seems to me assumed against probability. Sir Hew Dalrymple notices what he calls "the critical and embarrassed state of Junot," before that general has been pressed by the British army: and, in explanation of that expression, observes, that the surrender of Dupont, the existence of the victorious Spanish army in Andalusia, which cut off the retreat of the French in that direction, and the universal hostility of the Portuguese, made the situation of Junot one of great distress. No temptation for the translation of the war into Alentejo presents itself from this picture; nor does any other representation give ground to suppose that Junot could have contemplated the measure as holding forth any prospect but ultimate ruin, after much preliminary distress and disgrace. The strongest of all proofs as to Junot's opinion, arises from his send. ing the very morning after the battle of Vimeira, to propose the evacuation of Portugal; a step which sufficiently indicated that he was satisfied he could not only make no effectual defence, but could not even prolong the contest to take the chance of accidents. He seems, indeed, to have been without any real resource. It appears in evidence, that of the troops left by him in Lisbon and the forts, a considerable proportion were of very doubtful quality. Those troops on whose fidelity he could confide, had been dismayed by a signal defeat, and they were sensible that they had no succour to look to from abroad. To the British generals it was known, when the armistice was granted, that 10,000 men under sir J. Moore, as well as the 3d and 42d regiments of foot, with the 18th dragoons, might be immediately reckoned upon; and although much advantage had not been drawn from the Portuguese troops, their support and the general violence of the country against the French, cannot be laid out of this calculation. The disparity of force and of circumstances was, then, such as could leave no doubt that the issue must be favourable to us. I do not omit advertance to the difficulties urged as possible to occur in furnishing the British army with bread. But, putting aside the obvious solution, that such a temporary privation is not ruinous to an army where cattle can be procured in the country, this difficulty cannot be well pleaded, if admission is to be given to the speculation, that the heavy cannon necessary for battering forts St. Julien and Calcaes were to be got ashore in the Bays of the Rock of Lisbon. The question then comes to this: whether the convention did (as has been asserted) secure all the objects which were proposed in the expedition? If it did not, it was not what his majesty was entitled to expect from the relative situation of the two armies. I humbly conceive it to have been erroneous to regard the emancipation of Portugal from the French, as the sole or principal object of the expedition. Upon whatever territory we contend with the French, it must be a prominent object in the struggle to destroy their resources, and to narrow their means of injuring us, or those whose cause we are supporting. This seems to have been so little considered in the convention, that the terms appear to have extricated extricated Junot's army from a situation of infinite distress, in which it was wholly out of play, and to have brought it, in a state of entire equipment, into immediate currency, in a quarter too where it must interfere with our most urgent and interesting concerns. Had it been impracticable to reduce the French army to lay down its arms unconditionally, still an obligation not to serve for a specified time, might have been insisted upon, or Belleisle might have been prescribed as the place at which they should be landed, in order to prevent the probability of their reinforcing (at least for a long time) the armies employed for the subjugation of Spain. Perhaps a stronger consideration than the merit of those terms presents itself. Opinion relative to the British arms was of the highest importance, as it might influence the confidence of the Spaniards, or invite the nations groaning under the yoke of France, to appeal to this country, and co-operate with it for their deliverance. The advantages ought, therefore, to have been more than usually great, which should be deemed sufficient to balance the objection of granting to a very inferior army, hopeless in circumstances, and broken in spirit, such terms as might argue, that, notwithstanding its disparity in numbers, it was still formidable to its victors. No advantages seemed to have been gained that would not have equally followed from forcing the enemy to a more marked submission. The gain of time as to sending succours into Spain cannot be admitted as a plea, because it appears that no arrangements for the reception of our troops in Spain had been undertaken previous to the convention; and this is without reasoning on subsequent facts. The convention in Egypt, which has been advanced as a parallel case, appears to me inapplicable. No object beyond the dislodgment of the French from Egypt was there in question. In the present instance, the operation of the convention upon the affairs of Spain was a consideration of primary interest; and in that view the inevitable effect of some of the articles offers itself to my mind as liable to material objection. I trust that these reasons will vindicate me from the charge of presumption, in maintaining an opinion contradictory to that professed by so many most respectable officers; for, even if the reasons be essentially erroneous, if they are conclusive to my mind (as I must conscientiously affirm them to be), it is a necessary consequence that I must disapprove the convention. MOIRA, General. December 27, 1808. Convention of Cintra. THE following formal declaration of his majesty's disapprobation of the armistice and convention in Portugal, has been officially communicated to sir Hew Dalrymple: THE King has taken into his consideration the report of the board of inquiry, together with the documents and opinions thereunto annexed. While his majesty adopts the unanimous opinion of the board, that no farther military proceeding is necessary to be had upon the transactions referred to their investigation his majesty does not intend thereby to convey any expression of his majesty's satisfaction at the terms and conditions of the armistice and convention. When those instruments were first laid before his majesty, the king, reserving for investigation those parts of the definitive convention, in which his majesty's immediate interests were concerned, caused it to be signified to sir Hew Dalrymple, by his majesty's secretary of state, that his majesty, nevertheless, felt himself compelled at once to express his disapprobation of those articles, in which stipulations were made, directly affecting the interests or feelings of the Spanish and Portugueze na tions. At the close of the inquiry, the king, abstaining from any observa tions upon any other parts of the convention, repeats his disapprobation of those articies: his ma jesty deeming it necessary that his sentiments should be clearly understood, as to the impropriety and danger of the unauthorized admis. sion, into military conventions, of articles of such a description, which, especially when incautiously framed, may lead to the most injurious consequences. His majesty cannot forbear farther to observe, that lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple's delaying to transmit for his information the armistice concluded on 22nd August, until the 4th September, when he, at the same time, transmitted the ratified convention, was calculated to produce great public inconvenience, and that such in convenience did in fact result there from, Buonaparte's Speech to the Cor regidor of Madrid. N Address from the Corregi dor and Magistracy of Madrid was presented to Buonaparté on the 9th of December, 1808. In this document the inhabitants are made to thank the conqueror favour of seeing king Joseph at for his clemency, and to solicit the Madrid. In his answer to this application, Buonaparté makes his consent to depend upon the 30,000 cideclaration of their fidelity, and tizens Madrid contains, making a setting an example of submission to tizens we suppose householders are the provinces. By the 30,000 cimeant, for the Moniteur states that registers had been opened at Madrid, and that 30,000 fathers of families had rushed to them in crowds to sign the required supplication. The answer which Buonaparté returned to the address of the corregidor contains so many remarkable traits, that we think it necessary to give it at length, as it appears in the Paris papers, in the following terms: "I am pleased with the sentiments of the city of Madrid. I regret the injuries she has suffered, and am particularly happy that, under existing circumstances, I have been able to effect her deliverance, and to protect her from great calamities. I have hastened to adopt measures calculated to tranquillize all ranks of the citizens, knowing how painful a state of uncertainty is to all men collectively and individually. I have preserved the spiritual orders, but with a limitation of the number of monks. There is not a single intelligent per son son who is not of opinion that they were too numerous. Those of them who are influenced by a divine call, shall remain in their cloisters. With regard to those whose call was doubtful, or influenced by temporal considerations, I have fixed their condition in the order of secular priests. Out of the surplus of the monastic property, I have provided for the main tenance of the pastors, that important and useful class of the clergy. I have abolished that court which was a subject of complaint to Europe and the present age. Priests may guide the minds of men, but must exercise no temporal or corporeal jurisdiction over the citizens. "I have accomplished what I owed to myself and my nation. Vengeance has had its due. It has fallen upon ten of the principal culprits all the rest have entire and absolute forgiveness. I have abolished those privileges which the grandees usurped, during times of civil war, when kings but too frequently are necessitated to surrender their rights to purchase their own tranquillity and that of their people. I have abolished the feudal rights, and henceforth every one may set up inns, ovens, mills, employ himself in fishing and rabbit hunting, and give free scope to his industry, provided he respects the laws and regulations of the police. The selfishness, wealth, and prosperity of a small number of individuals, were more injurious to your agriculture than the heat of the dog-days. As there is but one God, so should there be in a state but one judicial power. All peculiar jurisdictions were usurpations, and at variance with the rights of the nation; I have abolished them: I have also made known to every one what he may have to fear, and what he may have to hope. I shall expel the English army from the Peninsula. Saragossa, Valencia, Seville, shall be reduced to submission, either by persuasion, or the power of my arms. There is no obstacle which can long resist the execution of my resolutions. But what transcends my power is thisto consolidate the Spaniards as one nation, under the sway of the king, should they continue to be infected with these principles of aversion and hatred to France, which the partisans of the English and the enemies of the continent have infused into the bosom of Spain. I can establish no nation, no king, no independence of the Spaniards, if the king be not assured of their attachment and fidelity. "The Bourbons can no longer reign in Europe. The divisions in the royal family were contrived by the English. It was not the dethronement of king Charles, and the favourite (the Prince of the Peace), that the duke de Infantado, that tool of England, as is proved by the papers found in his house, had in view. The intention was, to establish the predominant influence of England in Spain; a senseless project, the result of which would have been a perpetual continental war, that would have caused the shedding of torrents of blood. No power under the influence of England can exist on the continent. If there be any that entertain such a wish, their wish is absurd, and will sooner or later occasion their fall. It would be easy for me, should I be compelled to adopt that measure, to govern Spain, by esta blishing blishing as many viceroys in it as there are provinces. Nevertheless, I do not refuse to abdicate my rights of conquest in favour of the king; and to establish him in Madrid, as soon as the 30,000 citizens which this capital contains, the clergy, nobility, merchants, and lawyers, shall have declared their sentiments and their fidelity, set an example to the provinces, enlightened the people, and made the nation sensible that their existence and prosperity essentially depend upon a king and a free constitution, favourable to the people; and hostile only to the egotism and haughty passions of the grandees. "If such be the sentiments of the inhabitants of the city of Madrid, let the 30,000 citizens assemble in the churches; let them, in the presence of the Holy Sacrament, take an oath, not only with their mouths, but also with their hearts, and without any jesuitical equivocation, that they promise support, attachment, and fidelity to their king: let the priests in the confessional and the pulpit, the mercantile class in their correspondence, the men of the law in their writings and speeches, infuse these sentiments into the people; then shall I surrender my right of conquest, place the king upon the throne, and make it my pleasing task to conduct myself as a true friend of the Spaniards. The present generation may differ in their opinion; the passions have been brought into action; but your grand-children will bless me as your renovator; they will reckon the day when I appeared among their memorable festivals; and from that will the happiness of Spain date its commencement." You are thus, Monsieur le Corregidor," added the emperor, "informed of the whole of my determination. Consult with your fellow-citizens, and consider what part you will choose; but whatever it be, make your choice with sincerity, and tell me only your genuine sentiments." Opinion of General Palafox. Given by Order of his Majesty Ferdinand VII. (whom God preserve), in the City of Bayonne, the 29th April, 1808. HIS IS majesty having ordered me to give my opinion, in writing, whether he ought or ought not to abdicate his crown, and take in exchange that of Tuscany, as is proposed by the emperor of the French -I declare my opinion to be, that he ought not by any means to abdicate his crown, nor can he do so without violating his honour, and the engagements which he has contracted with his subjects, who took the oath of allegiance to him as heir of the crown. An additional reason is this, that his majesty is absent from his dominions, and consequently in a situation where no act of that description can be valid; such an act can the less stand good, as he is deluded and deceived by the false insinuations of the emperor Napoleon, and absolutely despoiled of all liberty. Besides, to render an act of this nature valid, it would be necessary to call a meeting of the cortes, and with their consent, his majesty might adopt any resolution which he should deem expedient. I am farther of opinion, that he cannot accept of the crown of |