than we fhould be juftified to admit, by the nature of the evi dence on which it is founded. The tranfmiffion of certain dogmata by colonization, is equally confonant to hiftory, reafon, and what we actually know of the facts.

ART. IV. Observations on the Documents, including the Evidence heard at the Bar, laid before Parliament, on the Subject of the

late Expedition to the Scheldt. 8vo. Pp. 160. 1810.

WE take some blame to ourselves, for not having long ago pat upon record, in this Journal, a short and readable epitome of this most memorable expedition. Our good intentions have been disappointed oftener than once, by accidents in which our readers can take no interest; but it is better, at all events, that the thing should be done now, than that it should not be done at all. The immediate interest of the subject, to be sure, is gone by; and few readers, perhaps, will now condescend to read five pages, on a topic which would have ensured their eager attention through fifty, eighteen months ago. In other respects, however, the delay is not without its advantages. It acquits us of all factious and personal feelings; and gives our statement a greater chance of making a permanent impression, than if it had been capable of being represented as a mere echo of parliamentary inculpations then actually in dependence, or a device to promote the ruin of a ministry under trial. It is wonderful, too, to consider how feeble and transitory are the moral impressions that result from the most momentous events that are only presented to us in combination with party and personal feelings; and if it be true, that we are every day moved and agitated by many things of which history will disdain to take any cognizance, it is no less true, that we every day witness, without emotion, many things which history will be tempted to reject as incredible; and forget, in a few months, what will excite the horror and disdain of posterity for many future generations. It is for our honour and our profit, however, to anticipate those decisions of posterity; and to try, at least, to place some of the characteristic events of our own times in the cold light of historical record,disembarrassed from the perplexity of useless details, and separated entirely from the violence of political contention and individual animosity. It is never too late to reap the dear-bought fruits of disastrous experience: and, while the men are yet alive, and moving in the visible front of public life, who planned this lamentable expedition, and sup ported it by their votes, it cannot be without its use, to lay calm

ly

ly and dispassionately before the public, one great, finished, and elaborate specimen of the talents by which they are governed,-to appeal to broad, certain, and most important facts, for the satisfaction of those who affect a distrust of argument,-and to put in the hands of as many as choose to look at it, a plain, experimental test of the intellectual and moral qualifications of those, to whose wisdom and vigilance their interests have been confided. In this humble attempt, we shall employ no reasoning, and draw no conclusions; but shall confine ourselves strictly to the simple and concise statement of facts that admit of no dispute, and would be unfit for our purpose if they stood in need of any commentary.

The war between Austria and France began on the 8th of April 1809; the battle of-Aspern was fought on the 22d of May, and known here on the 8th of June; the battle of Wagram was fought on the 6th of July. The armistice, which ended in a peace, was agreed upon, the 12th of July: And on the 28th of July, sixteen days after this, the expedition in aid of the Austrian monarchy sailed from this country.

The opinions laid before government respecting the policy and practicability of this expedition, were, those of Sir David Dundas, General Brownrigg, Colonel Gordon, General Hope, and Lieutenant-General Calvert.

The following is the conclusion of Sir David Dundas's opinion.

The service is one of very great risk, and in which the safe return of the army so employed may be very precarious, from the opposition made, and the length of time consumed, in the operation; which enables the enemy to assemble, in a short time, a great force from every part of the Netherlands, and Holland, and even from Westphalia by the course of the Rhine, as well as from the frontier of France. Observations, p. 11.

In addition to this, Sir David Dundas states, in his evidence, That from his knowledge of Antwerp in the year 1794, he was enabled to state, that the citadel was a very considerable one certainly, and would require a siege of some duration to take it; that it could not be entered without a regular siege, unless it was surrendered. It has been surrendered without a siege; but then the enemy was in possession of the country, which was not now the case. He also adds, that If the enemy had 10,000 men in the country, he supposes an army of four times that number would be necessary to besiege it, and to cut off the communication at the same time. He does not think any expedition could have been fitted out with the object of taking Antwerp by a coup de main. He could never have given as his opinion, that it could be so taken. It is not usual to employ 40 or 50,000 men, and a train of heavy artillery, for a coup de main.' p 26, 27. The

The conclus on of Lieutenant-General Calvert's opinion is as follows.

It must, however, be remarked, that the city of Antwerp is formidable, and the works of the town itself, such as would demand a regular approach, and a train of artillery, which could not be transported without much time and labour, unless we could secure the navigation of the Scheldt, which could only be assured by the possession of the forts on the left, as well as on the right bank of the river. From the moment our fleet and army appear off Wal. cheren, the enemy must necessarily be apprised of the object of the enterprize.' Lieutenant General Calvert concludes by stating, that, having no data to go on in respect to the enemy, no‘ argument can be entered on that point; but it may be presumed, that, on such an occasion, he would not hesitate immediately to draw all his troops from the fortresses in Holland, the Netherlands, and French Flanders, and from more remote quarters, if he had sufficient time for the purpose.

The service would be arduous; and the troops employed on it must unavoidably be exposed to considerable risk.' p. 13, 14. And the General's evidence before the Commons, is in these terms.

General Calvert was first informed of the project about the middle of May. He had been at Antwerp in 1794, It was generally stated, that it was imagined the enemy's country was very bare of troops at that time. He considered Antwerp a fortress, and the citadel a regular work. He thought it would not be possible, by any means, to have conveyed an army adequate to the siege of Antwerp, with the ordnance requisite from this country, by Sandvliet to Antwerp, without giving the enemy considerable time for preparation. He was never called upon to explain any part of his military opinion, delivered in to the Commander in Chief. He conceived it would be necessary to detach corps to mask Bergen-opZoom, and the other fortresses in that neighbourhood, before Antwerp could be invested. He did not think it probable such a fortress as Antwerp could be taken by a coup de main; he will not say it was impossible. He conceives a fortress cannot be taken without treachery, without a siege.' In consequence of the knowledge General Calvert possessed of the country, and his conversation with military men,his opinion was, that Walcheren would fall; but he adds, I had great doubts with regard to the ultimate operations, as is expressed in my written opinion. p. 27, 28.

Such an operation, (says General Hope) it is evident, would be attended with great risk to the force employed, without, perhaps, any adequate security to the attainment of its object: at the same time, if executed with decision immediately after the occupation of south Beveland, (supposing the enemy unprepared), it might have some chance of success. p. 17.

It is observed by Colonel Gordon- That this attempt would be a most desperate enterprize, cannot be doubted; and that, in the attempt, whether successful or otherwise, a very large 'proportion of our naval and military means would be put to imminent hazard.' (p. 19.) And, in his evidence before the House, he states, that, at the time his opinion was asked, no plan of the country, of its defences or its fortifications, was delivered to him. He thinks there can be no doubt, but that, if an army had been sent to besiege Antwerp, it would have been necessary to make great detachments, to cover the different posts in the province of Zealand. No communication took place between Colonel Gordon and Lord Castlereagh on the subject of his military opinion; nor does he recollect to have been asked any questions upon it by his Lordship. The opinions of the Earl of Roslyn, Sir John Hope, or Sir William Erskine, were never asked; though it was universally known, that Sir William had been at Antwerp in 1794, and had thoroughly examined the works on the Scheldt, and in Brabant. None of these officers entertained any hopes of the ultimate success of the expedition. Sir Richard Strachan, consulted by Lord Mulgrave, stated, that he could entertain little prospect of the ultimate success of the expedition, and that nothing more would be done but taking Walcheren. Even Sir Home Popham states, that the expedition ought to sail early in June.

These opinions, all unfavourable, are delivered; and, without further comment or communication, Lord Castlereagh orders Sir David Dundas to hold in readiness, for embarkation, an army of 35,000 infantry, and 1800 cavalry; and similar orders for preparation are given to the navy.

It appears in evidence, that Government were completely ignorant whether ships of war could, or could not, get up above Antwerp. They knew that the expedition had been long expected by the enemy; and they had not a single particle of intelligence respecting the French force in the Low Country. The English fleer might be observed the moment it quitted the Dowes; and the French have thirteen fortified towns within one day's march of Antwerp, and twenty-three other fortified towns within two days' march. The roads in the Low Countries are uniformly good; and, in many of the routes to Antwerp, are canals parallel with the roads, for the more easy transport of artillery. Ministers knew also, that a boom had been flung across the Scheldt; and that ships, in going up, must pass five batteries, four forts, and the temporary batteries on the banks.

It appears further, that this expedition had been suggested to Mr Pitt in 1798, to Lord Hobart in 1803, and to Lord Grenville in 1806; VOL. XVII. NO. 34.

Y

and

and had been rejected by them all, as desperate and impracticable. When first resolved upon by the present administration, it appeared that the whole disposeable force of the country had been reduced to 15,000 men, by their rash expedition under General Moore. The greatest efforts possible, however, were made; and the expedition which actually left this country, consisted of 34,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, 16 companies of artillery, 300 military artificers, 28 officers of engineers, 2 companies of the staff corps, 39 sail of the line, 36 frigates, besides mortar-vessels and gunboats, amounting to between 400 and 500 pendants,-furnished by government with one person acquainted with the navigation of the Scheldt, and with no plans of Antwerp, Lillo, or Liefhenshock. 'The Government (says Sir R. Strachan, from whose evidence these facts are taken) could supply us with none; and appeared to be utterly ignorant whether or not ships could get up above Antwerp.

To conduct this army, constituting a greater land force of English soldiers than the Duke of Marlborough ever had under his command, the person selected was the Earl of Chatham, -a nobleman altogether unknown as an officer, and known only as a civilian for his unsatisfactory conduct of the Admiralty, from which, on account of the universal complaints against him, he had been removed by his own brother. This commander, indeed, has himself declared in evidence, that he did not know, before he left England, whether the arsenals at Antwerp were commanded by the citadel; nor had he any distinct knowledge where the arsenals were situate. No plan in detail was ever concerted for the attack of Antwerp; nor had he ever seen, or received from Government, any plan of the present state of that town. He was also ignorant of the number of fortified towns within two days' march of Antwerp, and knew little or nothing of the state of the fortresses on the Scheldt before his sailing he never called for any explanation of their military opinions from the Commander in Chief, General Calvert, General Brownrigg, or Colonel Gordon, though those opinions had been given to him by the Secretary of state. He was never asked by the ministers, after his return, for any account of his proceedings, beyond what was stated in his despatches. All this appears in the evidence of Lord Chatham himself.

Sir John Pringle, surgeon-general to the English army employed in Zealand in the campaign of 1747, wrote a book upon the diseases of the army, in which, speaking of that campaign, he has this passage.

In Zealand, the sickness was great among the four battalions

which