And

Jefus Chrift was a meffenger fent from God, to make known his will, touching the true way to God's favour and eternal life? or whether I do not only withhold my affent to this propofition, but also believe the contrary? I fay, I apprehend, this must be meant, because, other wife, thofe appellations, with regard to me, are most loofe and indeterminate, and may be applied to any subject. So that until the fubject is fixed to which thofe terms, viz. believer and unbeliever, are applied, I am not a judge for myself, whether I am one, or another of these. tho' it would probably be a vain attempt to try to fatisfy fuch inquifitors, feeing, instead of fatisfying, I fhould, perhaps, rather offend them; yet, I will fhew my readers, because poffibly it may be of ufe to them, what my Jentiments are with refpect to the points before mentioned, as alfo on many other fubjects; together with the reafons, upon which thofe fentiments are grounded. And, in the doing of this, I fhall (as I think I ought) ftrictly purfue truth, without reSpect to perfans or things, and without paying a partial regard to any fyftem of religion, whether it be confidered as christian, or otherwife; and accordingly, fhall treat

every

every question with plainnefs and freedom, it being, in my opinion, a piece of justice which is due to all fubjects, that, if we make an inquiry about them, we fhould do it with plainnefs, fairness, and impartiality ; and introduce every thing that makes against, as well as for, the question in debate, whether that question has been generally admitted, or not; this being the most likely way to come at truth, and therefore, it is not likely that truth will be a fufferer by it. And, indeed, there is the more reason for a ftrict and impartial examination of fuch points as have met with a general acceptance ; because that very thing, viz. their having been generally admitted, is too,too apt to prejudice us in their favour. Nor fhall I (I truft) pay a partial regard to any opinion I myself may have been of, at any time past, with regard to any question I may have given my judgment upon; but shall confider it with the fame freedom and impartiality, as if I had not given any fuch judgment. For, as I then gave my opinion according to the evidence that appeared, and as it was then prefent to my mind; fo I fhall do the fame now, how widely foever I may differ from myself thereby.

BUT

BUT then, I do not pretend to any extraordinary illuminations, or divine impreffions, as having been made upon my mind, because I do not apprehend I have ever experienced any fuch thing; and therefore, I have no other way, in which I can purfue truth, but that of reasoning and argumentation only. And tho' there have been, as well in this, as in former ages, many who have pretended to have been favoured with divine impreffions, and thereby with extraordinary illuminations; yet, I think, they are very unsafe guides; not only because I cannot discover any principle, any premises, from which we may conclude, with certainty, that their pretences are well grounded; but also because these pretenders have, with regard to their doctrines, greatly differed among themselves, infomuch that what fome have held forth and taught as divine truth, others have exploded as pernicious error. Besides, as there is in man a discerning power, which renders him capable of diftinguishing betwixt good and evil, truth and error, (tho', through inattention, and a partial knowledge of the cafe, he is liable to err in the use of it ;) fo this power is of God; and that it is fo, is as evident, and as certain, as that we

are,

are, because it plainly appears to be a part of our frame and conftitution. And that this faculty was, by the Author of our beings, defigned and intended to answer the purpose aforefaid, is as obvious, as that our eyes were given us to fee withal; whereas, I think, we cannot have equal certainty, that any impreffions, made upon our minds, are divine; and therefore, the former muft, from the nature of the thing, be a much safer guide than the latter. And, as our discerning faculty is of God, and is planted in us, by him, to anfter the aforefaid purpose; so, I doubt not, but that in an honeft and careful use of it we shall render ourselves approveable to our Maker; whereas, with regard to the impreffions* that may be made upon our minds, it seems to me altogether uncertain, not only whether any of them are divine, and confequently, whether we ought to be directed by them, but alfo whether we fhall render ourselves approveable to God by following fo uncertain a guide. However,

that

*Some of thofe, who pretend to experience the fpecial operations of the Deity upon their minds, do not call thofe operations divine impreffions, but divine influence, which term is rather more unintelligible, as it's fenfe is undeterminate in the prefent cafe ; but then, whether the term influence is made use of for that reason, I am not a judge.

that I may fet this matter in as clear a light as I can, I will fuppofe, that fome ideas have been impreffed upon my mind, of which I have indulged the pleafing thought, that the impreffion was divine; this being fuppofed, the question is, what is there in the cafe for me fairly and rationally to ground the prefumption upon, that the impreffion was divine? And, in order to give a fatisfactory answer to this question, two things feem neceffary to be enquired into, viz. First, What different circumftances may be fuppofed to attend impreffions, by which difference of circumstances one impreffion may be diftinguished from another? Secondly, What are thofe circumstances, that are peculiar to divine impreffions, by which they may be diftinguifhed and certainly known, from all other impreffions, that may be made upon the mind? And, first, the enquiry is, what different circumstances may attend impreffions, by which they may be diftinguished one from another. And here, I shall not take notice of all the trifling circumstances, that may be fuppofed to attend the cafe; becaufe, I think, that is needlefs, and would look more like banter than argument; but only of fuch as are most material, or fome of them, at least, in order to explain

the