elect representatives identified with them in opinion, feeling, and interest, and refuse it to other parts-to enable one portion of the community to send into Parliament men hostile to the trade and property of the other, and to prohibit the latter from sending into it defenders.

Under the existing system, if an interest be too weak in numbers to obtain seats in any other manner, it can buy those of a small borough: or its more wealthy members can, on their own account, gain seats in a similar way, without the risk, cost, and pledges of a contest. I grant that the means are impure and defective, but I can only surrender them on condition that the same end shall be gained by others of better character.

It is of great public consequence that the moneyed interest should be duly represented-suppose, therefore, that the banks were permitted to elect from bankers as their members. The case is the same touching the shipping interest; therefore suppose the shipowners of a few of the principal ports were suffered to elect two members from amidst themselves. How would this operate?

With regard to means, it would be even more unexceptionable than the mode of election prescribed by the new plan; the members would be elected exclusively by the people in the most pure and independent manner. In respect of the end, bankers and shipowners would be represented precisely as landowners and shopkeepers are to be.

This might be extended to every interest which is of sufficient public value to deserve representatives, and too weak to gain them by the common mode of election. It is essential for placing the people on an equality; that part of them which would gain representatives through it, would possess no real advantage over the other, and must be destitute of them without it. Thus the benefits of the existing system might be preserved, enlarged, and regulated.

What can be said against it? Will any one assert that the means ought not to be varied and extended for the purpose of giving equal representation; or that if great masses of the people cannot gain representa

tives by one mode of election, they must be restricted from the use of any other? No. But I am recommending something new-well, a change is forced on me, and I am only struggling to make it a proper one: I merely advise new means to secure an old end.

In respect therefore of just and equal representation, the plan of Ministers is extremely erroneous and defective; it will give the contrary from this, it will leave property to a vast extent without protection. It confines the power of election in a great measure to those whose property is in no danger, and who seek to destroy that of others. The new electors are in the overwhelming majority anxious to invade the property of the fundholders, the church, the East and West India colonists, &c. ; yet this property is to have no special defenders. Ministers entertain projects hostile to the property of the colonial, shipping, and various manufacturing interests; yet these are to have no representatives. Enormous masses of continually assailed property will thus be left defenceless. I can pay no regard to the doctrine that the influence of property will compensate for the want of numbers, because every one knows that this influence must be constantly divided against itself. The property of landowners and manufacturers weighs against that of fundholders and West India coloniststhe property of merchants weighs against that of shipowners-the property of one mercantile or manufacturing interest weighs against that of another; what then becomes of the doctrine? The plan of Ministers is, in a large degree, one to strip attacked property of protection.

Let me now speak of talent, the admission of which is essential for preventing the House of Commons from being a public nuisance. I advocate no indiscriminate admission of it for its own sake, therefore what does the public weal call for ?

The House ought to be the great teacher and guide of public feeling, and it can only be made so by talent and eloquence. From its possession or lack of these, it must be trusted and followed, or despised and opposed, by the people-it must make popular opinion a subordinate and

ling from it eloquence, wisdom, experience, understanding, and knowledge. The amazing fact proves either that its parents are ignorant and imbecile beyond conception, or that they deserve to be impeached for attempting to sacrifice the empire to faction.

What made the House of Commons that glorious assembly of freemen it has been, on the confession of Ministers ? Its talent and eloquence, its experience, intelligence, and wisdom-its glorious assemblage of splendid ability-the means it possessed of drawing into it the master spirits of the time, and enabling them both to cultivate their powers to the utmost, and employ them in the most beneficial manner. And, above all, that glorious band of gifted, independent freemen it contained as the Opposition.

Why are the things which made it such an assembly to be taken from it? Have modern inventions and discoveries ascertained that talent ought to be excluded? No, reply Ministers, it should still be admitted. Do democratic interests call for the exclusion? Its evils will fall chiefly on the democracy; it will confine seats to aristocrats and men of large fortune, and wellnigh destroy the popular side of the House in regard to power and use. It is really a most unjust and odious aristocratic monopoly.

But, say Ministers, talent will still gain admittance. How?-I put the question touching means, description, and quantity. On a matter of such vital importance to the empire, nothing less than conclusive demonstration will satisfy me or any patriotic man. Where, then, is it? There is none; all is worthless assertion, flatly opposed to reason and fact.

Ministers tell me there are to be no more close boroughs, and I am bound to believe them; according to them, seats are only to be obtained through popular election. A young man, on commencing political life, has no name to gain him a seat; of course he will only be able to gain one by sacrificing a large amount of private fortune, under the risk of being rejected if he succeed, he will know that his constituents will scarcely elect him a second time,

and that he can only enter the House again by similar cost and risk. He must pay, on the average, a thousand per annum for his seat, and be certain that, for about half his life, he will be without one. This must be the case, unless he be in office. Granting that he might have the requisite fortune, he would still be sure that he could not be constantly in Parliament to cultivate politics as a profession with hope of

success.

Would the Pitts, Burkes, and Can. nings have entered the House under such a system? Impossible. It either imposes on rising talent a positive prohibition, or takes from it all inducement; under it none but men of large independent fortune-such men as rarely make accomplished ministers and legislators-can devote themselves to the service of their country in the higher depart ments of political life; and they must be denied the means for pro perly qualifying themselves.

The plan thus destroys the only nursery of legislative and ministerial ability-the great source from which both Parliament and the Cabinet draw their talent and efficiency. As it is to prohibit men from gaining eminence, I need say little of the assertion put forth by its parents, that eminent men will always find seats. Every one knows that if a man be on the unpopular side, his talent and fame alone will cause him to be rejected by the electors of populous places. At the best, the eminent men of one party only will be able to enter Parliament, and they must do it by pandering to popular passion and delusion; those of the other party will be excluded by their eminence. It is the common prac tice of every Ministry to prevent as far as possible the election of its more formidable opponents; every talented member of the Opposition will constantly have to sustain a furious contest, in which his adversary will be supported by the mighty means of Government; taking into account defeat as well as victory, his seat, when he may possess one, will probably cost him three or four thousand per annum.

Reason and probability may be put out of sight, for popular election has been most abundantly tried, and it

bas almost invariably excluded men of talent and eminence, if they have not been demagogues or Ministers. Need I point to the Burkes and Sheridans, or to the wretched means by which Fox won its favour? Need I say that it has twice excluded Lord J. Russell himself, that it has always treated Lord Brougham in the same uncourteous manner, and that, at the last election, it even excluded every Minister who appealed to it? Can any one be ignorant that the greatest statesmen, up to the present moment, have generally been destitute of the pecuniary means for maintaining a contest, though success might be certain; and that therefore they have been, if out of office, at the mercy of the Ministry with regard to popular election? It is inconceivable how a Minister can be hardy enough to assert, in the teeth of conclusive experiment, that, under the new plan, eminent men will always be sure of seats; and it is still more so, how any one can be simple enough to believe him.

If the more eminent leader on the unpopular and opposition side could get a seat, the case would be different with his less gifted associates, and he could do nothing without them. At present, Mr Herries, Mr Goulburn, Mr Croker, &c., are as necessary in Parliament as Sir R. Peel: each has his particular department of public business in which he is skilled; therefore, each Minister has an able inspector; the whole are wanted in council and debate as an Opposition, and they would be so should Sir Robert be called on to form a Ministry. If Parliament were now dissolved, nearly all, by the new plan, would be excluded from the next. Should Sir Robert be returned, he would be powerless from the absence of supporters. It is of the first consequence on public grounds, that the leaders of the Opposition should be all in Parliament.

Thus the plan will enable any Ministry, no matter whether Whig or Tory, to exclude the body of its talented opponents, by subjecting them to ruinous contests, and employing its gigantic means of seduction and intimidation against them; this must be especially the case if it belong to the popular party in creed. Saving the individual, there must be

in the House no constitutional opposition talent. For very many years previously to 1825, the plan would have regularly excluded nearly all the Whig talent; and it would now treat that of the Tories in the same manner. Its natural operation must be to exclude always that of one party or the other; and the natural operation of this must be to divest both of talent.

Ministers must, of necessity, be in Parliament; therefore, the plan creates new, and most reprehensible qualifications for office. A Minister must have the nerve to brave the unpopularity of a contested election, the meanness and vice to practise the arts of one, and-assuming that the public money will not be corruptly wasted in returning himeither a considerable fortune, or the dishonesty to contract debts he cannot pay. To the inferior ones, it must be equivalent to about a total loss of salary; and it is grossly unjust, because it compels a public servant to dissipate his private property in the discharge of his public duty. They must be in the body elected by some particular interest or class-by the landed interest, or the trading one, the aristocracy, or the democracy; and this must make them, in pernicious pledges and measures, the partisans of one part of the community against the other.

Here, then, is a plan of reform which will prohibit rising talent from entering the House, save as the menial of the Ministry, incapacitate it for acquiring the requisite cultivation, and repel it from the public service-which will cause eminent men, if they be not in office, to be excluded from the House by their powers and fame-which will enable the Ministry to expel from the House every gifted opponent-which will strip the popular, or opposition side of the House, of effective ability

and which will divest both the House and the Cabinet of talent.

And is it spared by public indignation? If the glories which blaze round the House of Commons of England be noticed no longer, can pounds, shillings, and pence call forth no ignoble effort for their own preservation, by pleading what they have gained from its talent and eloquence in victories over foes, acqui

sitions of territory, and increase of trade and riches? Do not the lightnings of talent flash on the unhallowed attempt to subject to spoliation, bondage, oppression, and destruction? Are not the young Burkes and Sheridans, who are struggling with poverty and obscurity, appealing to public justice against this sordid and guilty measure for closing to them the path of patriotism, dignity, and immortality? Alas! alas! at least let it no longer boast the insane support of its intended victims!

If

How this will operate on public interests, may be in some degree gathered from what I have stated. it be necessary for both sides of every great question to be carefully examined by the House and the country, it is equally necessary for the House to contain a sufficient number of gifted men, and for them to be fairly divided between both sides of it. Yet this plan must confine the talent to one side, and thereby prevent scrutiny, debate, and correct judgment. The Ministry, partial, interested, and incapable, will have no eloquent men; and, therefore, no party of moment to contend with. If I were asked what would be the means for enabling a Ministry under the constitution to keep constant possession of office, and make itself practically despotic, my reply would be-give it the power to exclude talented opponents from the House of Commons; by this you will give it the House, the voice of the House, and a sufficiency of the Press; you will put the King under its feet, and prohibit the formation of another Ministry.

With regard to the other description of talent, although the present system makes no adequate provision for introducing a proper portion of it into the House, it still makes much more than the new one will do. An able banker, merchant, or manufacturer, may now be certain of obtaining a seat for a certain sum of money; he must pay the price, but he is sure of receiving for it the desired equivalent. Under the new system, he must depend on the choice of electors who notoriously select for any thing rather than ability; and he must generally expend a large sum of money, with the chances against his success.

This

system will exclude all such men, save in the exception.

All sides declare that talent ought to be admitted; why, therefore, is nothing done to gratify this unanimous national feeling? Because the sages of the Cabinet can only allow one mode of election. In forming anew such an assembly as the House of Commons, it is to be divested of the leading essentials for enabling it to discharge its duties, and preventing it from being a public scourge, merely that its members may be all elected in the same manner, by the same descriptions of people. Rail no more against the ages of darkness and barbarism! Is it impossible to give the House the proper quantities and varieties of talent, without trenching on the rights of the people? I say no; and that to refuse it them, is to trench in the most unpardonable manner on these rights.

cannot tolerate the miserable error that the people's rights call for the sacrifice of their interests-that to enjoy their rights, they must possess a House of Commons which will ruin them.

If one mode of election will not give the House the requisite portion of talent, another mode that will do so is the sacred right of the people, and it is a practicable matter. With regard to the Ministry, there could be no difficulty. It is of the first consequence that Ministers should be perfectly independent and impartial between the different divisions of the community, and that they should not be permitted to employ the mighty means they possess in corrupting and intimidating electors. If the same man be both a minister and a representative, he must betray his trust in the one character or the other. On every principle of public good, they ought to have seats in virtue of office. If the Cabinet were allowed to dispose of any number of seats, for example twenty, this could not be abused; interest would compel it to give the seats to the most worthy occupiers. There would be no boroughmongers to treat with, or popular electors to bribe; the election would be pure, and it would only give seats to men compelled by the public service to possess them.

The difficulty would lie with the