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interfered and gave his undertaking to enter an appearance, in order to prevent the personal service from being effected. Different facts were stated which tended to shew that in consequence of the attorney's delay in entering the appearance, the plaintiff had been prevented from trying his cause at the last assizes, and that now, in the event of obtaining a verdict, the insolvent state of the defendant would most probably prevent his ever obtaining any fruits of it.

WILLIAMS, J.-No precedent has been shewn for such an application as the present, and I certainly am aware of none. It seems to me, that if there is any remedy, it is against the attorney on his undertaking, and that must, of course, be an application in a different form.

Rule refused.

1838.

MORRIS

บ.

JAMES.

REG. v. MATTEY.

costs, which, by the rule, are

payable to a high-sheriff, made under the authority of a power of attorney exeunder-sheriff

cuted by the

GRAY applied for an attachment for non-payment of A demand of costs pursuant to the Master's allocatur. The rule on which the Master had allowed the costs, required them, when taxed, to be paid to the late high-sheriff of the county of Bucks. The high-sheriff having gone out of office, a power of attorney to demand the costs pursuant to the rule, was executed by the under-sheriff after the highsheriff had left office. Under the authority of this power of attorney, a demand of the costs was made, and the de- out of office, is fendant refused to pay them. Gray contended that the support an power of attorney so executed after the high-sheriff had gone out of office, was sufficient, in the same manner that an assignment of a bail-bond, under similar circumstances, would be good.

WILLIAMS, J.-I think the attachment ought to go.

Rule granted.

after the high

sheriff has gone

attachment.

1838.

The 15th of April, which by 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 70, s. 6, is constituted the first

day of Easter

days before the 18th April,

of the notices

for the admis

ney, was held

Reg. Gen.

H.T. 2 Will. 4.

Ex parte BAYLEY.

W.H. WATSON made an application on the part of an articled clerk, for leave to insert his name in the list of persons seeking to be admitted as attornies in Trinity Term. By 5 Reg. Gen. H. T. 6 W. 4 (a), it was ordered Term, falling on "that three days at least before the commencement of the Easter Sunday, a delivery, three term next preceding that in which any person not before admitted shall propose to be admitted an attorney of either of the Courts, he shall cause to be delivered at the Massion of an attor- ter's or Prothonotary's office, as the case may be, instead to be a sufficient of affixing the same on the walls of the Courts as now recompliance with quired, the usual written notices." In the present case, the notices had not been delivered in due time, if Sunday the 15th was to be construed as the first day of Easter Term, as they had been delivered three days before the 18th of April; but they had been delivered in due time, if Wednesday the 18th was considered as the first day of the term. Great uncertainty existed as to which of those days ought to be considered the first day of the term, for doubts had arisen with respect to the construction to be put on the 11 Geo. 4 & 1 W. 4, c. 70, s. 6, in connexion with 1 W. 4, c. 3, s. 3, & Reg. Gen. H. T. 2 W. 4, (b). Under these circumstances, it was submitted, that the notices ought to be considered as delivered in due time pursuant to the rule of court.

WILLIAMS, J.-I think the notice is sufficient.

Application granted.

(a) Ante, Vol. 4, p. 5:4.

(b) Ante, Vol. 1, p. 423.

1838.

Ex parte LYONS.

Where the part of an

delay on the

articled clerk

in sending in the answers required by Reg. Gen. E. T. 6 Will. 4, has been caused by the unexpected absence of the

attorney with

whom the

MANSEL applied on the 25th of April, that an articled
clerk named Lyons might be allowed to give in the an-
swers pursuant to Reg. Gen. E. T. 6 Will. 4 (a), nunc pro
tunc. The affidavit, on which, the application was founded
stated that the applicant had been articled to his father,
and served the whole five years. Mr. Lyons had expected
his father in town on the 18th of April, but he did not
arrive before the 22nd of the month. The Secretary of
the Law Institution had fixed Saturday the 21st as the
last day for receiving the answers. As they could not
procured without the father's presence in London,
course, the rule could not be strictly complied with. Im- tunc.
mediately after the father's return the answers were pro-
cured, and tendered to the Secretary of the Law Institu-
tion. That gentleman, however, declined receiving them,
without the authority of the Court. It appeared, that the
examination would take place on the 1st of May.

be

articles were served, the

Court will allow

of

WILLIAMS, J.-I think the application is reasonable: the answers may now be sent in.

Application granted.

(a) Ante, Vol. 5, p. 1.

them to be sent

in nune pro

WALTER V. NICHOLSON.

W.H. WATSON moved on behalf of the defendant

for a rule nisi under 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58, s. 1 (the Interpleader Act). It was an action against the sheriff of Durham for negligence in the sale of certain goods seized under a writ of fi. fa. The affidavit of the defendant stated, that he claimed no interest in the subject matter of the

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suit, and that he expected to be sued by the assignee of the bankrupt from whom the warrant of attorney supporting the judgment and execution had been obtained. The affidavit contained the usual denial of collusion required by section 1. The claim here was for unliquidated damages, and it might be a matter of doubt whether such a claim was within the meaning of section 1 of the Interpleader Act. The words of the section were in the preamble applicable to "a person sued at law for the recovery of money or goods wherein he has no interest;" and by the enacting part of the section the applicant is required to swear that he is ready to bring into Court, or to pay or dispose of the subject matter of the account in such manner as the Court (or any judge thereof) may order or direct." There might be some difficulty in considering this claim as money or goods, or in the defendant swearing himself to be ready to bring into Court, or to pay or dispose of the subject matter of the action, since the amount of damages to which the plaintiff would be entitled must depend on the verdict of a jury.

WILLIAMS, J.-It appears to me that the provisions contained in section 1 of this act clearly refer to claims to property in its nature distinct and tangible, and not to a claim like the present, which consists only of unliquidated damages. I think, therefore, I ought not to grant a rule.

Rule refused.

DOE d. AVERY v. ROE.

Where an attor R. V. RICHARDS shewed cause against a rule nisi obattesting witness tained by Butt, calling on an attorney of the Court to shew

ney, who is the

to the counter

part of a lease, is afterwards concerned for the tenant in an action of ejectment brought by the lessor, the Court will, notwithstanding, compel him to make an affidavit of the execution of the counterpart, in support of an application for the usual landlord's rule, under 1 Geo, 4, c. 87, s. 4. Quare, whether the affidavit of the attesting witness is, in every case of such an application, indispensable.

cause why he should not, within three days, make an affi davit of the execution of the counterpart of a lease, and pay the costs of the application. An action of ejectment had been brought by the lessor of the plaintiff against his tenant for the recovery of certain premises held by the latter. The lessor being desirous of obtaining the usual landlord's rule under 1 Geo. 4, c. 87, s. 1, an application was made to the attesting witness of the counterpart of the lease to swear to the due execution of that instrument. The attesting witness having now become the attorney for the tenant, he declined making the affidavit immediately, but requested the delay of a week. An affidavit of the execution was accordingly prepared, and at the expiration of the week it was tendered to the attorney, in order that he might swear it. This he refused to do, and the present rule was accordingly obtained. It was submitted, that the present application was an attempt to extend the jurisdiction of the Court further than any precedent warranted. The Courts had never been much inclined to compel persons to make affidavits. The only cases where such an interference had taken place, were those in which proceedings would be rendered totally inoperative, unless such affidavits were made, as for instance, where it became necessary to prove the execution of warrants of attorney, or of submissions to arbitration. But, in the present in

plaintiff sought was to

stance, all that the lessor of the
avail himself of the extraordinary security given by the
statute in question. Whether he obtained this security or
not, the proceedings in the action of ejectment might
equally be carried on. The plaintiff would be equally
capable of recovering his premises, which recovery was
the substantial object of the action. Again, it could not
be considered that such a step need be taken on behalf of
the lessor of the plaintiff, for it appeared from the case of
Doe d. Gowland v. Roe (a), that in order to obtain the

(a) Ante, p. 35.

1838.

DOE

d. AVERY

V.

Rox.

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