the slaves of popular passion and delusion, or be expelled Parliament. Every Whig reformer will declare that it would have been a great public evil, if when the Whigs were in opposition, such men as Fox, Burke, Brougham, Tierney, &c., had been excluded from the House of Commons. Yet they would have been in danger of exclusion at every election, and they could only have escaped it through the money of others, had it not been for the close boroughs. If such men ought always to have seats, it needs no proof to shew that seats ought always to be provided for them; they could place no dependence on popular favour, and their election through it would be rather injurious than beneficial; it of course follows that they ought to have seats given them in some other manner. The man who would replace a system which secures them constant admission into the House with one which would generally exclude them when in opposition-that is, when their presence in it would be the most necessary for public good-is not a friend to popular liberty and privilege. We do not speak thus for the sake of the Aristocracy; the distinction of the boroughs might, we believe, be effected without injuring its interests. We are anxious to see the abomination they form in principle removed; but, seeking nothing beyond reform, we are also anxious to retain the benefits they yield in operation. We cannot consent to sweep away good with evil. It is an easy matter to generalize, and if it were only necessary to look at the elector, reform might be understood by the factious dunces who decide on it so rashly. But impartial men who love their country will not be satisfied with merely glancing at the surface; they will not be moved by assertion and calumny; they will examine deeply and widely, and sanction such change alone as will be improvement. Either substitute for these boroughs something which will secure to the great leaders of opposition the easy and certain entrance into Parliament they have hitherto had, or, for the sake of liberty and the empire, preserve them with all their iniquity! If they, or any part of them, be abolished, the question arises-to whom are their seats to be transferred? Putting out of sight the Aristocracy, they have always,in the most flourishing part of English history, belonged to the landed interest; and if nothing beyond reform be attempted, they must, after the abolition, belong to it. The name of this interest has, in late years, been as studiously suppressed, as though it had been without existence. The newspaper scribes and gin-shop reviewers have always spoken from motives alike guilty and obvious, as though the whole land of the country were held by the great Aristocrats. Placing the latter and their land entirely out of the question, there is a landed interest, which in wealth and numbers is of far greater importance than any other; and according to the constitution, justice and equity, it has as much right as any other to be represented in the House of Commons. Every honest reformer will say, that on the score of public good, the seats which are now its own, must not be taken from it by reform; how to secure them to it, requires much consideration. This great interest in late years has been far more inefficiently represented than any other, the causes of this are continually enlarged, and without reform, the distress which has so long sat on it must soon become ruin. In circumstance and system of election, other interests have a destructive superiority over it; and this is utterly indefensible, even on the uniformity doctrines of the Radicals. In the first place, while it has no influence in filling the seats of other interests, the latter have almost as much as itself in filling the only seats it possesses. The landowners have no share in electing the members of manufacturing and trading places; but the manufacturers and traders have a vast share in electing the members of counties; and they have lately gained the support of various borough owners. Small country towns which are open, are about as free from the influence of the landed interest as London and Liverpool; and their inhabitants are as hostile to it, as those of the manufacturing districts. It follows that the members of manufactures and trade represent them only, and therefore they zealously promote their interests at the cost of agriculture, as the best means of securing their own re-election; but those of agriculture represent manufactures and trade likewise; in consequence they cannot, in many cases, even defend its interests, without ensuring their expulsion from their seats; probably of two county members, one regularly acts with its enemies, while the other opposes them with nothing better than compromise. This state of things rapidly grows worse. The cities and boroughs continually become more independent of, and hostile to, the landed interest; and manufacturing and trading freeholders increase very greatly, while agricultural ones remain almost stationary. This interest has already been stripped of the county members in Middlesex and Surrey, and if no reform take place, it will soon share the same fate in various other counties. Its members are losing the seats for boroughs they formerly possessed; and not many of them can now afford to contest either borough or county. Not only manufacturers and merchants, but even trading lawyers and party empirics, aspire at present to county seats. In the second place, the elective franchise in manufactures and trade is gained not only by purchase, but by birth, servitude, occupancy, and we think marriage: in agriculture it is gained only by property. In the former, mechanics, labourers, and petty tradesmen, to an enormous extent, have votes, independently of property of any kind; and in the latter, neither labourer nor farmer has a vote, if he have not a freehold of a certain value. In manufactures and trade, the poor voters go with the rich ones, and surpass them in hostility to agriculture; but the small and middling freeholders of country towns, are as much opposed to the latter, as those of large manufacturing places. In the third place, a borough can be contested at far less cost than a county, and the latter cannot be contested on the side of agriculture, with any hope of success, without the support of certain great families. It follows that the borough has greater choice of members, and is represented with more ability and independence, than the county. In the fourth place, the members of the landed interest are connected with the party Aristocracy; but those of other interests are not. If, therefore, Ministers decide on sacrificing it, they, by their influence with this Aristocracy, are enabled to array almost half its own members against it, and neutralize the whole. Although this interest has a great number of members, it is little better than nominally represented; it is at the mercy of government; on every emergency, one party of them by their dependence on trade and manufactures, on the one hand, and the party Aristocrats on the other, make the whole powerless in its favour. If trade and manufactures be attacked, their members act unanimously and independently in their defence. And in the fifth place, government has been for some time acting on the policy of basing itself more and more on trade and manufactures, and conciliating them by inroads on agriculture-the great party aristocrats are ranging themselves more and more with trade and manufactures-the latter are carrying on a war of extermination against agriculture, and both the Ministry and Opposition have embraced the doctrine, that its continual, though gradual, sacrifice to them, is necessary for the common good. From all this, our own most carefully formed and conscientious opinion is, that the Landed Interest and Aristocracy, as a whole, have only this choice before them-Reform or ruin. It is demonstrated by experience, and the nature of things, that the present system will soon virtually drive them out of the House of Commons, and render them defenceless against the mighty enemies who seek to plunge them into destruction. It is asserted by the constitution, right and public good, that the landed interest ought, in respect of representation in Parliament, to be placed on an equality with every other; and he who denies it, is not a reformer, but a revolutionist. We care not for the Peers; it would be far better for this interest if the more influential of them had nothing to do with the choice of its members; we will throw them out of the question, and then we may safely affirm, that the landowners who are not Peers, farmers, and husbandry labourers, have as much right to be directly represented in the House of Commons, as the manufacturing and trading part of the population. To produce the equality, it is manifestly essential that manufactures and trade should have as little to do with electing the members of agriculture, as it has to do with electing theirs. Let the large towns have members, but restrict their inhabitants from voting for county ones. For example, let the freeholders of Liverpool, Manchester, or Leeds, vote for its members, instead of those of the county. This would be so far from being unjust, that it is necessary to remove indefensible injustice. The town freeholder in general has as much connexion with trade, and as little with agriculture, as the burgess; yet he is prohibited from voting for the members of the town who represent the trade to which he belongs, and allowed to vote for the county ones who repre sent an interest he has nothing to do with, and is hostile to. In number. less cases, he votes for both the town and county ones-he votes for four, while the agricultural freeholder can rarely vote for more than those of the county. The inhabitants of Westminster, Southwark, and their suburbs, elect not only their own members, but the county ones also; they thus usurp a double portion of the franchise, and practically disfranchise the landowners. The unconstitutional and flagitious character of this must be obvious to every one. The freeholder of the town too small for members ought still to vote for county ones. - Having thus in a great measure separated the electors of the landed interest from others, it must next be considered which would be the best mode of giving them the members of the abolished close boroughs. If these members be given to country towns, they will either be elected on the same grounds as those of manufacturing places-they will in effect be given to manufactures and trade, or they will again become the property of borough owners. These objects must be kept in view-the vote must be principally confined to those who are interested in agriculture-a large number of landowners must share in the elec tion-and the expense must be greatly reduced. They would perhaps be the best attained by a modi. fication of Mr Pitt's plan for increa sing the number of county members. It is objected that the experiment has failed in Yorkshire; but we imagine matters would have been quite as bad in this county as they are, if no change had been made. The four-member system might, we think, work as well in a county as it does in the city of London; perhaps more might be said in its favour; it might break the power of the great landowners, and cause-which is a thing much to be desired-many of the county members to owe their election to middling and small ones. We of course say this on the assumption, that manufacturing freeholders would not be permitted to vote for counties. A county might be divided into two parts, for the purpose of giving two members to each; or a number of its existing divisions might be formed into a whole, and receive two members. The system of attaching the adjoining hundred to a country town is objectionable, because it gives the turn of the elec tion, either to men who are hostile to agriculture, or to one great land, owner. Nothing less than a district ought to have members. To reduce the pernicious ascendency of the great landowners, the number of electors ought to be enlarged. The vote should be given to copyholders. The principle of giving it to occupancy is recognised, and the reformers intend to make it the leading one in bestowing mem bers on the large towns; why then cannot it be adopted in agricultural elections? The great landowners let cheap farms, and in consequence their tenants are to a wide extent freeholders; the middling and small ones demand high rents, therefore their tenants have few votes; thus in proportion to quantity of land, the former have a great advantage over the latter. If every occupier of land worth annually twenty pounds and upwards, had a vote, the effects we think would be greatly in favour of the middling and small landowners. This vote for occupancy should, however, be confined to the occupiers of land, and withheld from every freeholder; its object should be to put the respectable occupier on a level with the latter. For the same purpose the expenses of election ought to be reduced. We do not wish to substitute one extreme for another; on the contrary, we are convinced that a system which should elect the members of the House of Commons free of cost, would be a very ruinous one. The existing law of qualification can be, and often is, evaded; if there were no election expenses, men without a shilling could easily gain seats; and it is evident enough, that, in every quarter, such men would be amidst the first in seeking them. What business has a man without fortune in the House? He must live, and his seat will yield him no honest income; he must, therefore, either follow some employment which will disqualify him for discharging his public duties, or become a hireling; in truth, he must at once be a slave to gain his nominal property. Such a system would be in effect an extension of the close borough one; and it would increase the corrupt power of the leading Peers and Ministers. This of course does not apply to what we have said respecting the free admission of talent, because it is to be confined to talent only, not elected by popular choice. We wish to see agriculture still represented by reasonably rich country gentlemen; but we also wish to see that practical disqualification removed which now rests on them. Our plan would be to reduce the expenses of a seat for a county or agricultural district so far as to put it within the reach of any of them, in order that the candidate might offer on ability only-the middling and small landowners might have a proper share in choosing their representatives-and the members of the landed interest might be duly dependent on the mass of their constituents. 245 We will observe, that if the members of the abolished boroughs be given to counties, without taking from manufacturing and trading freeholders the power of voting for county members, it will be virtually to the landed interest much the same as though they were given to the large towns. If Middlesex and Surrey get each two additional members, The manuwho will elect them? facturing parts of Yorkshire already boast that they return two of the county members; and it is evident enough, that in the space of seven or fourteen years, they will be able In most to return all the four. counties, the additional members must fall into the hands of the freeholders we have named; who be sides must neutralize the others to the landed interest. It matters not whether the close boroughs in question, or an equal number of the small independent ones, be secured to agriculture; it is however evident, that if the proposed change transfer seats from the latter to hostile interests, it will be the reverse of reform. Of these small boroughs we need say little; their members might be given to the large towns; although they are in many cases called agricultural ones, theyare generally in both feeling and representatives the contrary. Should they be retained for agriculture in lieu of the close ones, the combining of them with a large track of surrounding country will not be sufficient; the vote in them ought also to be taken from the trading and given to the agricul tural part of the inhabitants. What will reform do with the large boroughs? They are the most corrupt and dangerous of the whole; and if it do not operate on them with an unsparing hand, it will produce small benefit. The system under which the franchise is gained by apprenticeship and birth, is not more false in principle than pernicious in effects. A petty tradesman is free, but a rich one is not; from this alone the apprentices and children of the former gain the vote; and those of the latter are denied it. Because a labourer is free, his children are; because a merchant or professional man is not free, his children are not. This system confines the increase of freemen in a great measure to shopmen, mechanics, and labourers, and scatters them through the country. It has already established in these boroughs what is equivalent in effect to universal suffrage. If in each borough the manufacturing and trading freeholders, and all housekeepers paying more than a certain rent, be aliowed to vote; this will do something towards forming a balance to the poorer burgesses at present; but it will be very insufficient for the future. Such burgesses must necessarily multiply far more rapidly than freeholders and housekeepers; consequently in a comparatively short period of time they must bear the same proportion to the respectable electors they do now-they must gain the complete control of the election. A burgess gives the vote to his apprentices and sons-we think he even in some places gives it to the husbands of his daughters; if freeholders and housekeepers be allowed to vote, they must do the same, for the injustice cannot be tolerated of conceding the privilege to one set of electors, and refusing it to another far more worthy of it. We need not shew how this would operate in multiplying electors, particularly nonresident ones. At present the bought outvoters are so numerous, that it requires a fortune to bring them to the poll, and they hold the turn of the election; their power is so formidable, that a candidate frequently canvasses them the first, as the best means of discovering how far he can hope for success. We could name several places in which at the last election the candidates who had a majority of the inhabitants were thrown out, and the sitting members were elected by the outvoters. The latter continually increase largely in numbers and power, and if no change be made, they will soon in most places virtually disfranchise the inhabitants. The evil fruits of this system extend much farther. The same men who elect members of Parliament also elect the mayors and aldermen -the magistrates-the local rulers of the place. Thus the selection of the magistracy is, in the majority, confined to the corrupt and preju diced ignorant; while respectable merchants, tradesmen, professional men, and housekeepers, have no voice in it. It is therefore a matter of bribery also. If our memory do not mislead us, the Liverpool papers stated, not long ago, that as much money had been expended in this most pure place, in a contest for the office of mayor, as is often expended elsewhere for a seat in the House of Commons. In addition, the Magistrates must be taken from the burgesses. It must be observed, that this monstrous system is in the highest degree destructive to public and private morals; it strips both representative and constituent of patriotism and integrity. Those who would spare it, and yet destroy the comparatively beneficial close boroughs, are not reformers, but men whose schemes would hasten the arrival of public ruin. We have no wish to take the franchise from any one who already possesses it; but, however, we would not suffer it to be gained any longer by apprenticeship and birth. This would gradually extinguish the poor, corrupt, and non-resident electors. A boy from the country goes to any borough-for example, to Hull-as an apprentice, and in consequence he becomes one of its electors. At the expiration of his apprenticeship, he removes to London or Liverpool, and fixes himself there for life. What stake has he in the welfare of Hull? None; it is not the place of his birth or residence; he has no vote during the period he is really interested in it, he only gains one when he becomes to it a stranger. Yet he votes for its members, while its respectable inhabitants are restricted from doing so ; and he, and men like him, hold the turn of the election, in spite of the inhabitants. He is more accessible to bribery than the resident electors, and he almost always sells himself, without regard to any thing but price. Either this is thoroughly indefensible, or the members of a place ought to be chosen by corrupt strangers and enemies to it. As the vote is given for the good of the place, and not of the individual, we cannot see why a man should not forfeit his freedom by removing from the place, of which he is free; but, however, we would |