to the fate of the labouring poor, to whom the poflibility and hope may, and, no doubt, will be extended, of becoming, through induftry and other good habits, independent cultivators of the foil, and raifed to the poffeffion of farms on their own account.-It is poffible, by due attention to these things, and to all that falls within the progrefs of political economy, to maintain our power and rank in the scale of nations; not only until the viciffitude of human affairs fhall reduce the power of France, from its prefent preponderancy on the continent, to a flate lefs formidable, but for a long feries of future ages. The fmall republic of the inland of Rhodes made head and flood out against the Romans, long after great kingdoms on the European continent had owned their fway: after Spain, Gaul, and part of Germany, had bowed under their yoke. Great Britain will maintain a more fuccefsful conteft with France than Rhodes did with Rome, in proportion to its greater extent and happier fituation. The war, which had been unavoidable in its origin, had been well condu@ed, and fuccefsful on the part of Great Britain, whofe [02]

naval

naval power was never fo great, nor commerce fo flourishing and extensive, nor revenue fo high, as at the prefent moment. And all this profperity was not afcribed to the uncontrolable tide of affairs, but to the fuperior penetration and providence of the British govern

ment.

There were others, again, who, on the fubject of the prefent ftate of affairs, indulged an oppofite train of reflection. The continental powers, it was faid, had Britain food aloof, would have made fuch arrangements, among themfelves, as might feem adequate to the control of the French republic. Their confederacy would have been the more folid and fincere that it would have appeared the more neceflary. When they found England fo zealous in the caule, they readily devolved on her the labouring oar, because they judged that he was the ableft to wield it. Had not Great Britain interfered, the whole continent of Europe would have been involved in war: Britain alone would have been at peace. By a conduct the moft extraordinary, and a destiny the most fantastic, Britain alone is likely to be at war with France, and all the other nations to be at peace. France, bounded by the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Rhine, and the Ocean; in friendship with Spain, and overawing the Italian ftates, will be miftrefs of a maritime coaft, from the fea of Marmora to the Texel. With fach internal refources, fuch an extent of coaft, the Scheldt, Rhine, and other rivers, as well as canals for circulating her commerce, it is to be feared that the will overtop not only Great Britain, but give law to all Europe. But all this is the refult of thofe precipi

The

tate counfels which drove the French to become a military re public, and gave them power by the neceflity of exerting it. Our com merce, flourishing, indeed, for the prefent, beyond all example, yet cannot be lafting, being founded, in a great meafure, on principles of injuftice. The dominion which is arrogated by the British flag at fea, cannot poffibly fail to be as odious to the European nations, as the ambition of the French at land. trade of the Eaft and Weft Indies, the most valuable in the world, and the great ftimulant to all commerce, is, at prefent, in our hands; true. If, however, this be a great good to us, which in the eye of found and moral policy it is not, it is a. great evil to other nations; to whom, as well as to us, the productions of the tropical and other diftant climates, have, through ufe, become articles of the first neceflity. Is it to be fuppofed, that the inventive genius of France will not, after the fhall have made peace with the continent, encouraged by the univerfal difcontent, jealoufy, and refentment, at the conduct of Great Britain, fall on fome means to fap the foundations of her naval power, pride, and ty ranny? Have we not to expect fuch a combination against us, as was formerly excited, by jealoufy, envy, and cupidity, against Venice? may not an armed neutrality at fea be yet formed, more general and more firm, in proportion to the growing. tyranny that prompts it? may not the French, and the other nations on the Mediterraneah, excluded from the great India-trade, by the way of the Cape of Good Hope, entertain the project, and in fome fhape, and fome time or other, ef

fect

fet it too, of inviting it into its old channels, through Perfia, Arabia, and Egypt? The route to India, by the Cape of Good Hope, being loft to all nations but England, is it not to be expected that thofe nations will either combine for the purpofe of recovering a participa-, tion in that advantage, or attempt to open new, or rather re-open old channels of communication with the Eaft for themselves? That they have adopted the general principle of oppofing our power at fea, by their power at land, they have al ready difcovered, by their efforts to exclude our merchandize from Am-, ferdam, Venice, Genoa, Leghorn, and other ports. It is but an ex-, tenfion of tire fame principle to force back the India-trade into its ancient channels. In order to evade the effects of fuch meafures, a plain road lies before us. Let us entrench ourselves, as it were, in moral and facred ground, and make head against the ambitious views of France, by railing up the flandard of juftice: by fhewing a readiness to give up all conquefis, Dutch as well as French, without referve, as the price of a peace, founded on fimilar principles of justice. Can any thing be more infolently abfurd than to ftand forem oft in a confederacy, against a fyftem of ambition on the continent of Europe, while we ourfelves glory in ruling the waves with abfolute way? let us refpect neutral flags, encourage univerfal freedom of trade, and avow a juft conviction, that all nations have but one general intereft: the inviolability of private property and public

*

credit, of the rights of men, and the rights of nations; and free ports be opened in every part of the British dominions. We may then find, fome fuccefs in rouzing Europe against oppression, when we ourfelves have given the example of moderation and justice.

Such were the outlines of the two oppofite parties, which appeare ed at this time in Great Britain, on the fubject of peace or war, and free or forced commerce. In recording public opinions, as well as actions, we do not confine ourselves merely, on every fubject, to the des bates in parliament, but pay due refpect to liberal and enlightened minds, whether exprefled in public fpeeches, productions of the prefs, or in private converfation.

The lofs of the armament, 'on which the Batavian republic had expended large fums, was aggravated by the fcandalous, neglect of the French government, to farmish them with that naval affiftance which had: been ftipulated and duly paid for, This behaviour of an ally, for whom they had made fuch faorifices, greatly abated the fervour of their attachment, and excited many complaints throughout the feven provinces. The acceptance of the money, for defraying the charges of equipmentA and the diverting it to their own ules, was a breach of faith, that difgraced them much more than they were benefited by the fumms thus diverted. It to much weaken ed the confidence of their Dutch allies, that, ever fince, these have conftantly teftified a mistrust of their molt folemn affurances, that has

more

more than once proved highly detrimental to the intereft of France. It was imagined, at the time, that this retention of the Dutch money proceeded from a motive by which the directory doubted not to justify it. This was the great project of invading Ireland, that had long been meditated, and which they were now preparing to carry into execution. The importance of that noble inland to Great Britain was well known. The number and bravery of its inhabitants, the fertility of the foil, abounding in all the neceffaries of life, pointed it out as an acquifition to France, that would fet it above all difficulties, and put an end to the war at once, by depriving England of thofe fupplies of men and provifions, indifpenfibly wanted for its armies and navies.

In this vaft undertaking, the French principally relied on the cooperation of the Irish themselves. They were thoroughly acquainted with the fituation of the country, and the difcontents of the people, by means of the fecret correfpondence between the French government and the heads of the malcontents, who regularly informed it of the meafures that were taking, on their part, to excite a general infurrection.

The armament, defigned for this great expedition, had been preparing, at Breft, during the whole fummer. It confifted of twenty-five fhips of the line, including the feven that compofed the fquadron of admiral Richery, who was to join it with all fpeed, fifteen fout frigates, befide floops and tranfports for an army of twenty-five thousand men, to be commanded by general Hoche, whofe military abilities were cfteemed equal to thofe of any officer in the

French fervice, Moreau and Buoaaparte himself fcarcely excepted.

Through feveral unforeseen accidents this armament was not ready for failing till the eighteenth of December. On going out of Breft, fome of the largeft fhips ftruck upon the rocks, at the mouth of the harbour, and feveral were loft, and others rendered unfit for prefent fervice. The Day after its departure, a violent form arofe, which difperfed the fleet, and damaged many of the fhips. This tempeftuous weather lafted during the whole time of the expedition. On the twenty-fourth, admiral Bouvet, commander-in-chief of the French fleet, anchored with feven fhips of the line, and ten others, in Bantry-Bay. In order to reconnoitre the country, a boat was dispatched towards hore; but it was immediately captured, and multitudes appeared on the beach in readinefs to oppofe a landing. After lying fome days in this bay, the ftorminefs of the weather increafed to fuch a degree, that, on receiving no intelligence of general Hoche and the principal officers, who were in a frigate that parted from the flect, in the gale of wind that fcattered it on putting to fea, the French admiral determined to quit his pofition, and make the bef of his way to France. The land officers, on board, objected to this, and infifted on landing the troops; but, as general Hoche, who alone poffeft the plan of the expedition, was abfent, he refused to comply with their representations, and let fail for Breft, where he fafely arrived, on the laft day of December. The other divifions of his fleet had alfo the good fortune to reach that harbour, with the lofs, however, of five ships; two of the line, and

three

three frigates: one of the latter was captured by the English, and two foundered at fea, with one of the former. The other, after a defperate engagement, with fomne fhips of the British fquadron, off Breft, ran afhore to prevent the being taken.

The fate of this fleet proved, even to fenfe, what needed no proof in the eve of reafon, that a fuperior naval force is not, in all cafes, a cer tain fecurity against invafion. Ire land, notwithstanding the fuperio~rity of the English fleet, was fixteen days at the mercy of the enemy, and faved from attack only by the elements.

Such was the iffue of this famous expedition: the real object of which had long kept Europe in fufpence. Some thought it Portugal, others the English outward-bound fleets. Few imagined it was fo hazardous an enterprize as the invation of Ireland. The ftrength of the Proteftants there alone was deemed fully fufficient to repel fuch an attempt, and the Roman Catholics had fo many reafons to be fatisfied with the conduct of government, that no fufpicions were entertained of any defire, on their part, to exchange their connection with England for one with France, whofe treatment of thofe who were become its dependants, under the name of allies, afforded, certainly, no encouragement to follow their example,

The clofe of 1796 was marked by the death of Catharine II. emprefs of Ruffia. Catharine, as we have feen in the preceding volumes of this work, had fubdued by her policy, or her arms, the Crimea, the Caban, with a part of the frontier of Turkey, and almoft one half of Po

land. Indulging ftill in her ambition of conqueft; inflamed, not fatiated, by fo much fuccefs, the fought ftill to extend her dominion, where-` ever it was bounded only by that of a neighbour, not by the hand of nature. She contrived to stretch forth, as it were, both her arms, the one in Europe, the other in Afia; but contrarily to what had been ufually experienced, both by herself and predeceffors, while he made a conqueft of no small importance in the north of Europe, he was vigorously repelled from the fofter climate of Afia. By careffes and intrigues fhe induced the inhabitants of Livonia to insist on the fulfilment of an ancient convention, whereby the Courlanders were obliged to bring all their merchandizes to Riga; though they had, on their own coafts, excellent harbours, happily fituated. A quarrel, which had naturally arifen on this fubject, between the Livonians and Courlanders, was not yet terminated, when the emprefs fent engineers into Courland, to mark out a canal for facilitating the merchandize of that country into Livonia." The Courlanders, feeing this, and fearing left they fhoul! be foon forced to make ufe of this canal, thought it better for them to be protected, than oppreffed, by the emprefs, and to be her fubjects rather than her neighbours.

Catharine, informed of thefe difpofitions, called to her the duke of Courland, the feeble fon of the famous Biren, under the pretext of having occafion to confer with him on matters of importance. But no fooner was that prince at the foot of the throne of the Autocratrix of the north, than the ftates of Courland held an aflembly. The nobi[04]

lity