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4. The election of every open borough is, to a large extent, under the control of electors who live at a distance from it, take no interest in its welfare, and sell their votes to the highest bidder, without regard to any thing but price. These hired strangers often throw out the best, and elect the worst representatives, in spite of the majority of the inhabitants; practically, they disfranchise the latter. Farther, they form a leading cause in preventing all but the most incompetent men from becoming candidates. Remedy here is called for by the constitution, to remove innovation.

5. Bribery prevails to an enormous extent in almost every open borough. The Constitution and laws, of course, are opposed to it.

We could add largely to the list, but it is wholly needless. The defence of all this rests chiefly on two assertions; the first is-It works well; and the second is-Reform must pro

duce revolution.

Touching the first, it is really the odious doctrine-the end sanctifies the means: the constitution is trampled on, the law is violated, and gross crime is committed, but it works well, ergo, it must continue. The assertion, however, is totally untrue; the present system has long worked in the most baleful manner possible. When the Catholic Question was carried, it was proved that a coalition of the great borough interests could make almost any change of law and institution, in defiance of the public voice, and the solemn engagements of the Legislature. No upright man can say that this ought to remain without remedy. For several years the House of Commons has treated the sentiments and petitions of the community with the utmost disregard; and it has never even attempt ed to remove the unexampled public suffering which has prevailed without intermission. At present the House proclaims the population to be in great distress, yet it takes no statesmanlike view of causes, and proposes no adequate remedies; it contents itself with repeating, parrot-like, the vulgar, ignorant, factious cry for retrenchment and reduction of taxes, although every schoolboy knows that, in the nature of things, it is impossible for the lat

ter to yield any relief worthy of notice to national loss and want. Thus it is proved by experience, that the present system forms a House of Commons which neither supplies proper security for public possessions, nor possesses the ability required for the discharge of its ordinary duties.

This system is so far from preventing change in the distribution of election power, that it is hourly making it. It is an argument with the anti-reformers, that reform would, of necessity, be revolution, because it would place power in new hands: now that which they defend, is continually producing the revolution they profess to oppose; it is constantly transferring power from the Aristocracy to the Democracy, and giving effect to the schemes of the Radicals. We need only point to late elections, and particularly the last one, for proof that in many open boroughs it has given the populace as complete an ascendency as universal suffrage could do; and that in various counties it has placed both the Aristocracy and Agriculture in the minority. These anti-reformers bewailed the issue of the last election, and yet it was produced by change of interest and person, but not of sentiment and conduct, in the elector; it was the natural and certain fruit of the system they defend. In the nature of things, the latter must regularly extend what is tantamount to universal suffrage amidst the boroughs, and enlarge the command of manufactures and trade over counties. If it make no direct change in the close boroughs, it makes a very sweeping indirect one; it destroys the means by which they work for good, combines them and degrades them into engines of vicious private gain.

This system causes an election war between the Aristocracy and the Democracy, which reform only can terminate. The lower orders, so far as principle is concerned, elect none but professed enemies of the former; and manufacturing and trading freeholders act in the same manner in counties. While it thus makes it the great object of the elector to return the most unfitting representativeto elect the demagogue and profligate, it of necessity carries the same

war into the House of Commons, and makes it the great object of a large part of this House to sacrifice public interests for the sake of aspersing and trampling on the Aristocracy. The system, therefore, fills the mass of the people with disaffection, leads them to embrace the most pernicious principles of policy, and renders the popular branch of the Legislature an engine of discord and public ruin!

Having shewn that the first de fensive assertion is of no value, we will now look at the second. To say that reform must necessarily be revolution, is to say what is not only groundless but ridiculous; it is demonstrable that it may be revolution or preservation; a loss to the Aristocracy or a gain, according to kind and degree. Is there, then, any danger that none but ruinous reform will be adopted? The passion of the lower classes for reform has greatly abated-the middle and upper ones wish for such only as will be cau tious, practical, and moderate.-Ministers have pledged themselves to stop too soon rather than proceed too far;-the honest part of the reformers ask only such as will disfranchise the corrupt democrat as well as aristocrat, and base the representation on property-and a majority of the Legislature is at least strongly opposed to all that may be speculative and dangerous. It seems to be scarcely possible for any pernicious scheme of reform to be carried in the teeth of all this.

We, of course, conclude from what we have stated, that a general reform ought to be no longer delayed; but in saying this, we must disavow all participation in the opinions which the reformers have lately put forth at public meetings. Whatever may have been the case with others, the intellect of these men has not "marched" an hair's breadth, and they have never been visited by the "schoolmaster." They can only repeat the silly, senseless, factious trash which was current amidst the lowest of the Radicals ten years ago. Exceptions there are, but the body of them have proved that they are profoundly ignorant of the question they pretend to decide on. If we consent to have reform, we must have nothing more; we must have > change of principle-no innova

tion-nothing which is not reform in reality as well as name; and farther, we must have no partial and corrupt reform. We are willing to repair dilapidation, supply defect, and remove abuse, on substantial proof, but not on controverted opinion; and also to dispense impartial justice to Aristocrat and Democrat, Anti-reformer and Radical, without regard to person, and solely with reference to public interests; beyond this we cannot go.

The close boroughs form the great object of contention between the reformers and their opponents; the former attack, and the latter defend them, on the ground that they are possessed by the Aristocracy. Both sides err egregiously. The Aristocracy, as a whole, does not possess, and it draws little exclusive benefit from them. They belong to a few Peers and Commoners, who use them as individuals for private gain; and the great body of the Peers have no boroughs. On all matters which more directly affect the Aristocracy, for example, the Game and Corn Laws, it finds the close-borough members divided; and at the best, it has only the few votes which one division possesses more than the other. With the exception of a number too small to have any material effect on the general deci. sions of the House of Commons, the close boroughs practically belong as much to the Democracy as to the Aristocracy; their members act like those of the open ones.

When the history of late years is looked at, it seems a most ludicrous absurdity to argue that the close boroughs form a source of exclusive benefit to the Aristocracy as a body. The men who have regularly attacked the latter-who have continually taken the lead in depriving it of its possessions-who have made it the object of popular animosity-and who have, as even its enemies assert, placed it on the brink of destruction, have been the members of these close boroughs. It has found in these very boroughs the most bitter of its foes; it has suffered infinitely more from them than the rest of the community, and there is the best reason for believing that its situation would have been far better than it is, had they not been in existence.

The truth is, in general the Aris

tocrat who possesses a certain number attaches himself for private gain to the Ministry or Opposition; in consequence, they are not used for the benefit of the Aristocracy, but for that of party; they are made to operate like the open ones. In these days, when the popular side has gained the ascendency and the Ministry follow it, the close boroughs are in the majority used as a tremendous weapon against the Aristocracy. The assertion that they give to the latter a monopoly of place, is not true; they only give it to a few individual aristocrats, to the prejudice of the Aristocracy as a body. Because the vicious and imbecile exception possesses them, the great mass of virtuous and talented Peers are as much excluded from office, as uninfluential commoners.

It may be said that the members of these boroughs might in an urgent case be made to act in a body for the benefit of the Aristocracy. History pronounces this to be scarcely possible; but however, if the interests of the Aristocracy cannot be protect ed without, they cannot be with such union; it would create an opposite union against which it would be powerless, and which would be destructive to all.

Our deliberate conviction, therefore, is, that if the close boroughs were abolished, and the members of them were transferred to the landed interest generally, the Aristocracy would be a great gainer from the change.

But how would the abolition affect the community at large? In looking at this question, we must disregard the silly assertions of the reformers. Whatever these boroughs may be in ownership, they have always supplied the most effective bulwark of the popular cause. By the latter we mean the real cause of the peoplethat of their interests, but not of their passions and delusions-the cause which in the nature of things must eternally exist as one distinct from, jealous of, and in a certain degree opposed to, that of the government. An Opposition, that is a party in the Legislature to watch vigilantly, and when needful to withstand, the acts and policy of the Ministry, is as necessary for public good as a Ministry; to make it beneficial, it ought

VOL. XXIX, NO. CLXXVI.

not only to be highly endowed with talent and knowledge, but to be almost as independent of the people, as of the government. Such independence is essential, because the people commonly support Ministers the most warmly when their interests call for opposition; and it is necessary for their party in Parliament to lead, rather than follow them. The close boroughs have furnished such an Opposition-they have placed in the Legislature a powerful body of men, having a deep personal interest in scrutinizing the conduct of government, qualified in every way to fight the battles of the community with the greatest effect, and alike independent of both the Ministry and the People.

The abolition would necessarily destroy this Opposition. We grant that it would raise up another in its place, but what would be its character? A question of greater moment could not be propounded. It is well known that the lights and leaders of the House of Commons must, in general, enter it free of expense, or be excluded; whatever may be the case with the Pitts, Burkes, Cannings, and Broughams, in mature life, they cannot gain an introduction by popular favour, or the money of others. Without these boroughs, the Ministry might have as much leading talent in the House as ever, but the Opposition could not calcu late on any; the former would be supported by the ascendant party in the country, therefore, the leaders of the latter could scarcely be elected in any quarter through popular favour. If there were now no such boroughs, the heads of the existing Opposition could scarcely hope for seats, save through weight of purse; and if the Lord Chancellor had to sustain a contest with Mr Hunt, the latter, in all probability, would triumph. Then it would be impossible for untried and rising young men, possessed only of ability, to gain seats on the side of Opposition. Under the proper working of the Constitution, the case would always be the same, because the Opposition would have only the minority of electors.

Thus, in the first place, the new Opposition would be destitute of leading talent and knowledge. In the second, it would be almost powerless

in numbers; and in the third, it would be compelled to pander to the passions of the populace, feed popular delusion, and betray the cause of the people in important matters, as the only means of securing the re-election of its members. If one of the latter should, however, conscientiously and justly, oppose or advocate measures in hostility to popular clamour, where could he afterwards gain a seat?

England forms the only great nation, in which liberty ever could regularly flourish, reach perfection, and take the character of perpetuity. In all others, it could only obtain partial and transient existence. We ascribe the difference, in a large degree, to the circumstance that England hitherto has placed in the popular branch of her legislature, a powerful body of men, highly gifted, and alike independent of government and people, to inspect and check the former, on the one hand, and lead and restrain the latter, on the other. It must be observed, that in addition to its effects on the Ministry, this body keeps in order the democratic party; the Humes and O'Connells are rendered insignifieant and powerless in Parliament, not by Ministers, but by the regular Opposition.

We, therefore, conscientiously believe, that these maligned close boroughs enter largely into the root and aliment of British liberty; and that their abolition would inflict infinitely more injury on the democratie cause, than on the aristocratic

one.

The example of America is of no value. She is yet so much an infant, that she has not reached the divisions between poor and rich, or the age of demagogues and popular discontent. Besides, she has no aristoeracy for the passions of the multitude to act against.

The honest part of the Reformers are willing to spare a certain number of these boroughs as a means of admitting talent into the House of Commons. We apprehend there will be infinite difficulty in making this a matter of legal arrangement. The talent must not only be admitted, but it must be divided, and a full share of it must always be in opposition. The number might easily

be fixed, but not the ownership. Although they are at present filled by the choice of party, they belong to individuals who very frequently change sides. The Marquis of Cleveland is, we believe, a pretty large proprietor; this man has been, for some years, constantly leaping from side to side, with all the agility of a mountebank; and by extraordinary accident, some piece of personal benefit has fallen on himself at almost every leap. The Marquis of Hertford is, we think, another; he supported, in succession, the Liverpoos, Canning, and Goderich cabinets, and he is now in opposition. Various of the great borough owners have, in late years, changed sides more than once, in violation of principle, and apparently from the base motive of private benefit. Mr Canning, by the formation of his Ministry, and the Duke of Wellington and Sir R. Peel, by their conduct on the Catholic Question, wellnigh destroyed integrity amidst public men ; and these borough owners have since taken the first place in exhibiting sordid and shameless disregard of it. A number of ministerial and opposition boroughs might be spared, but it would be neither practicable nor proper to bind individual owners of them constantly to the same side. What Cleveland, or Hertford, or Bedford, or Rutland, could, in these liberal times, be always restricted to the bread and water of opposition? Without bonds, the opposition boroughs would, probably, be nearly all ministerial ones, a month after the passing of the Reform law.

It is thus evident, that if a portion of the close boroughs should be retained, they ought to be no longer individual property. Should they remain such property, the reduction of the number would tend to range them all on one side, and give them the most mischievous character. It is because they are so numerous that they are beneficial; that however the owners may change sides, there must still be a formidable part of them in opposition. Diminish the number sufficiently, and it will make them all the instruments of government. Where then ought the ownership to be vested? With regard to the ministerial ones, there would be little difficulty. Every man who seeks

nothing beyond reform and public good, will say that Ministers ought to have seats in the House of Commons; and if this be true, the country ought to provide them with seats. A number of boroughs might be given to them without any danger of their being improperly used. A Minister ought not to represent any populous place; he ought not to be exposed to election unpopularity and defeat, or to be enabled to employ the mighty means given him by office in intimidating and corrupting electors; he ought to be wholly independent of every place and interest. The connexion of Mr Canning and Mr Huskisson with Liverpool had the most baleful effects on the councils of the empire, and it frequently caused great embarrassment to government by the disclosures they made, in public and private, to their constituents; we do not say how far it produced the scandalous corruption which the people of Liverpool have just displayed. It would be a gain to public convenience and benefit, if Ministers had seats in virtue of their offices, were restricted from becoming candidates for populous places, and had a limited number of seats for promising young men as subordinates or supporters. This would exempt them in a considerable degree from the pernicious influences which, not the Aristocracy, but a few individual Peers, exercise over them; and it would remove the things which so often deprive the leading Peers of virtue and patriot ism. Practically a Minister might as well sit in virtue of his office, as of the votes of the electors he nominally represents. The object in retaining the boroughs is to retain the seats, without giving any power of choice to the ostensible electors.

The difficulty would rest with the Opposition boroughs. It is essential for the Opposition to have as many of these boroughs or free seats as the ministry. But then the perplexing question shews itself-How is it to be defined and distinguished? The Ministry is a duly appointed and recognised body; but the Opposition, although quite as necessary, is not. The world knows who form the latter, but the constitution knows nothing of it save in sufferance. The heads of it, like the Ministry, ought

to dispose of its seats. Assuming that these heads at present consist of Sir R. Peel and his friends, how long will they continue to do so? Only, we suspect, until Ministers will take Sir Robert and certain of his colleagues into office. If afterwards the heads of Opposition be found in Mr Hume, Mr O'Connell, Mr W. Harvey, &c., it will scarcely be said that they ought to be intrusted with the filling of the free seats. If the parties which, until lately, bore the names of Whig and Tory, were perpetually separated, the matter might be arranged; but they are not. For some time before the change of Ministry, there were two great hostile parties in opposition-the old Tories and Whigs-the one of which had at least quite as much right to be deemed the constitutional Opposition as the other. Thus we know not how the difficulty could be surmounted of naming proper men to dispose of the seats in question.

There has often been, and there ought always to be, an independent party-one not seeking office, and holding the balance between the Ministry and Opposition. This party is quite as necessary, and needs talent as much, as the others. It, therefore, ought to have a small share of these seats.

If the close boroughs be wholly abolished, and no provision be made for securing to talent admission into the House of Commons without cost, and exempted from the caprice and control of popular electors, we are confident that the abolition will inflict infinitely more injury on the cause of the People than on that of the Aristocracy-will be chiefly a gain to arbitrary power-and will give a deadly blow to the best interests of the empire. If the plan of the reformers we have mentioned do not secure half of the boroughs it may retain to the constitutional Opposition, its retention of a part will be more pernicious than the abolition of the whole would be: it will destroy the portion which is invaluable to the country, and give the worst operation to the other. Talent will only be able to gain the free seats by ranging itself with the Ministry; and the heads of Opposition, or, in other words, its ability, knowledge, and integrity, must make themselves

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