WE devoutly hope that Sir R. Peel's promised motion on the Police will cause, not only the Legislature, but also the whole community, to examine most severely and impartially the new principles of domestic government, which are receiving such comprehensive application.

The new system of Police confessedly forms one of the greatest inroads on the principles and practice of the British Constitution that modern times have witnessed. An intense feel. ing of hostility to it prevails in the Metropolis, which actuates the middle classes, as well as the multitude, flows much less from party prejudice and misrepresentation, than fair experiment, and forms, in a revolutionary period like this, an important source of discontent and disaffection. It is in course of extension to most populous places, and circumstances have just proved that it can easily be perverted into an engine of the most improper and dangerous character. Here is one very conclusive reason for the examination we have named.

Another is formed by this. The New Police makes, in a certain degree, a most vicious change in the magistracy, and it is connected and combined with another mighty inroad on the principles and practice of the constitution, which is calculated to give it the most mischievous operation possible, viz. the regular adoption in principle, and to a considerable extent in practice, of a stipendiary magistracy.

As a third, we have the virtual decision of the Executive and Legislative, that at least the people of England can be no longer governed by their ancient institutions and laws,

by that constitution which has been so long boasted of so immeasurably, worshipped so ardently, and identified so essentially, with England's greatness and happiness. We are assured, on such grave authority, that morals and subordination have declinedvice, crime, and turbulence have increased-the national character has retrograded to an extent so mighty, as to put mere improvement out of the questtion, and call for a new system of local government, the reverse of the old one in both form and spi

rit. This forms a question which could not be surpassed in perilous magnitude. Local, must always in a great measure determine both the shape and character of general, government; and to the mass of the population, a vicious, tyrannical local government must be a greater scourge than an absolute monarchy.

In addition, the spirit of both the executive and legislative, in late years, has been radically changed. It has become theoretic, anti-popular, stern, savage, and arbitrary. In making its sweeping alterations, it has disdained to seek instruction at home, and to consult the disposition and circumstances of the people to be affected by them. Gathering its theories in foreign parts, it is not only ravished with the Code Napoleon, but it must have its Napoleon Police, its Napoleon Magistrates, and its Napoleon Maxims of governing. All is to be done by mandate and force, and nothing by influence and feeling; a worthless skeleton of freedom is to be animated by a soul of tyranny. Its alterations, saying nothing of the ruin and misery they have produced, have placed the empire on the brink of destruction; if it be carried a single step farther, nothing can save it.

The principle of keeping physical force, to the utmost extent possible, from the hands of the Executive, enters into the essence of national liberty. It is, without it, little better than useless labour to fashion constitutions,-to erect limited monarchies and republics. All must be name and shadow, sound and pageantry, incapable of being turned to effectual use, if ample security be not given to the full exercise of popular right and privilege. The latter exist as means of watching, opposing, and restraining the Executive, therefore it has the most interest in preventing their exercise when this is the most necessary; and its power of prevention must be in proportion to its command over physical force. An error more loaded with ignorance and contradiction could not well be conceived than this, to create a power for placing the Monarch under limitations, and then to enable

him to intimidate and influence it, to convert despotism into freedom, and then to clothe the Executive with the means of controlling the only things which can restrain it from being a practical despotism.

The founders of British liberty were not only far more knowing, but infinitely more honest, in such matters, than their descendants are; therefore, every sentence of the hallowed creed they formed, and every portion of the magnificent fabric they reared, display and enforce the maxim -Compel the Executive to govern as much as possible by the instrumentality of law alone, and as little as possible by the use of physical power; keep the things, through which only it can be duly restricted, sacred from its influence. The wholesome jealousy of the army, which they made a leading constitutional feeling, related as much to the nature of its employment as to its strength. It was to be not only confined to the lowest number admitted of by public safety, but prohibited from being used by the Executive, save against the foreign foe, or the open rebel. Its presence was not even to be tolerated when the people were exercising their privileges, and it was only to be employed to repress commotion in extreme cases, and under the direction and responsibility of independent magistrates. While the Executive was thus to be prohibited, as far as possible, from using the army as a means of governing, it was also to be prohibited from having any influence over the physical force requisite for preserving peace and order. The people themselves were to supply, select, and employ this force, under due responsibility.

This was, until recently, held to be so true and essential, that it was kept sacred from the feuds of party; Whig and Tory vied with each other in maintaining it, and even the government professed for it the highest reverence. In a few short years, without struggle or debate, and by general consent, it has been abandoned for the reverse.

The police officer is really a soldier in disguise; in some respects he is a more dangerous character than the soldier. What difference does it make in the eye of the constitution,

whether his coat be a blue or a red one; or whether he be armed with a staff or a firelock? He is as much the mercenary and slave of the Executive, as the soldier; and the latter is always in readiness to assist him, if the firelock and bayonet be necessary.

Čertain of his duties are of the most detestable description; one is, he is to make himself a general spy. It is no defence of this to say, it is necessary for enabling him to know and trace bad characters. No great abuse might flow from it, if he acted solely under the direction of independent magistrates; because they would have no interest in wishing him to obtain improper knowledge. But he is the menial of the Ministry, which, through his superior, can at pleasure make him a political spy, and employ him in the worst kinds of espionage.

Such a spy must of course be a finished tool of corruption. Knowing, in conjunction with his brethren, every one's person and character, he is exactly the man to form the Ministry's acting or directing agent for spreading amidst the people, in their political proceedings, disunion, treachery, and profligacy,-for bribing and intimidating electors, dividing and swaying public meetings, &c. &c. Through him a Ministry may generally have the rabble and its leaders in its pay, and use them for rendering the exercise of popular rights and liberties a nullity; it will be remembered that this has been, to a certain extent, practised in late years by men in power.

Another of his duties is to disperse assemblages, however small, peaceable, and innocent they may be. If two or three friends be merely at mid-day standing near the door of one of them, he possesses the power, and has been known to exercise it, of ordering them to move on." No sanction of the magistrate, or call of the citizen, or breach of the peace, or danger of any kind, is requisite as his authority; but at his own will and caprice he can, if half-a-dozen people be conversing quietly on the street, command them into motion; and disobedience to him, is guilt to be punished on his own evidence. Thus, at an election, when the constitution will not suffer a soldier to

shew himself, the police-officer, on the pretence of preventing tumult, can prohibit the people from holding the public converse and discussion, and exercising other rights, which, on such an occasion, are of high importance. In case of illegal and arbitrary conduct in the government, he can prevent that communication amidst the people which is essential for enabling them to do their duty to themselves. He, therefore, is armed with despotic power against the preparatory and accompanying matters which are of the first consequence for giving to elections, public meetings, &c., their proper character.

He farther possesses the power of dragging any person he may meet before a magistrate on charges of his own invention, and sustained only by his own evidence. It is sufficiently known how shamefully this shameful power has been abused; but we may mention, that instances have occurred in which men of respectability have been tried for high crimes solely on his evidence. His powers virtually make the liberty of the subject little better than a name.

These powers enable him to be a general robber. Almost any man, however innocent he may be, will rather pay a sum of money than incur the loss of time, and shame of being carried before a magistrate, particularly if he can produce no witness of his innocence. The officer, therefore, has only to provoke a few angry words, magnify any trifle into a charge, or utter a causeless threat, and it will be pretty sure to extort for him the bribe. There is every reason to believe that this system prevails to a large extent.

He is surrounded with every thing that can destroy his morals. He no longer belongs to, or can mix with, society. His regular pay is scarcely sufficient for his subsistence; and he is instructed to look on reward and extortion as the only means of adding to it: it is made his interest to provoke offences, increase guilt, invent charges against the innocent, and commit general plunder through false accusation and perjury. All other things operate with interest to stimulate him to do this; opportunities continually force themselves on him; he has brethren to give him counsel and assistance in it as a calling; the

arts and stratagems imposed on him by duty, habituate him to disregard of truth; he is brought into contact with the vile, and communication with iniquity of every description; through the night he is exposed to the society and bribes of prostitutes. It is notorious that in general the old police-officers were men of most depraved character, who prowled about in all quarters to get up litigation and charges in utter disregard of truth, and solely for their own pecuniary benefit; yet their incitements and means were nothing, compared with those of the new officers.

The only effectual restraint on him against abuse of power and villainy, must be found in the discontent and animosity of the people. In proportion as the latter are submissive, he must, in the nature of things, tyrannize over the exercise of popular right, and coin the liberty, property, and fame of the subject into criminal profit for himself. Thus he must always be a source of either disaffection, or tyranny and robbery.

If the spirit of the people be broken into passive submission to his monstrous power, it must be broken not only into utter incompetency for the exercise of popular rights and the defence of national freedom, but also into all the profligacy requisite for enabling the Executive to make the people instruments in their own wrong and oppression.

When the system reaches completion, the Executive will have a regular standing army, consisting of perhaps twenty or thirty thousand of these disguised soldiers-these mercenaries, who must be, in many respects, infinitely worse than soldiers

distributed through, and doing duty day and night in, those places in which alone public spirit and privilege can operate with any material effect against it. This army it can afterwards double in number, without the consent of parliament; and it can tax the community for its maintenance without such consent. This immense army, when generally established, will be, in both numbers and taxation for its support, above the regular and effective control of parliament; it will be employed in watching the political, as well as other conduct of the community; and it will really form, so far as re

gards domestic uses, an addition to the undisguised soldiers.

Let the system of stipendiary magistrates be carried to perfection, and the case will stand thus. The blue army, almost unlimited in numbers and powers, will be the servile instruments of the Executive: it will continually increase its encroachments on popular rights and the liberty of the subject: if it be unable to trample on the people to the desired extent, or if it by instruction goad them into resistance for the sake of pretext, the red army will always be in readiness to assist it. The stipendiary magistrates will readily combine the regular army with the police, and make both the instruments of the Executive. To the latter they will practically destroy the prohibition which has hitherto prevented it from employing the military against the people, and give it despotic control over both the police and the

army.

It must be observed that the military force of the empire cannot be reduced by the creation and multiplication of the police; the latter, therefore, forms a means of increasing the standing army to an unlimited extent. It is idle to speak of the responsibility of the Executive in the absence of restriction and the teeth of law: such responsibility in these days is only a mockery and delusion. In addition to its usual command over the Legislature, the Executive is to possess legal means of filling the land with any number of its mercenaries, overawing and corrupting the people to any extent, and having at its nod the whole military and civil force of the empire. Where, then, are we to find its responsibility?

Let all this be contrasted with what it has replaced. In the first place, there were the beadles and street-keepers-a few straggling individuals employed by the people, and having no power to act save in manifest violations of law, or from the request of competent witnesses. Then there were the regular constables-men employed by, and selected from, the people, who only held their office for a short period, and who, while holding it, never acted save when called on by proper evidence, but followed their regular

trades and occupations. Then there were the special constables taken from the people, and employed only for the moment, under independent magistrates, to keep the peace on particular occasions. Then there were the watchmen, taken from and employed by the people, having nightly duty alone, following during the day their respective callings, and armed only with legal powers against direct outrage. And then there were a few police-officers attached to the different offices; they were little more than the servants of the magistrates; their duty was in a great measure confined to the discovery of offenders, and in other respects they were bound from pernicious interference with public rights and liberties.

The civil force was thus not only carefully kept from the control of the Executive, but duly restricted in its powers, and as far as possible both prevented from making its of fices a source of corrupt trade, and protected in its morals. Then the army, except in special cases, could not be employed against the people, save with the consent, and under the direction, of really independent magistrates; in consequence, it was properly preserved from the control of the Executive.

It will be seen that the new measures completely reverse English institutions in principle, spirit, and operation. They actually or practically throw aside sheriffs, mayors, and other independent magistrates, constables, &c., and give to the Crown despotic command over the whole military and civil force of the State. They in effect annihilate the civil force, and replace it with the menials of the Executive, and a force which in habits, character, and employment, is much worse than military. They take from the people almost wholly the constitutional power of governing themselves; although they spare the elective franchise, they expose the exercise of it to so much intimidation, corruption, and profligacy, that they make it little better than a name. When they reach maturity, any Ministry may, through them, make the King absolute.

The constitution and laws of our country-the maxims and injunctions of our fathers, insist that the Exe

cutive cannot be trusted; and, sanctioned by them, we protest against being thus placed at its mercy. The doctrine of such persons as Mr Hume and Sir Robert Wilson, that it ought to be armed with despotic power, because the people in these times will prevent the abuse of such power, is worthy of its parents, and of the contempt merited by every thing they teach. The turbulent, disaffected spirit of the people has, in the last fifteen years, been so far from forming a protection to public liberties, that it has produced a regular succession of legal inroads on them; and it has supplied the pretext for these despotic measures. The people's conduct and objects are at this moment exactly calculated to destroy their independence and morals, sink them into the lowest degradation, cause the better classes to support any thing for enslaving them, render necessary the preliminaries of arbitrary government, and furnish a Ministry with reasons for establishing such government. In all countries and ages, the leaders of the populace have been the men, first to delude the people into the conduct for making tyranny necessary, and then to assist in placing them under it.

Having stated our constitutional reasons, we must now offer some of a different description against the New Police. It is infinitely more expensive than the old one, and operates as a grievous new tax. In its leading objects-the prevention of crime and protection of property-it is not more efficient than the old one; on the contrary, it is alleged to be less so. By the exasperation it causes, it operates as a source of disorder. There are misdemeanours, crimes, tumults, and riots, because there is a Police.

And now, what overpowering state necessity, or even plausible plea of expediency, can be urged to justify these detestable changes? "Property must be protected!" replies the sagacious Mr Hume. We say the same; but then we are compelled to ask, Was not property protected before the New Police was established? The inhabitants of the metropolis respond, That, while the change has not increased their protection against thieves, it has reduced it against law; and that, in consequence of it,

their property has lost no small portion of protection.

Speaking of the metropolis during the day, we maintain, from personal observation, that no alteration was called for; we have never met with one intelligent individual who on this point has differed from us. The populace was far more peaceable and good-humoured than that of provincial towns; and as to thefts and burglaries, they need not be named; the exceptions to this were confined to well-known parts, and principally to those inhabited by the Irish. The street-keepers, &c. were in general amply sufficient for the preservation of order; if they were not so in a very few great thoroughfares, or riotous streets, they could easily have been duly strengthened. If unexpected tumult took place, both the police-officers and the military could be at once obtained. On particular occasions, the special and other constables were abundantly adequate for preserving the peace without exciting animosity. With regard to the suburbs of the metropolis, where a day police was necessary, and had not temptations and means for abusing its powers, the efficiency of the patrol excluded all pretext for change.

Touching day duty, therefore, the New Police causes enormous expense, and grievously offends national feeling, without yielding any benefit worthy of notice; it is almost useless. Yet the idle officers swarm in every street throughout the day, as though the population consisted only of thieves and rebels; an Englishman of the old school can scarcely look out of his dwelling, without being led by their presence to imagine he is living under martial law, amidst a people without morals. They are ostentatiously obtruded into the last of all places where we might expect to find them. If we walk across Hyde Park, from Cumberland Gate to where Achilles stands, and casts his fearful frown over the metropolis, as though he were drawing his weapon to place it for ever under military bondage, we meet two or three of them loitering about; and as to use, it is sufficient to say, the Park is more infested with sturdy insolent beggars than it was before their introduction.