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CHAPTER II.

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.

In a review of the subject now before us, we find in our mental constitution faculties for the acquisition of knowledge, and ability for such a use of it, as would render man, even on earth, akin to angelic nature. Let us now look upon the world within us, by consciousness, and examine the world without, and we shall perceive in the human soul the ruins of an exquisite piece of workmanship. This is visible in all the intellectual operations, and still more in the feelings and emotions of the heart.

The senses present innumerable objects that address themselves to the understanding and to the feelings, but how does it happen that we most frequently disregard those that are useful and good, while we are attracted to those which are hurtful? Why instead of nourishing ourselves with proper food, do we pamper the appetites and do injury to the body—the organ which God has provided for the immortal spirit, so as to impede its operations, and sink the understanding below the instinct of the mere animal, or else work, through intemperance, the feelings up to the wickedness of demoniac rage? Why in our perception and love of the beautiful do we so attach ourselves to certain objects, as

to forget that there are higher delights than those of earth? Why so carried away by imagination as to forget the sober duties of life; even extracting poison from its sweets, presenting the intoxicating draught, or bitter chalice, to those that should be cherished in the bosom? Why seeing ourselves connected with others, not only in the intimate relation of family, but also participants of the same Providential allotments; enjoying equally the light and the dews of heaven, resembling each other in form and intellect; partakers of like joys, like sorrows; alike feeble, suffering, and subject to death. Why sensible of all this, do we not feel, at all times, the heart warm with love to those who so nearly resemble ourselves, who are of the same flesh, the same spirit, and under the same natural government?

Look abroad, and see the dissensions that reign in households; what jealousy, envy, anger, hatred, even revenge among brothers; how much more among neighbours; between nations how much blood is spilled through these unholy passions, and ambition still more unholy. Even when the passions do not thus flame out in fury, we find that mankind delight to pour contempt upon each other. They defame whole nations, they slander their neighbours, they speak evil of those who occupy exalted stations, and over

whelm those who through misfortune are sunk below them. Men will have what they call their own rights, should humanity weep tears of blood at their feet. The heart sickens at the contemplation of such disorders, and we perhaps seek consolation in the thought that we find ourselves free from these debasing passions. But let us examine. Do we, in every instance, "esteeming others better than ourselves," prefer, when competition takes place, the good of our neighbour to our own? or do we not sometimes seek our own interest at the expense of our neighbour? When we hear him complain of misfortune, of pain or of grief, do we not, in thought, immediately revert to our own trials, and instead of relieving his heart by sympathy, selfishly pour upon him our complaints, with the feeling that we are the greater sufferers? Does not the cheek sometimes grow pale and the lip curl in scorn when deserved praise is given to a rival, and does not the eye sparkle with pleasure when some tale to his disparagement is told? Our moral nature revolts at such conduct in others, and the consciousness of such feelings in ourselves brings a blush of shame upon the cheek; yet we listen not to such prompting, but excuse ourselves with the plea, that we cannot help it; that so we are born; that it is the nature given us by our Creator. Experience indeed teaches

that thus we are born, but Reason contradicts the assertion, that a Just and Good God thus created us. Conscience loudly proclaims that the sin is our own, and that, at some time, it will meet its just and terrible punishment. Still we go on, and on; we choose the evil and reject the good. And why? are we impelled to evil by irresistible impulse? Some are of this opinion: but you, my young friends, are unwilling to think yourselves mere machines, moved by a power without which you cannot resist; still you possibly believe, that your desires and affections leading you to certain indulgences, and to conduct which you disapprove, are a power within, over which you have no control. But is this true?

I desire to move my position and I do not, because the motion occasions pain, and I will not. Here desire and will, are opposed and will prevails. A man desires money, but does not obtain it because the attainment would involve his honesty; he will not have it by unfair means, though it might purchase comfort for his family and pleasures for himself. The affections indeed are not under the control of the will, but are we on this account excusable for loving what is wrong, and hating what is right? Would a man be cleared at a tribunal of justice who declared that his hatred of a person was so strong

that he could not forbear taking his life? Or would that son be considered justifiable who should declare that he disliked his mother so much that he would give her no support in her old age? This would be unnatural, and monstrous. If a person had conferred a benefit upon another, and should receive the confession, I have tried to love you and feel gratitude but cannot; would not every one cry out against the unnatural creature? A desire to love or to be grateful, is not the same as loving or being grateful; of such a person we should say, he has no right sensibilities or feelings, but this would be no excuse. Our evil propensities show a depraved nature, but they are no excuse for our evil actions; they show, that although we hold a most exalted rank in creation, and are favoured with the innumerable blessings of Providence, yet that we are in a most deplorable condition. We not only do wrong, but love to do wrong, while our moral nature approves, and prompts us to the right. We feel that we will not, and declare that we cannot do, what we acknowledge we ought to do. These facts should affect every rational mind, and induce to the consideration of what may be the consequences of dying in this state.

We are all aware that if we wish to turn the attention to an object or subject we can do so, even though it be disagreeable; many a boy has

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