the imagination and the reason, and thus produce lively emotions. The new and strange varieties in which they present themselves to the understanding is the foundation of curiosity and research. Hence the discoveries of science. The imagination, in the objects of sight and hearing, discovers qualities much finer than those perceived by the gross senses, such as beauty, sublimity, congruity, dignity, und harmony; thus are pleasurable emotions raised which come under the denomination of the emotions of Taste. These emotions give to life an inexpressible charm.

The soul or mind as we have seen is connected to earth by the senses, and is formed not only to know but to enjoy all that the world of matter can exhibit and produce. But this is not all, for mind every where seeks its fellow mind. In his sensitive state, man is also social. Creating Wisdom and Goodness declared it "not good that he should be alone," and in accordance, provided such ties of kindred as involve endearing relations, from whence spring some of the strongest emotions of the soul; feelings enduring as life, and sometimes stronger than the love of life.

In our reason and our moral nature do we find other sources of strong emotion and powerful incentives to action. Reason searches for

cause, and in this employment, men often forget the cravings of nature for sustenance and repose; they even give up the enjoyments of social life, abandoning all in their research. Philosophers in ancient days travelled through the known world to seek for knowledge, and in later times men have boldly encountered the rigours of the arctic wave, and the dangers and privations incident to adventures in high northern latitudes; they have languished under the fiery beams of the torrid sun, and have dared the club of the ferocious savage, to establish facts important to science.

Moral sense in its approbation of truth, justice and benevolence sometimes carries the mind to great and noble actions. Socrates, impelled by this strong emotion, instructed the youth of Athens in virtue and belief so contrary to heathen sentiment and practice, that they laid the hand of violence upon the aged moralist. “Alas, cried one of his friends, that you should die, being innocent." "How," replied the virtuous Socrates, "would you then have me die guilty?" Howard, the philanthropist, in the exercise of his natural and sanctified benevolence, made long, fatiguing and repeated journies through Europe, Asia, and Africa, visiting the prisons, and relieving the prisoner degraded, afflicted and suffering. Nor was this all, for he exposed

himself to the peril of that most horrible malady the plague, that he might search into its nature, and if possible discover a remedy to relieve suffering humanity. Thus he writes in his journal, "How should I bless God if such a worm is made the instrument of alleviating the miseries of my fellow creatures, and of thus connecting more strongly the social bond by mutual exertions for mutual relief." Says Foster of him in his celebrated Essay, "The law that carries water down a declivity was not more unconquerable and unvariable than the determination of his feelings towards the main object."

Man's moral and immortal nature, by which he is connected to God and a future state of existence, is provided with a strong sense of accountability which we call Conscience. His sensitive nature shrinks from dissolution, and his conscience or moral nature looks with forebodings, sometimes with anguish intolerable, to a future retribution. Hence also the fear of death, common to all, which nothing but a wellfounded faith in the Salvation of the Gospel, can overcome and in this faith originates a joy which the possession of an earthly empire could not bestow; a joy which no human ill, even the prospect of the martyr's stake, and the anguish of the devouring flame can destroy.

There is between the intellectual powers and the feelings a reciprocal action. When an object is presented to a child a feeling of pleasure or aversion is awakened, and the little one exhibits voluntary action in his efforts to obtain the pleasing object, or in turning away from the disagreeable one, sometimes with show of strong dislike. As with the infant so with others. The perception brings the mind in contact with objects. A movement is thus caused and its voluntary action is exhibited in the attention given to the object, impressing it upon the memory, bringing it by association to the recollection; and thus in time making it the subject of all the powers of the intellect.

A variety of causes depending upon our nature in connection with the circumstances in which we are placed, move the mind to action, but why some are more influenced by the objects of the gross senses, others by the ideal or imaginary qualities in objects, others again by the social connections of life, and some few by the necessary and moral relations of things, we cannot tell. In this, as far as we can understand, seems to originate the remarkable difference we notice in the pursuits and characters of mankind. In this we find the sensual mind, commonly coarse, sometimes brutal; the imaginative or refined, the social or philanthropic,

the reasoning or philosophic, and the religious. Though we find these distinct classes of character, yet we frequently find different and opposite characteristics mingled in the same person. As in Savage the poet, who now appeared a man of refined taste and profound thought, now a man of pleasure, most selfish and dissipated. Or in the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, who was both a philosopher and a bigoted persecuter of the Christians.

To say that we should not suffer ourselves to be influenced by feeling, is to speak without reflection. Insensibility is not a rational or moral state. Our Creator has given us feeling as well as intellect, and the right exercise of the mind is in the full employment and balanced action of all the powers of the soul. We must feel, but our feelings should be right. The emotions produced by our intellectual perceptions, by our social and moral relations must be guided by reason, by conscience, and by the Word of God.

CHAPTER II.

TASTE.

Taste cannot in strictness be called a distinct faculty of the mind, but rather a perception of the qualities, bestowed upon objects by the cre