should be left for cooler moments, and made to take place by insensible additions. It is thus that all the great changes of nature are effected. The darkness of winter melts into the light of summer, without any day being sensibly longer than the one which preceded it. All violent and sudden accessions of power are dangerous to society,-ruinous to those who receive them. The riches of harvest are gradually ripened by the increasing warmth of summer; but what would be the consequence if the sun of July were suddenly to succeed the chill of February?

Reflections of this sort are naturally produced, upon comparing the present state of public feeling in Great Britain with that which preceded in France the first Revolution. They cannot be useless at this moment. Past experience is the best guide to future safety.

For some years previous to the first Revolution, a vague feeling of disquietude pervaded France. The weight of the public debt was excessive, and totally disproportioned to the revenues of the state; increasing burdens, and diminishing income, daily augmented the embarrassments of the financiers; the Parliament of Paris and the provinces were refractory, and refused to register the edicts of taxation, or sanction the loans that had been contracted by the royal authority; the people groaned beneath the weight of feudal servitude and oppressive taxation; the middling ranks were impatient under the invidious distinctions between them and the privileged classes. A general cry for Reformation pervaded the nation; from the peasants, for liberation from their burdens; among the burghers, for extension of their civil rights.

No administration, in such arduous times, was able, for any length of time, to maintain its place at the head of affairs. It was in vain that the old courtier, Maurepas, called to his aid the enlightened Turgot, and the virtuous Malesherbes, to combine the favour of the people with the support of the court. The reform which they attempted, excited the jealousy of the noblesse, and

* Mignet, Introduction.

they were overturned. Calonne next endeavoured, by a profuse expenditure, to increase the public activity, and put in practice his favourite maxim, that " prodigality is a large economy;" but the contraction of new debt soon brought matters to a crisis, and the discovery of an annual deficit of L.7,000,000, overthrew his administration. The Archbishop of Sens then succeeded, and, yielding to the increasing clamour of the nation, agreed to convoke the StatesGeneral in 1789; but being unable to avert a national bankruptcy, or provide funds for the public creditors, he, too, was compelled to yield, and Neckar, the idol of the populace, was recalled.

Two courses to alleviate the public suffering, presented themselves to the Swiss minister. The first was to redress the real and experienced grievances of the people: the second, to seek their favour by the concession of political power. Turgot had been the great advocate of the former he himself had always espoused the latter. In an evil hour he made his election for the adoption of his favourite democratic principles, yielding to the following considerations:

"It is in vain," it was said, "to argue that the representation, as it stood on the last convocation of the States General, in 1614, is to regulate the National Assembly in 1789. New cities have arisen, new districts have been covered with inhabitants: the relative importance of the nobility and the commons, have been totally changed by the lapse of time.f Something is necessary to tranquillize the public mind: the only way to prevent a revolution, is to remove the causes of popular complaint."

These considerations prevailed with the liberal administration of France; and Neckar, to tranquillize the country, and gain the discontented party to his side, obtained an ordinance of the king, increasing to a

considerable degree the number of popular representatives in the approaching States General. Tranquillity, gratitude, and peace were anticipated from this liberal concession to the popular party; and

† Bailly's Memoirs, 1. 364.

what was the consequence? Did it satisfy the public mind; did it put a stop to the clamour for innovation; did it avert the horrors of the revolution? The answer will be found in the words of the man in existence who gained most by the revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte. "The concessions of Neckar, were the work of a man ignorant of the first principles of the government of mankind. It was he who overturned the monarchy, and brought Louis XVI. to the scaffold. Marat, Danton, Robspierre himself, have done less mischief to France than Neckar: It was he that brought about the revolution. I have lived through it. I have witnessed those days of disaster and public mourning; but be assured, while I live, they shall never return. Such reformers as M. Neckar, such framers of Utopian plans of government, do incredible mischief. The weak read their works; the populace are carried away by them. The public happiness is in every mouth, and soon after, the people find themselves without bread; they revolt, and that is all that is gained by such theories. Neckar was the author of all the evils which have desolated France during the revolution: all the blood shed during it rests on his head."*

In truth, it is not difficult to perceive that nothing can be so dangerous as to give any considerable accession to the power of the people, during a period of public excitement. It is an equal error to augment their power, in such circumstances, as to repress it with undue severity in prior periods of tranquillity. Neckar granted to the tiers etat, a great accession of numbers; he gave representatives to many places which had previously possessed none, and by these liberal concessions, he hoped to have allayed the public discontents. Immediately after the meeting of the States General, viz. on 23d June, 1789, the king published an ordinance, which, even according to the admission of the republicans, redressed all the real evils of France. Thus the people had obtained parliamentary reform, and all their practical causes of com

Bourrienne, viii, 109.

plaint were removed. And what was the consequence? Were the commons satisfied with the advantages they had gained? Were the new representatives inclined to support the cause of order? Their conduct was diametrically the reverse. No sooner had they obtained real freedom, no sooner had they got quit of the feudal fetters, than they were seized with the passion for political power: their very first act was an usurpation of the rights of sovereignty; they subverted the constitution of the monarchy, by compelling the other orders to form one assembly with them, instead of voting according to immemorial usage in separate houses; and then, by the force of numerical majorities, confiscated the whole property of the church; struck off two-thirds of the national debt; abolished titles of dignity, and the right of primogeniture; and established the most thorough democracy which the world had ever beheld.

Nor was the fate of this popular minister-this champion of the commons of France-this leader of Parliamentary Reform, less remarkable than the consequences of the measure which he introduced. For a few weeks, he was hailed by the shouts of the multitude; and when the king, acting under the influence of other councils, dismissed him from the ministry, he was brought back from Coppet, in Switzerland, by the popular voice, in triumph, equalled only by the return of Napoleon from Elba. But, from that day, his popularity declined. The popular party having gained their object of augmenting their own forces in the constituent assembly, speedily abandoned the minister who had conceded that great addition to their power; dismissed by the assembly, who now adopted other leaders, more audacious and less honest than himself, he was arrested by the populace on the very road which he had recently traversed in triumph, and compelled to sue for permission to leave France, from that very assembly which owed its elevation to his concessions.

There can be no greater error than to suppose, that because the conces

+ Mignet, i. 37,

Concession to the Catholics, it was universally said by the ablest men in Britain, would extinguish the jealousies and animosities of Ireland. Religious rancour would no longer distract that beautiful island: the great military force hitherto maintained in it would be withdrawn for the protection of the rest of the empire, and instead of a focus of sedition it would become a fortress of loyalty. This measure, in itself just and reasonable, was carried by a great exertion of ministerial vigour and capacity; and what was the consequence? Is Ireland less formidable to Britain, her peasantry less discontented, her Members of Parliament more grateful than before? Have any of the troops who compose her garrisons been withdrawn to protect the south_of England from violence and conflagration? The fact is notoriously the reverse, the democratic spirit has come instead of religious fervour; Repeal of the Union has become the war-cry instead of Catholic emancipation; and the bitterest enemies of the late ministry, have been those very men who owed their seat in the Legislature to their exertions.

The great error of the friends of order in the present time, consists in not attending to the ultimate consequences of the concessions to the democratic part of the constitution, which are now proposed. They see it brought forward by able and enlightened men; splendid orators and gifted statesmen; supported by those who have a great stake in the country, and whose interests are decidedly adverse to popular violence. Nothing brought forward by such men, it is thought, can have a revolutionary tendency. This is perfectly true with reference to the measures which will be proposed by them. But the question is, if they give an impulse to democratic ambition by conceding one point, will the government be hereafter able to resist additional concession, when demanded by an inferior class, roused to revolutionary energy by the hopes and ambition which the first great victory of the people will infallibly excite?

* Mignet, i. 4.

Democratic ambition, it is always to be recollected, is insatiable; it will never rest satisfied till all the power of government is at the immediate disposal of the people. It is totally unlike the discontent arising from oppression; like all other passions, it is repressed by the absence, and increased by the revival of hope. It is never so strong as when it has the nearest prospect of complete gratification.

A signal proof of the truth of these observations occurred in both the French revolutions. The revolutionary energy of France was quadrupled by the duplication of the tiers etats; it multiplied an hundred-fold with the Tennis Court oath. "The Commission proposed by the King on 23d June, 1789," said Mirabeau," would have been hailed with transport two years ago; now it is too late."* Why was it too late? Because in the interval Neckar had yielded to popular clamour; because he had doubled the number of the Commons and excited the revolutionary ardour of all classes by this extraordinary addition to the power of the people.

"The consequences of the revolt of July 14th and the capture of the Bastile," says Mignet, were immense. Half a million of National Guards immediately rose into action; the movement of the Revolution became irresistible." This is the language of the ablest of the republican historians-this was the consequence of the next victory of the people. So far from inspiring moderation, it increased audacity; because the spirit which got possession of the nation was not the desire of freedom, but the passion for power.

Twenty pieces of cannon, guided by a Ney, a Davoust, or a Murat, placed in battery at the Louvre, on July 28, 1830, would have changed the destinies of France. They would have crushed a hydra which five hundred thousand brave men now could not overcome. Such are the consequences of irresolution and imbecility, in resisting the first attacks of revolutionary aggression.

Napoleon knew well how to act against popular insurrections-no

+ Ibid. i. 69.

man understood better that the way to quiet the people was not to yield to their demands. On the 2d October, 1795, all Paris was in insurrection against the government of the Convention; 40,000 National Guards, well armed and disciplined, and animated by the utmost enthusiasm, advanced against the Tuileries, defended only by five thousand regular troops and a train of heavy artillery. But these troops were commanded by Napoleon. Menou had nearly ruined the government by his irresolution on the preceding day -the committees of governmentthe Convention were trembling; proposals of capitulation to the insurgent capital were openly made in the Assembly. But Napoleon was immovable. A few discharges of grapeshot from his powerful batteries dispersed the dense columns of the assailants; and a revolt which, if successful, would have changed the destinies of the world, was extinguished in three hours.

On July 28, 1830, the same posts at the Tuileries were attacked by a mob, not exceeding 6000 men, imperfectly armed, and totally undisciplined; but they were not met by Napoleon. The whole effective regular forces in the city did not then amount to 5000 men; they had only eight pieces of cannon, and only four rounds of grape were discharged in the whole three days' conflict.* The consequence was, the Tuileries were forced, the government overturned, the disaffected over all France roused into action, revolutionary hopes universally diffused, the dynasty of Belgium overthrown, and Europe threatened with a general war.

Such are the different effects of steady resistance, and imbecile submission to popular clamour.

Where was it that the Revolutionary spirit so powerfully excited by these memorable events was arrested? Was it by the system of concession and temporization which went on at Brussels at the commencement of the revolt, or the feeble and dastardly attack of the Dutch troops? It was by the fire of the citadel of Antwerp:

Had General Chasse commanded at Paris, the approaching devastation of Europe would have been averted.

We do not make these remarks in order to recommend any illegal or violent acts on the part of government. We have an utter horror for all coups d'etat, especially when supported by five thousand men, and four rounds of grape shot. The steadiest adherence to existing law, the most rigid observance of the Rights of the People, should form the leading principle of every administration: nay, the existence of public excitement is a sufficient reason for selecting this as the period for the most anxious examination into any real grievances that may oppress the people, and the immediate repeal of all restrictions on, or unnecessary burdens on, public industry. But while all this is conceded, the question still remains, is this the time for a great and unprecedented addition to the powers of the people? When the democratic spirit has been every where set afloat by the extraordinary success of the Belgian and French Revolutions; when the daring, the reckless, the desperate, are only waiting the commencement of any considerable change to work upon the people by their ambitious projects; is it a fitting season to give a greater increase to the popular part of the constitution than it has received since the Norman Conquest? is there no danger that if the relative strength of the opposing forces in the machine is so suddenly changed, its balance may be subverted, and the flywheel become incapable of regulating its movements?

There is a principle in the constitution which admits of a progressive and gradual addition to the democratic part of the state; and we deeply lament that it has not been matured into a regular system. This is in the disfranchisement of such boroughs as are convicted of corruption, and the transference of their right of electing to the most considerable manufacturing cities. Such a system would produce that gradual addition to the democratic power in the constitution, which is consistent