general principles and character. Thus the condemned boroughs will practically form the parent of a great number of destructive democratic

ones.

Reform is no longer a party question between Whig and Tory, but one between the Aristocracy and Democracy; instead of dividing parties, and connecting classes and interests, as it did until lately, it does the reverse. It is made by the reformers, and their press, a cause of bitter hostility to the upper classes, and a means of combining all other classes against them; through it the body of the people are led to embrace the most dangerous general doctrines. It destroys Whiggism and Toryism, Whig and Tory, in the correct constitutional sense of the terms; it arrays the poor against the rich, and the subject against the ruler; it renders the mass of the population turbulent and disaffected; and it makes a public enemy of the House of Commons. If refused, it must henceforward keep the two Houses of Parliament in opposition, not only on it, but in general feeling. The majority of the House of Commons has, in my judgment, permanently passed from the oppouents to the advocates of reform.

I find in this, reason to think reform is highly expedient.

When I am asked how the monarchical government can be carried on with reform, I must reply by asking -was the Wellington Ministry able to carry it on without? Can it now be carried on by a Tory Ministry, or any other than one of reformers? When I am assured that reform will create democratic rulers and revolution, I am constrained to enquire what the refusal of it will create. The Duke of Wellington confesses that his Ministry was principally expelled from office by this question; and matters are now far worse than they were when it fell. A dissolution of Parliament at this moment would create a House of Commons decidedly hostile in general creed to the anti-reformers-violently democratic and revolutionary in every thing; and such a House would secure office to a democratic and revolutionary Ministry. If the King wish to discrown himself and destroy the Throne he occupies, he has only to consent to this dissolution; a single Parlia

ment such as it would form, could scarcely fail of ensuring the exchange of the monarchy for a republic. I am told that he will consent, if reform cannot be carried without; and therefore, however deeply I may lament his error, I still must regulate my opinion by it. I believe that the government cannot be carried on without reform-that a Tory Ministry could not stand without at once granting it -and that to delay the concession of it would be highly injurious; of course I think it a matter of public necessity.

I speak thus, not to refute or blame the opinions of others, but to justify myself.

Reform therefore with me is a matter of morals, reason, expediency, and necessity; but then I must have that which they call for. I can sanction no reform which, in removing evils, will destroy things not complained of, but confessed by all to be of the highest value. In the first place, what is manifestly defective, impure, and erroneous, must be taken away; in the second, the fair and reasonable demands of the reformers must be so far satisfied that reform may no longer be a party and election question; and, in the third, all which is blameless and beneficial in the existing system must be carefully preserved.

Although so much in these days is said and written on a representative form of government, there is scarcely any thing so little understood. What are the duties and powers of the popular division of the Legisla ture?

It ought demonstrably to act with the utmost impartiality between interest and interest, class and class, for general benefit; and to give equal protection to every part of the cominunity.

It ought, as a matter of paramount importance, to give that ample security to property which, in the confession of all, forms the corner-stone of public and private wealth and prosperity.

It ought to manage the general affairs of the nation in the most wise, just, and upright manner possible.

As to powers, it virtually or otherwise appoints judges, and directs the Ministry; it makes and annuls laws, and has every thing at its mer

cy; in this country, it calls itself omnipotent.

The mode of electing this body is but a means-it is only an engine for attaining a given end. The distribution of the elective franchise ought clearly to be made without reference to private right and gain, and solely to form the body in the best possible. manner with regard to its duties and powers.

This division of the Legislature ought not to be chosen by the Executive, because there could be no freedom; it ought not to be chosen by the Peers, because there could be little freedom and no impartial management of public affairs; but it does not follow that it ought to be chosen by the lower or middle class

es.

Yet such is the general conclusion. The argument really is-The Executive and Peers ought to have no share in electing the House of Commons, ergo, it ought to be elected by the less exalted part of the population. Nothing could be conceived more false in logic and principle. A House elected by either the Executive or the Peers would be more able, independent, and impartial; and would give more protection to property and right, than one elected by the classes I have named; of course the latter are not more worthy of possessing the power of election than the former.

This House ought to represent, in due proportion, every class and interest; therefore the doctrine is preposterous, that it belongs to, and ought to be chosen by, particular classes. The highest have as much right to their share of it as the lowest; and each interest has as much right to its share as any class.

But it by no means follows that the House should consist solely of men chosen by the same mode of election. It has to do much more than represent the feelings and promote the separate interests of the various divisions of the community. It has to act as both representative and judge, not only to urge the claims of each division, but to decide on them with the utmost impartiality. Instead of being an assemblage of warring interests, a democratic engine for destroying the aristocracy, or a collection of combatants for fighting the battles of the aristocracy

VOL. XXIX. NO. CLXXIX.

and democracy against each other, it is in the main an independent tribunal to shew equal favour to allto dispense the same measure of pure and severe justice to every part of the population. It is intended to represent the community in the aggregate, in disregard of the distinctions of interest and class. The great object of representation is to make it this.

It is as essential for every interest, as it is for every class, to be duly represented; if the interest be not so represented, the individuals connected with it cannot. If one mode of election leave in effect many interests without representatives, the adoption of it alone must be in the highest degree unjust; and must have baleful operation on the public weal. Collective as well as individual benefit makes the fair and effective representation of every interest a matter of the first consequence.

The House of Commons ought to be an equitable guardian of property. This is essential for the benefit of all -of the labourer as well as the capitalist, the poor as well as the rich. If one mode of election will, on the one hand, expose property, or large masses of it, to furious attack, and, on the other, deprive it of full protection, the use of this mode alone must be confiscation, robbery, and a public plague.

It is of the first consequence that the House should contain the talent requisite for enabling it to discharge its duties and exercise its powers properly. Of course it must be highly injurious to use one mode of election only, if it exclude such talent, or any material portion of it.

It is a matter of even national preservation that the House should judge with severe impartiality between one interest or class and another, connect and harmonize the various divisions of the community, and above all things, prevent war between the aristocracy and democracy. If one mode of election will make its decisions partial and unjust, create strife amidst the divisions, and light up exterminating war between the aristocracy and democracy, the use of this mode alone must inevitably produce the fall of the empire.

The right of representation exists, that all parts of the community may have due regard paid to their senti

3 E

they are only suffered to address the House by petition. They have the power to elect, not that they may dictate to and govern the House, but that it may be composed of the most fitting men; and the power to restrain its conduct is expressly confided to other hands; every thing possible is done to make it as independent of them as of the Executive. Almost the only portion of tyranny contained in the constitution, has for its object to make the House of Commons perfectly independent and impartial-perfectly free from the dictation of electors and popular feeling, as well as from all other.

The existence of the House of Lords does much to produce the delusion, that the other House belongs exclusively to the middle and lower classes. They are not separate legislatures, having the same duties and powers; they are the two parts of a whole, and, to a large extent, their duties and powers are essentially different. The Peer is disqualified by his office for interfering with the formation of the Lower House, but his brothers and sons are not: the disqualification is a special one, resting on the individual, but not on the class. The House of Commons is to fairly represent and act for all classes -the whole population, save specified individuals; and the House of Lords exists for common good, partly to assist and regulate it, and partly to perform totally different duties. The Aristocracy must have its share in electing the former, to be placed on an equality with the rest of the community.

From all this it appears undeniable, 1. That as the House of Commons demonstrably exists to represent the community in its collective indivisible character, as well as its component parts to act in the best possible manner for the empire in the aggregate, as well as for separate interests and classes; it is not more necessary for the parts to be fairly represented, than it is for the whole to be so-it is not more essential for the claims of the separate interests and classes to be brought properly before the House, than it is for them to be decided on with severe impartiality, on the principle of common good alone.

2. That, therefore, the system of election should be quite as anxious

3. That the claims to form, and dictate to, the House, put forth by these classes or those, are groundless, unjust, and destructive. The right to distribute the power to elect belongs to the state, and the right of the individual and class amounts only to this, that the distribution shall be made without favour and prejudice, in the manner best calculated to promote the general weal. The alleged right to dictate is so far destitute of foundation, that the House is chosen by the people, chiefly that it may be free from dictation: the grand essentials in the House with regard to both intention and law are, perfect independence and impartiality between man and man, class and class, electors and the population in the body, popular feeling and the interests of the empire. The system of election, therefore, after bestowing equitable representation, ought in both right and duty to dispose of the franchise in any manner that will make the House what it ought to be collectively.

Taking what I have said as my test, I find the old system of election exceedingly erroneous and defective, and the proposed new one infinitely more so. The former is generally good in principle, but faulty in provision; the latter is very faulty in both, its principle is as bad in some points, as good in others.

In the first place, the old system provides the means for enabling every interest and class to be duly represented, but it does not place them under proper regulation; therefore, they are neglected or abused. But the new one annihilates such means; while it pretends to establish equal representation, it prohibits many interests and classes from being represented.

The power of election is to be chiefly confined to two or three descriptions of people, who are the same in every place, and who have little connexion with the various interests which need representation the most. If the electors vote independently, manufacturers, merchants, shipowners, bankers, people

of independent fortune-all who have on private and public grounds the best claims to representatives, will be in the minority, and have none. The members of some interests may prevail by numbers and influence, but those of various others will find it impossible to return men who are not opposed to them. The doctrine, that the members of a place represent all its electors, is of small value, because they perhaps differ from almost half these electors in creed. Granting that the bankers or shipowners of any place could prevail on its members, elected by the shopkeepers, to plead their cause; such advocates would be worthless to them, compared with others of their own electing.

The cry is, that all men ought to be fairly and equally represented, and a plan of reform is brought forward for the express purpose of causing them to be so; yet under this plan, bankers, colonial merchants, shipowners, &c. &c., will have no representatives in regard to their trades and fortunes, the matters on which representation is the most essential to them. While this is the case with them, shopkeepers, a few kinds of manufacturers and landowners, will fill the House of Commons with the advocates of their particular trades and interests, and to a large extent with the opponents of those of the divisions of the community which will be denied representatives. In respect of business and property, one part of the community is to have representatives and interested champions, but the other is to have only neutrals and interested

enemies.

The criminal injustice of this can be denied by no man, for who can say that the banker and shipowner have not as much right to have their trade and property represented, as the landowner and cotton manufacturer? The injustice of it is the greater, because those who are to monopolize the representation in towns, are men who have scarcely any need of representatives in regard to their separate interests. Laws which affect exclusively the trade and property of shopkeepers, and the occupiers of small private houses, are rarely enacted; but laws affecting exclusively those of the divisions of

the community which are to have no representatives, are frequently made and altered.

Ministers say their plan will give representatives to the different interests; but what is their evidence? They assert, that by giving representatives to a seaport, they give them to its shipowners. Now a seaport must of necessity be a place of much foreign and domestic trade; its merchants, shopkeepers, &c., must far outnumber its shipowners; and they conceive that the separate interests of the latter are opposed to their own. The shipowners of course must get any thing rather than representatives. Bankers, colonial merchants, &c., form a trifling minority everywhere, and it will be impossible for them to return members. There can here be neither direct nor virtual representation.

On public grounds alone, it is of the first consequence that the House of Commons should contain a due proportion of the members of every interest-should contain bankers, shipowners, and merchants, as well as landowners and cotton or woollen manufacturers. This is essential on the score of information; without it the House cannot legislate justly and wisely.

Thus then many important interests and classes are to be denied representatives, while the House is to be in a considerable degree composed of their enemies, and vast masses of attached property are to be left without protection-why? Because, forsooth! the House is to be wholly chosen by the people through one mode of election. Are not then bankers, merchants, &c., as much a part of the people as shopkeepers? And ought not the means to be made subservient to the end? Right and justice are to be sacrificed to numbers and accident; the end is to be made unattainable for the sake of the means; and equality of representation is to be destroyed, that a certain system of election may be established.

I am blaming the plan, not for giving representation to shopkeepers and others, but for denying it to the rest of the people. I insist that all ought to be made equal, and that it is the height of injustice to give some parts of the people the power to