ed upon? which ground I am carefully to examine, in order to fee whether it is a proper foundation for fuch opinion; if I find it to be fo, I affent to it, not because it is univerfally affented to, but because it appears to me to be well grounded, independent of fuch univerfal affent. If I find it to be otherwise, the question will be, What must I do? Muft I judge of the cafe according to the strength of the evidence, as it appears to my mind, or muft I give up my understanding in complaisance to univerfal opinion? Not the latter, furely, because the ground of affent does not become a whit the stronger, by its having obtained univerfal affent; nor is it more fo, than if it had obtained affent from one mind only; or even than if it had gained no affent at all. Suppofe the reafons, upon which the Ptolemaick fyftem of aftronomy was grounded, had obtained univerfal affent; would that system have been well grounded, because the reasons upon which it was grounded had been univerfally admitted? and ought universal opinion to have determined the judgment of Copernicus, against the strongest and most obvious reasons to the contrary? Surely, not. If the advocates for fpecial grace fhould tack about, and fay, that by grace is not

meant

meant any new power that is given to men ;
but only that the Deity does particularly, and
specially, interpose and dispose men to make a
proper ufe of the abilities they already have,
which otherwise, or without such a divine in-
terpofition, they would not be difpofed to do:
Answer: This is in reality giving up the doc-
trine of special grace we have had under con-
fideration, and introducing another fort of
special grace in it's place and ftead. And, as
to this new sort of special grace, if the Deity
does by it any other ways difpofe men to do
their duty, (if it may be called duty, which
is greatly improper) than by difpofing them,
by motives of perfuafion, to make a proper
ufe of the powers they have, this would be
deftructive of human agency; because, fo far
as force takes place, agency is difplaced, and
in all such cases man is a mere paffive fubject;
he does not act, but is acted upon. And, if
this fort of grace confifts only in furnishing
men with proper motives of perfuafion, to dif
pose them to do their duty; then, in this, it
the province of another fort of
Special grace, which by way of distinction I
call the fecond fort; viz. external divine re-
velation, commonly called the chriftian reve-
lation; whose proper province it is, or, at least,

enters upon

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it

1

it is faid to be, (by general, if not universal, opinion among chriftians) to lay before men those motives of perfuafion as are proper to dispose them to do their duty, which motives of perfuafion, without external divine revelation,men could not have attained to,and therefore, without fuch external divine revelation, they must have been deftitute of them. So that, in this cafe, it is pulling down one fort of fpecial grace, to fet up another; it is taking from the fpecial grace of external divine revelation, by fetting up a third fort of special grace to Supply it's place, and to answer it's purposes. Thus, when men have taken from the human conftitution, those powers and capacities, which the author of nature has furnished it with, and compounded it of; then, they introduce what they call fpecial grace, to repair the injury.

BUT farther, I beg leave to repeat an obfervation that I have already made, (perhaps more than once in the course of my writings) because, I think, it is what my readers fhould always remember, and govern their judgments by; viz. that in the determinations they come to,concerning the truth of any propofition, or fact, fuch determinations ought to correfpond with, and be

pro

go

proportionate to the strength and clearness of the evidence upon which they are grounded; and, that where certainty cannot be attained, our judgments ought to be directed and verned by probability; and, as probability may be greater, or less, so where the greater degree of probability appears, it ought to determine our judgments to that fide of the question, to which the greater degree of probability ftands related; and, that our affent ought to be stronger, or weaker, in proportion to the greater, or lefs degree of probability, which is the ground of that affent. This, I think, ought to be the cafe; and herein, I apprehend, lies the propriety, rectitude, or morality of faith, if it may be expreffed thus. But then, by the term faith is here meant the bare act of assent to the truth of a propofition, or fact, abstracted from any rectitude of action that may be previous to it, or confequent upon it; whether that affent be grounded on fenfible evidence, or on demonftration, (which may, perhaps, come under the denomination of Science or knowledge) or or whether it be grounded on any other kind of evidence. I am fenfible, that in oppofition to what I have thus frequently observed, it is pretended.

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tended, that the excellency and merit of faith arifes from, and bears a proportion, rather to the weakness, than to the strength of the evidence upon which it is grounded. And, this opinion is founded upon the words of Chrift to St. Thomas,-John xx. 29. Jefus faid unto him, Thomas, because thou haft seen me, thou haft believed; blessed [or more bleffed] are they who have not feen, and yet have believed. Now, if the faith that is founded on the teftimony of others, is more worthy, more blessed, than the faith that is founded on the teftimony of a man's own fenfes, as in the instance referred to; then, the confequence is clear, viz. that the virtue and merit of faith arifes from, and bears a proportion, rather to the weakness, than to the ftrength of the evidence upon which it is grounded. Wherefore, I obferve, that if this were the cafe, viz. that to believe upon weak evidence is more valuable, than to believe the fame thing upon evidence that is Stronger; then, by parity of reafon, to believe without evidence must be more meritorious, than to believe upon weak evidence; and then, to believe against evidence muft be still more valuable, than to believe without evidence; the very ftating of which cafe

fuf