SECTION II.

Concerning a DEITY.

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HAT there is a Deity or governing mind, who gave being to all things external to himself, and who exifts by, or from, an abfolute neceffity, in the nature of things, is, to me, most evident and plain. Through the whole frame of nature, as far as it comes within our notice, there appears to be defign in every part, each part being directed to answer Some end. This is most apparent in the frame and texture of every animal, each part of every individual being directed to answer fome purpofe. Now, to fuppofe defign, without a defigner, or a designing mind to be the ground and foundation of that defign, appears to be very abfurd; and, therefore, is not to be admitted. And tho' there may arife difficulties that are not easily folved, upon the fuppofition of a Deity,

which

which difficulties Atheism may be supposed to be grounded upon; yet thefe, I think, are by no means equal to the difficulty, or rather, the abfurdity and impossibility abovementioned, viz. that great art and defign

may take place, without an artist or defigner to betheground and foundation thereof; and, therefore, I think, atheism, in point of argument, is insupportable. Whoever takes a close view of the human frame and conftitution, and, from thence, obferves with what art and skill every part is contrived, and directed to answer fome end; how the bones and muscles, the nerves, the veins, the arteries, and all the other parts of the compofition are contrived, and difpofed, in order to constitute, and continue in being, for a time, that mafter-piece of art called man; (not but this argument must of neceffity fuffer, through my inability to handle it fully, and give it * it's due weight); I fay, whoever thus takes a view of the human frame and conftitution, together with the other various parts of nature, must, I think, be convinced, that the prefent conftitution of things is the produce of fome artift, or skilful contriver, and that it could

not

* See this argument more fully handled, in Mr. Abernethy's difcourfe, concerning the being, and natural perfections, of God.

not be the effect of meer accident ; and therefore, whatever difficulties may take place, which cannot easily be folved upon the fuppofition of a Deity; yet thofe difficulties do not weaken, much lefs deftroy, the grounds upon which that fuppofition is built. And, as the whole frame of nature bespeaks defign, fo that defign plainly befpeaks the most perfect intelligence, goodness, and unlimited power to take place in the defigner; because any thing short of this would not be fufficient to answer that defign. When we take a furvey of this vifible world, and carefully obferve the curioufnefs, and the multiplicity of its parts; and how each part is excellently disposed to answer the end to which it seems, at least, to be directed; together with theamazing greatness, and the prodigious extent of the whole; and how it is well adapted to answer the purpofe of a general good; we can scarce avoid drawing this conclufion, from the reflection, viz. that the most perfect intelligence, goodness, and boundless power does moft certainly take place in the founder of it. And, as the founder of this world could not poffibly give being to himSelf, the fuppofition being abfurd; fo he must exist, either from an abfolute necessity

in

in the nature of things, or else be the produce of some external cause. If the former be the cafe, then the founder of this world is that being, who is ufually characterised by those terms, fupreme Deity. If the latter be the cafe, then we must look back to a cause, that exists independent of every thing external to itself, and consequently that exifts necessarily; which neceffarily existing being, as he is the original and primary cause of every thing external to himself, fo he is that fupreme Deity, which is the subject of our prefent enquiry. By exifting neceffarily, or by an abfolute neceffity in the nature of things, I mean, that the Deity cannot poffibly be otherwife than what he is, nor can he do otherwise but exist; that his existence, and his being what he is, as to all his natural powers, do not depend upon accident, nor defign; do not depend upon himself, nor upon any thing external to himfelf; that he did not give being to himself, nor make himself to be what he is, nor can he poffibly annihilate himself, nor make himself to be otherwise than what he is; and therefore, he must exist neceffarily, or, of neceffity, he must and will exist.

IF it should be asked, whether it be not equally as hard and difficult, to admit the fuppofition, that a defigning mind has exifted eternally, independent of any external caufe; as to admit that defign has taken place, independent of a defigning mind? Answer admitting a difficulty to attend each fuppofition; yet, I think, the former is by no means equal to the latter. For, as of neceffity fomething must have exifted eternally, because, otherwise not any thing could have existed at all; fo it is more eafy and natural to fuppofe, that what has existed eternally is a defigning mind, than to fuppofe the contrary; because, upon the former fuppofition, there is a fair and clear account of all that defign, which appears to take place in the universe; whereas, upon the latter supposition, all that defign remains to be accounted for. Suppofe unintelligent matter to have exifted eternally; yet that could not of itself have been productive of defign, without a defigning mind. Unintelligent matter could not have difpofed of itself to answer any purpose, much less to answer those great and noble designs, which plainly appear to take place in nature: whereas, if a defigning mind has always exifted,

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