at once permit every freeman to vote in that of his residence, borough or county, and prohibit him from voting in any other. A distinction must be made between burgess and freeholder; the latter has the same stake in the county from which he draws his vote, whether he reside in or out of it; therefore his vote ought not to be affected by non-residence. The county freeman is at present disfranchised as soon as he parts with his stake in the interest of the county.

If reform do not extend to those matters, and be successful in putting an end to bribery and the influence of superiors, what will be its leading fruits? The seats of these boroughs will be monopolized, not by the Whigs-not even by the democrats of Greek-loan renown-but by the Cobbetts, Hunts, and O'Connells. The great cause why better men now possess them, is, such men monopolize the means of bribery and intimidation; remove this cause, without changing the majority of electors, and every seat will pass to demagogues and traitors.

Notwithstanding the faults and impurities of the scot and lot places, we are inclined to spare some of the larger of them. We even think that a very small corner of the House of Commons should be given to the Woods, Hunts, and O'Connells-to the members of the very rabble. We are aware that these members are always the most incapable, and the most hostile to the interests of the people, but still they have their use. They form the means by which the multitude can always bring its grievances and politics before Parliament; and also be made acquainted with the want of sense, truth, and honesty of the demagogues who delude it.

All seem to be agreed, that in giving members to the large manufacturing towns, the franchise ought to be limited to property; we will therefore only observe, that a low qualification will operate much like universal suffrage.

We will now offer some general observations. Reform is not to create a new system; it is cautiously to remove what is bad and supply what is defective; but it is also to preserve what is valuable, without regard to theory and speculation. What does

the elective franchise exist for? Solely to provide the best possible House of Commons. To set up individual right to it against general good is absurd; the right can exist in the good only. Each interest and class must be duly represented, this is essential for enabling the individual to be so; and to compass it, the existing system gives a number of seats to each. In some places the lower, in others the middle, and in a third portion the upper classes elect the members. In those places the agriculturists, and in these the manufacturers, are the electors; the seats of this place belong to one trade, and of that, to another. The effect is what it would be if the labourers of the whole country were to elect a certain number of members exclusively, and the other classes, and each of the different interests, were to do the

same.

This is perfect in principle; it is the only mode which can ensure proper equality of representation, individual and collective. It is, however, railed against by the reformers as an intolerable evil. They must look at the elector, but not at the House of Commons-at the individual right, but not at the general good. They must have the same system in every place without regard to consequences.

This is false in principle, and it would be radical change, but not reform. If the lower classes had the same proportion of power in every place, they would elect all the House, or none of it: the case would be similar with the upper classes. Uniformity would give to some interests a destructive command over others: thus it is now in freehold votes giving many of the seats of agriculture to manufactures and trade. The House of Commons affords abundant proof, that to make a man the repre sentative of conflicting classes and interests, is to make him no representative-is to render him a cipher or betrayer; and that to give him efficiency, he must represent one only.

Reform, therefore, ought to retain the principle of the existing system, and give to each interest and class the number of seats required by common good: by this it ought to regulate its distribution of members and

the franchise. We speak not of minute calculation, but, in portioning out the House of Commons, it must disregard individuals, and give proper portions of it to proper and distinct portions of the community; or it will create an intestine enemy to destroy the empire. With reference to the larger divisions, manufactures and trade may be regarded as one; but they are opposed to agriculture, therefore care must be taken to preserve a proper balance of power between them and it; the lower and middle classes have many feelings in common which are adverse to the upper ones; of course the latter must have a sufficiency of seats for their defence. It is self-evident that the prosperity and happiness of the individual depend on those of the class and interest to which he belongs; consequently it is preposterous to look at him only in distributing the franchise without paying any regard to the class and interest.

. We are not friendly to the principle advocated here and adopted in France, of exalting professional men into privileged electors. The civil part of them would be, in general, entitled to vote as housekeepers; and with respect to the naval and military part, we think they have no more right to the franchise than custom-house and police officers. Professional men would make the least independent of all electors. In most places their vote would be little felt, but in some it would have great effect; in Westminster, naval and military officers, medical men, &c. would almost hold the turn of the election. When the incessant fierce ness with which half-pay and other officers hunt employment and pro motion is looked at, it may easily be conceived that their votes would be generally at the command of govern

ment.

On reducing the expense and length of elections, we will not speak; it excites no difference of opinion. We will, however, repeat, that we have no wish to substitute one extreme for another. Public good, and even purity in the elector, do not require that an election should be wholly divested of expense. Every Englishman who has been accustomed to the humours and festivities of a popular one, will be loath to see

them replaced with the sombre, moody, hungry, sanctimonious characteristics of a Ranter camp-meeting. It is part of the Englishman's nature to dine on his political solemnities to remove their gloom and asperities with refreshing viands and generous beverage; let not reform do violence to it. Prohibit the vote from being sold-get rid of outvoters

let county electors vote as near home as possible-confine the duration of an election to one day-let there be no treating until the closebut still let poor and rich have the means of drinking in moderation the health of the members. A man who cannot afford to expend a thousand or two at an election, is not a fitting one to be a representative; woe to the purity and independence of the House of Commons if it be taken possession of by the poor and needy f

The reduction of expense must bring into the field a host of new candidates; reform must therefore be careful to exclude improper ones. By the constitution and law, every member is bound to be a burgess of the borough, or freeholder of the county, he represents. What is the intention of this? Clearly that he shall be a real and regular inhabitant of the borough or county. What would be the fruits if duly enforced? Each borough and county would be represented by men of business, fully acquainted with its interests, and having a deep stake in them. The House of Commons would be composed of men minutely informed touching the circumstances, habits, and feelings of their constituents— little liable to be swayed by the temptations of power and partylargely interested in honesty and independence-free from the spirit of Cockneyism—and filled with the sentiments of the whole population of the country. It would more frequently change its members, and gain new spirit and ability; the members would be infinitely more under the proper control of their constituents, than is the case at present.

The law here is constantly evaded. A man who has never even seen a borough or county wishes to offer for it at an election; therefore at the moment he buys his freedom or a petty freehold, or he has a mock freehold given him, he is elected, and

perhaps he never sees it again. This gross violation of the constitution and law, in respect of their spirit, has the most baleful consequences. The boroughs at least are generally represented by utter strangers to them-by men who are divided from them in sentiment and interest, who are incapable of representing them, and who seek their seats as a means of corrupt gain to themselves. It is a fertile source of corruption to the elector, as well as the candidate; it fills the place with factious politics, and causes the election to turn on them. It forms the great engine by which government and party fill the House of Commons with their profligate menials.

Southwark has been for some time represented by a party military officer. At the last two or three elections, Hull was infested by strange Irish men and government clerks as candidates; and on one occasion an Irishman was elected. The members for Nottingham now are a Scotch soldier and a Cockney lawyer. A Scotch placeman sits for Norwich, One of the York members is an officer in the Guards. A London merchant and a military Colonel represent Worcester. At the last election for Yorkshire, a practising barrister, wholly unconnected with the county, was returned; and when he vacated his seat, the party which elected him wished, according to the newspapers, to replace him with Sir T. Denman. The boroughs generally are represented in this manner. What could an Irish stranger, like Mr O'Neil, know of the interests and feelings of Hull? How can those of Norwich be known to Mr R. Grant; or those of Nottingham to Sir R. Fergusson and Sir T. Denman? What possibility was there that a man like Lord Brougham could represent the sentiments, or attend to the weal of Yorkshire? Such men are destitute of the knowledge of business, local information, and provincial feeling, requisite for enabling them to discharge their duties. They may present petitions, but they cannot even be depended on for supporting them. They have little hope of being again elected, therefore they use their seats to serve the Ministry or Opposition, in utter contempt of their constituents. It is notorious that many of the individuals we have named, were

invited to stand by ignorant profligate factions, without the least refer ence to the good of the places or the empire, and to prevent the intelligent and patriotic part of the electors from returning proper representatives.

The House of Commons is in consequence composed mainly of men whose lives are spent in London, Paris, and the watering places, and who all move in the same kind of society. Instead of being, as it ought, an epitome of the whole population -an assemblage selected from the real inhabitants of every part of the United Kingdom, it is little better than a body of fashionable Londoners. Its members, of course, are in the highest degree incompetent. Are laws made or altered which affect agricul ture and trade-they do not understand them: is the population dis tressed-they know nothing of cir cumstance and fact, cause and reme dy: is it necessary for them to speak the opinion of the country-they are only acquainted with the opinion of the London newspapers. They enter it to push their own fortunes, or follow party leaders only; many of them are furnished with money and influence, and sent to the places they represent, by the Ministry, Opposi tion, or some great family, solely that they may be its instruments.

All honest men will admit that it is essential for the electors of a place to have due knowledge of a candidate before they elect him; they ought to know his political creed from better authority than his own declarations; and to have correct information touching his private, as wellas public character. Yet, through the practical violation of law in question, the electors of most open places, save counties, return men of whom they know nothing; the candidate may be, as he too often is, a demagogue, gamester, turncoat, profligate, or party slave, and still they elect him in utter ignorance of it. Let elections be divested of expense, aud then, not the itinerant Broughams, Denmans, and Grants, but the itinerant Hunts and Cobbetts, will gain the borough seats.

There is not a single point on which reform is more necessary than it is on this. To fill the House of Commons with men of the best morals, creed, and heart-patriotically independent-duly acquainted with the

affairs and circumstances of the community-animated with the feelings of the population at large-free from the passions and chains of party leaders-and bound to make a right use of their trust it, is essential that the members of every place should be elected from amidst its real inhabitants.

What is there to prevent this? If Reform give, as it is intended to do, members to populous places only, each will contain a sufficient number of duly qualified men to select from; no place, in truth, ought to have members, which does not contain men capable of representing it. A great change would be made in the composition of the House-so much the better. Who would be expelled? A host of party minions, adventurers, slaves of faction, officers, lawyers, &c., who only occupy their seats to disgrace and ruin their country. Every upright, able man, who now sits in the House, could still sit in it; nay, his chance for a seat would be better than it is. The free seats would admit the talented members. The Aristocracy would have for its connexions the agricultural seats, which are about all it can hope for, or even now obtain: in many respects it would be a great gainer.

We would therefore make the existing plan properly operative. No man should be permitted to offer for a place, who had not resided a certain number of years in, or within a small number of miles of it. If this number were ten or twelve, it might enable smaller places to elect from inhabitants of large ones, and country gentlemen, as well acquainted with, and known to them, as their own inhabitants. In counties, this would make scarcely any practical change.

We must now bestow a brief notice on voting by ballot. It might be very properly put out of the question by the fact, that it is not reform

that it is a radical change of mode, advocated avowedly for the purpose of making a radical change in the majority of electors-that its express object is, to deprive that of election power, which has always exercised it with the sanction of the first authorities.

Waiving this, the ballot places before us the following question-Is it

beneficial, or the contrary, for property to have influence beyond the vote it gives to its owner? The question affects the manufacturer and tradesman as much as the landowner, the borough as much as the county. We have already supported change, for taking the control of seats from the property of one individual, or a very small number; therefore the question may be stated thus-If the influence acquired through property, in a county or borough, be divided amidst a considerable number of men, ought it to be destroyed, or preserved ?

How is such influence always exercised? The owners are intelligent, honourable men, having a deep stake in the interests of the place they dwell in, and the public weal; they are pretty equally divided in politics; their party feelings are pure from corrupt motives; they wish to elect only respectable candidates, and they combine to exclude demagogues and traitors. If particular individuals among them act from personal reasons, the body does not. Now suppose that, in a county or borough, forty or fifty such men control the votes of their tenants, workmen, &c.; the worst which can be said is, they really elect the members. Is there the smallest ground for believing, that if the case were different, the electors at large would have better qualified candidates to choose from, or would make a better choice? No; but there is proof for producing an opposite conviction.

But these men do not really control the election. The turn of the latter-the casting vote, is still held by electors who possess no propertyinfluence. Assuming that, in the county of York, twenty great landowners are on one side, and twenty are on another, their votes neutralize each other to a very large extent; the middling and small independent landowners hold the turn of the election, therefore they really elect the members, and the influence of the great ones is chiefly felt in the exclusion of improper candidates. Such influence is now carried too far in exclusion; but this arises from, and of course may be corrected by abolishing, the great expense.

If the influence of property were entirely destroyed, what would follow? The philosophers-the men

of abstract principle-reply triumphantly,--Every elector would vote independently! Is independence inthem all that is necessary? The electors who returned O'Connell, who have just elected Hunt, and who on various occasions voted for Cobbett, were no doubt perfectly independ-, ent; but their use of independence is sufficient to convince most people that they ought not to possess it, if the constitution and public welfare be of any value.

The most conclusive demonstration exists, that under such destruction, the lower classes of electors throughout the country would all vote on one side. On what grounds would they vote? Opposition to, and hatred of, their superiors-prejudice, passion, and delusion-factious motives and objects—the wish for ruinous changes of law and institution. For whom would they vote? Projectors, innovators, demagogues, and traitors. The truth of this is put out of question by the conduct they have so long exhibited.

If the elector be not qualified to give his vote wisely as well as independently, he must be guided by the intelligent, virtuous superior, who has a deep interest in guiding him aright, or he will servilely follow the unprincipled demagogue.

The choice before us, therefore, is this. We must have the majority of electors ranged on one side as a whole, actuated by the most dangerous feelings, and supporting the worst candidates; or we must have them broken into parties combined with their superiors, voting on principles of public good, and supporting the best candidates. The evils on one side are so trifling compared with those on the other, that no honest man can hesitate. The history of this country proves, that the influence of property, when duly divided, is of the most necessary and beneficial character. It will not do to tell us that reform will lop off the bad part of the electors, for we know better. The middling housekeepers in towns, small freeholders and farmers, are infected to a fearful extent with the doctrines of Radicalism. Cobbett's influence lies chiefly amidst farmers. The Irish electors, if free from the influence of property,

would return only such members as O'Connell.

Our decided conviction, as we have stated on other occasions, is, that the influence of the landlord over the tenant, the master over the servant, the superior over the inferior, enters into the essence of free and good government; that there can be no harmony, liberty, and prosperity without it; and that it is a matter of state necessity for that part of the population which has a deep stake on the right side of things, to be able to combine with it, or at least to restrain the other. It must be remarked, that this influence differs widely from absolute control; dissatisfaction in those subject to it, aided by public feeling, commonly prevents it from being improperly exercised.

As the ballot is advocated chiefly for the sake of destroying the influence of landowners, we will observe that, in our judgment, so far as concerns England and Scotland, it would injure the county landowner far less than the borough master and freeholder.

We might safely leave the matter here, but we will not do so. It is evident that the ballot does not, and cannot, ensure secrecy; in regard, therefore, to its great object, it is of no material value.

With it, the tenant or workman would be asked by his landlord or master for his vote, or who he intended to vote for; a refusal to promise or disclose, would be equivalent to, and punished as, an open vote given against his landlord or master. Thus he would be compelled to vote as he does at present, or to be guilty of deliberate falsehood; the ballot would only exempt him from the influence of property by destroying his morals.

It would rather promote than prevent bribery and corruption. The committees can easily ascertain how far the promise of an elector, from his politics and character, can be relied on: they would, therefore, on his solemn promise, as readily bribe him as they do now. At present, if he give a solemn promise, shame prevents him in most cases from violating it; but with the ballot he could, after selling his vote to one