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In 1825, the year preceding that on which the bounty of 3s. per hundred weight on the exportation of refined sugar terminated, the entire drawback paid by the customs amounted to 777,634l. 6s. 11ąd. Of this sum, 77,7634. was on account of the bounty, the remaining 699,8717. being the drawback of duties actually paid. Notwithstanding the loud clamour which was raised against this bounty, the small sum stated was all the charge to which the nation was subject. It was, indeed, contended by several writers, that the practical benefit derived by the West Indian proprietors from the bounty, was of far greater extent than the sum paid by

government that the allowance of 3s. a cwt, on exportation of sugar, enabled the exporter, for example, to realise 36s. per cwt. on the continent of Europe, when the price there was only 33s, and thus our refiners could sustain competition with their continental rivals. In regard to our home market, it was affirmed, too, that, since the price of sugar on the continent regulates prices in England, any regulation which enabled the refiners to sell their sugar on better terms on the continent, enhanced, in a corresponding degree, prices to consumers in England. budistoot

The account, therefore, these writers maintained." should stand thus:

Bounty paid to colonial proprietors by government.. £77,763 Bounty paid by the people of England on the quantity

consumed by them, 3,400,000 cwts. at 3s. per cwt.. 510,000

587,763

This reasoning was several times repeated with much minuteness in Parliament; and previous to the abolition of the bounty, it passed as conclusive with the great majority of all parties. Not withstanding this authority, however, the whole argument, in the manner in which it was urged, may be pronounced to be very erroneous. › a sou

When we speak of enhancement of price benefitting particular parties at the expense of the consumers at large, it is always implied that the enhancement proceeds from unreasonable profits and causes out of the usual course of things. When the channels of commerce are open, and left to their natural operation, we never attempt to complain of occasional advances in the price of merchandise in general. Before, therefore, we affirm, that the price of sugarvis enhanced to consumers in England, by any adventitious regulation, it is necessary to show that it is above its proper and natural rate; that it is above that price at which sugar would sell on the continents of Europe generally, if call the continental markets were open, in precisely that manner which the censurers of the bounty maintain should be

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regarded as the natural course of things. If the price of sugar in England, aided by the bounty, be not above the average price on the continent, supposing trade free and unrestricted, it is quite erroneous to affirm that that bounty operates at all to the injury of the British consumer. Now it is easy to demonstrate, that it is not higher, but that, in consequence of restrictions imposed by the continental states, it is depressed below its natural rate, below that rate at which it would sell if commerce were free and unrestricted. Any measure, accordingly, adopted by the British Government, is entirely remedial, and is on the true principle of the reciprocity system, of meeting foreigners with regulations similar to those which they themselves impose.n

To make this subject more clear, let us imagine that Great Britain exported annually 50,000 hhds, of sugar, which found a free vent to the continent; and that, under these circumstances, the price of sugar in England was 35s. net per cwt., at which rate both producer and consumer were satisfied. Suppose now France, envious of our prosperity, gave great encouragement to her colonial interests, and granted a bounty to exporters of sugar, which had the effect of supplanting the sale of 10,000 hhds. of British plantation sugar in some of the continental markets. In consequence, these 10,000 hhds. would have to be disposed of at a great depreciation; and from principles main

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tained by the censurers of the bounty themselves, that there cannot be one price abroad for British sugar and another at home, all sugar sold in Great Britain must suffer the same depreciation as took place in regard to those 10,000 hhds., amounting, say, to 3s. per cwt. The price to the consumer then becomes 32s. in place of 35s. Now, could any person conscientiously declare, that this 32s. was the natural rate at which sugar should be sold; and if the British Government introduced any regulation which did not, properly speaking, enhance prices, but merely kept them where they were at 35s., and which prevented French industry from supplanting British industry, would any consumer complain that he was injured, or that he paid one farthing more for his sugar than what was proper and equitable? We apprehend not. It is as much the legitimate province of government to frame remedial measures when prices are below their proper and natural level, as it is to frame remedial measures when they are above that level. No British manufacturer would covet cheapness caused by a glut of his merchandise, or by a return of goods upon his hands, unsold because of the restrictions of foreigners; by the same analogy, he ought not to clamour for cheapness in sugar attributable to causes precisely similar.

This illustration explains, in a short compass, the principle, the tendency, and the expediency of

a bounty on the exportation of refined sugar. Adopting Mr. Huskisson's position on its broadest grounds, that we are to take the price of sugar in the European markets generally as the criterion selling price, the bounty is not fixed and invariable in its nature. Though its amount payable out of the customs be fixed, yet the advantages which it yields to the sugar grower are variable. Sometimes they are great, sometimes entirely nugatory. This is a point pregnant with importance, as we shall presently have occasion to demonstrate.