WITH the approach of the winter season, the time seems fairly to have arrived for examining the success of the Liberal policy to which the country so light-heartedly committed itself in the springtime. Churlish Conservatives, who have not the fear of Cambridge University before their eyes, may be tempted to rub up their Greek and recall Esop's fable of the grasshopper and the ant. The Liberal party have piped and sung persistently throughout their halcyon days of spring and summer, and may fairly be invited to dance to their own music through the coming winter.

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There appears, however, unfortunately, to be as little harmony amongst our present rulers amongst that more important body of performers, the Powers of Europe, in whose concert Mr. Gladstone aspired to the honourable post of conductor. Whilst the Prime Minister at the Guildhall discourses on the primary necessity of maintaining law and order in Ireland, Mr. Bright and Mr. Chamberlain are speaking words of scarcely veiled sympathy with Irish seditious agitators; and whilst Mr. Gladstone says at the Guildhall that the Treaty of Berlin "was a treaty that promised to confer great benefits upon Europe; and that we" (the Liberal Government) "at once declared our intention to address ourselves to the purpose of endeavouring to secure the execution of an instrument which was due to the policy of our predecessors," Mr. Chamberlain, a week later, tells a Birmingham audience that the "authoritative mandate of the country to Mr. Gladstone was an emphatic condemnation of the pol

icy of the late Government,” and instructed him "to reverse as far as possible a policy which the nation had condemned."

We willingly leave to the Prime Minister and his President of the Board of Trade the task of making these apparent contrarieties agree, and shall regard the subtle explanation which will no doubt be forthcoming, with little more than academical curiosity. We say this on the assumption that the Cabinet have not agreed to differ amongst themselves on so important a subject as the foreign policy of their country; and that they will be able to demonstrate to Parliament that the two Ministers whose words we have quoted really meant one and the same thing. But it is of importance to know which of the two seemingly divergent lines of statesmanship is to be pursued. Six months ago we should have attached the greater weight to Mr. Chamberlain's language; but after the Austrian, Cyprian, and South African recantations, we cannot feel sure that our versatile Prime Minister may not one day pose as a great War Minister. It is a curious instance of the irony of circumstances to read in foreign newspapers, French, German, Austrian, and Italian, that a universal feeling of relief is manifested all over the Continent because the English Premier, the inveterate opponent of a "spirited foreign policy," the modern David, the slayer of the Jingo Goliath, has unexpectedly intimated his reluctance to let slip the dogs of war on Europe. Will any honest man deny that Mr. Gladstone overthrew the late Administration on the ground that their policy was a turbulent and

reckless one, calculated to involve their country in foreign complications? Will any one demonstrate that his own policy has not been one of restless interference of threats against a State (Turkey) with which we are at peace-of insult, per Mr. Chamberlain, to a Government with which he found England on the most cordial terms of friendship? In short, what Liberal statesman will show us that it is the Tory party who has troubled Israel, and not his own house?

Throughout the last session of Parliament the leaders of the Conservative party persistently abstained from raising any debate on foreign politics, because the newcomers advanced the weighty and reasonable plea that time must be allowed them to shape and carry out a practical policy, the onus of which had devolved upon them at an unexpected moment. Again and again were we told, "We are acting in perfect concert with Europe; wait a little, and see what we will do." Well, we have waited six months and more, and are wellnigh as much in the dark as ever. The only light afforded to this free constitutional country has been the negative evidence of the Austrian Red-book, which certainly fails to substantiate the Ministerial contention that they have acted throughout in harmony with the rest of Europe. Our own memory may be as short as that of our political opponents, yet we surely accurately remember the denunciations levelled at the Conservative Ministry for keeping the country in the dark as to their policy. Are we to be dependent for the future on foreign publications for an explanation of what is being done in our name?

Responsible statesmen, and the voice of the public press, have attributed to Mr. Gladstone a proposition to commit an act of war

against Turkey by seizing certain property belonging to that Government. The charge has never been denied; and Great Britain is literally in this position (assuming the accuracy of a story oft repeated and hitherto uncontradicted), that her Prime Minister, coming into office as a peace Minister and champion of open diplomacy, has, to the best of his ability, and without consulting Parliament or the nation, plunged his country into war. Most happily, Continental statesmen were cooler and clearer headed than the English Premier; and a crying scandal has been averted through their prudence and moderation. A strict account will be demanded from the Government when Parliament meets, of all the circumstances attendant on this "Smyrna dues" question.

Let us briefly examine the Ministerial explanations and defence of their present position. Their parrotcry is, We are pledged to carry out the provisions of your (the Conservative) Treaty of Berlin. The Liberal versions of the term "Treaty of Berlin" recall to our mind the celebrated fire described by Sir W. Scott in his "Bride of Lammermoor." In that novel the old family retainer burns up some rubbish at his master's castle on the plea "that this fire will be an excuse for asking anything we want through the country; this fire will settle many things for the family's credit that cost me daily the telling of twenty lies" and he adds, "in some sort a good excuse is better than the things themselves." In this latter sentence we are disposed cordially to concur, when we think of the "things themselves" Liberal foreign policy has conferred upon us in the shape of Crimean, Chinese, Abyssinian, and other wars.

As regards the former portion of Mr. Caleb Balderstone's remarks, the Treaty of Berlin has undoubtedly

been a godsend to the Radicals, who contrive with much ingenuity not only to make it an excuse for "asking anything they want through the country," but also to present it under two totally different aspects to their constituents.

When a Ministerial orator is replying to any strictures a Tory may venture to make on the policy of coercing Turkey, he is apt to say, "We are simply carrying out your own policy: the Treaty of Berlin is your work; we take it up loyally as the legacy you left us, and are endeavouring faithfully to execute it." But, not unfrequently, he goes on to say in the next breath, "As for the Conservative Government's boasted Berlin Treaty, they are entitled to no credit for it; all the valuable provisions of the Treaty were inserted at the instance of France or Russia," as the case may be.

Now we cannot permit such assertions to pass unchallenged. If the late Administration are to be held to have simply dictated the terms of the treaty to which their signature is affixed, they are necessarily entitled to the full credit of the provisions of it affecting the interests of the Eastern Christians, which are usually represented by the Liberal party as the special contributions of other Powers to the settlement of south-eastern

Europe. If, on the other hand, the Tory plenipotentiaries are to be held as having acceded with reluctance to the article affecting Montenegro, and the recommendation regarding Greece, they are surely within their right in taking exception to the course Mr. Gladstone seems to wish this country to adopt-namely, that of taking the lead in Europe in carrying out these particular provisions by force of arms. We are perfectly ready to concede, granting for the sake of

argument that the latter hypothesis is correct, that it would not be unreasonable for Liberals to taunt Conservative statesmen with bad faith if they should refuse, when called on by the other Powers, to join in executing a treaty to which they had set their hands. It is not necessary, however, at this moment to enter upon the question exactly how far we might be bound to go in executing a treaty par voie de fait, if called on to do so; because it is not contended that the other Powers who are held up to us as the Christian patrons have, with one exception, suggested to us that we should make war on Turkey. The fault Conservatives find with the Ministry is, that they appear anxious to drag other nations forward in a hostile enterprise in which our honour and interests are not specially concerned.

In connection with this topic it is worth while to devote a few lines towards pointing out an ingenious attempt made by our political opponents to show that our responsibilities towards Greece and Montenegro are identical. Indeed many Liberal speakers, trading on the sentimental affection Englishmen are supposed to entertain for a country immortalised by Homer and by Byron, do not hesitate to insinuate that the claims of Greece upon us are even stronger than those of Montenegro. They base this assertion on two facts,-first, that during the progress of the Russo-Turkish war we advised

Greece in her own interest to abstain from attacking Turkey; and secondly, that the 13th Protocol of the Berlin Treaty recommended a certain territorial cession by Turkey to Greece: and Article 24 of that Treaty provided that if Greece and Turkey could not agree on the rectification of frontier suggested in the Protocol, the great Powers re

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served their right to mediate. Now what, in all this, gives Greece claim to ask for our armed assistance against an old ally? As regards the first point, she had value received. Her money and the blood of her soldiers were saved. It must not be forgotten that, independently of the greater or less resistance she might have met with from Turkey on land, her sea-coast, her Piræus, her very capital, were exposed to the attack of the powerful Turkish fleet. As regards the claim conferred by the Treaty of Berlin, the principle of a cession of territory to Greece by Turkey is conceded, and always has been conceded, by the Ottoman Government. The great Powers expressly abstained from positively declaring that such and such districts must be ceded; they laid down authoritatively the new Montenegrin frontier, but only recommended, with a formal reservation in Article 24 of the Treaty, a particular new line of Greco-Turkish frontier.

Sir Stafford Northcote did well, in his recent speech at Bristol, to intimate, not merely to Greece, but also to her Majesty's Ministers, that the Conservative party would resolutely oppose any armed intervention on the part of this country for the mere purpose of extending the Greek frontier in a particular direction. Since the days when Byron sang, the complexion of Eastern politics has totally altered. We have good grounds for asserting that there is no real animosity between Greek and Turk. Both are menaced by that new factor in European affairs, the Pan-Sclavistic movement. That common danger should unite them; and if Greece does, as she not unreasonably may, look forward to the ultimate inheritance of Constantinople, her wisest statesmen must feel that it must be an affair of generations

rather than of years before she is strong enough to grasp the dazzling prize. An attempt to pluck such a pear before it is ripe is far more likely to lead to its total loss than to any other result.

The question of the Montenegrin frontier is somewhat different. Lord Salisbury has been severely attacked for his declaration that it was a matter that did not concern this country whether Montenegro got possession of Dulcigno or not. Yet in the sense in which he spoke he was entirely right. Lord Salisbury asserted that it was the duty of Turkey to make the cession, and that he desired to see it made. That is the Conservative programme as fully as the Liberal. Turkey signed the Treaty of Berlin; and although that treaty expressly provided that Dulcigno should be restored to Turkey, yet, as she has subsequently agreed to cede Dulcigno in lieu of the cessions specified in the treaty, and as this arrangement has been assented to by the other signatory Powers, the Porte is clearly bound to fulfil its engagements. No Conservative statesman would have the smallest right to support the Ottoman Government in an attempt to evade their promise. But we cannot leave out of sight the question of our own relative obligations towards the other Powers of Europe in this matter. Montenegro has always ostentatiously posed as the special protégé of Russia. It will hardly be denied that it was at Russia's instigation that she took up arms against Turkey. The late Government unquestionably viewed with regret the result of the Russo-Turkish war-the outbreak of which they strove hard to prevent. The Conservative Administration fully recognised the urgent need for Turkish reform; but they sought to attain that end by peaceful means, and

means by which Turkey might have been truly strengthened rather than prostrated. But Russia saw her opportunity, and precipitated hostilities. The States of Servia and Montenegro profited by her victory. Now the Liberal party seek to figure as rival patrons of those two countries. Mr. Gladstone affects to believe that by zealously pressing upon Turkey the execution of the provisions of the Berlin Treaty relating to Montenegro, he can detach the latter Power's allegiance from the Russian to the English Government. We do not be lieve the statesmen of Cettigné are as simple as he supposes.

Does the Prime Minister hope to persuade the Montenegrin Government that England would, under any circumstances and under any Government, have sanctioned the making of an unofficial war upon Turkey by British subjects and officers fighting on behalf of Montenegro? Yet it is to the flame thus kindled by Russia that Prince Nikitá owes his accession of territory. It is only reasonable for him to hope that history may repeat itself, and to prefer solid pudding to Mr. Gladstone's empty eulogies of the valour of his subjects.

We hold, therefore, that Lord Salisbury was perfectly justified in saying that England would be none the worse off if Dulcigno were not surrendered. Turkey would have broken her word, no doubt; but if we are to go to war to punish every State that breaks faith with us, what are we to say to the tearing up of the Black Sea Treaty and the annexation of Khiva? If our readers will refer to Lord Salisbury's despatch of July 13, 1878, enclosing the signed Treaty of Berlin, they will see that the question of the Montenegrin frontier is not treated as one in which England has any peculiar interest. A treaty

drawn up by six Powers conjointly, whose views are divergent, must be in the nature of a compromise. English special wishes, let us say, are considered in the delimitation of Eastern Roumelia; French, in the recommendation regarding the Greek frontier; and Russian, in the concessions to Servia and Montenegro.

As long, therefore, as the Conservative leaders abstain from encouraging, directly or indirectly, the Turkish Government in its neglect to fulfill the treaty, they are fully entitled to point out to their own countrymen that England will suffer no material harm from the non-execution of a particular provision; and they are also within their right in protesting against their successors, under cover of the pretext that they are carrying out Conservative policy, seeking to embroil England in a foreign war, in a matter in which we have no vital stake. If the doctrine we have here laid down seems to any of our readers to require vindication, we would refer them to the Liberal leaders' speeches passim on the occasion of the tearing up of the Black Sea Treaty by Russia, and their able arguments to prove that we were not bound to resent by force of arms the violation of a treaty in which (according to their contention) we had no special interest.

Before closing this article, we may devote a few general remarks to what we have ventured to call the Paulo post futurum policy of the present Administration.

At the moment of writing these lines, the cession even of Dulcigno has not been accomplished. With a somewhat strange sense of humour, Mr. Gladstone capped a course of six months' energetic policy by reading a telegram from a foreign sovereign on the subject, amidst " roars of laughter," at the Guildhall ban