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ifted, then all is plain and clear, and every thing is accounted for. All that beauty, that variety and order, that skill, contrivance and usefulness, which fo confpicuously appear, through the whole animal and vegetable creation, is clearly accounted for, upon the fuppofition of a defigning mind, and fo of the folar fyftem; whereas, without a defigning mind, all is darkness and perplexity, and remains to be accounted for. And seeing that something must needs have existed eternally, (as I have already obferved) because otherwife not any thing could have existed at all, nothing multiplied by nothing gives nothing for its product; fo it is more eafy and natural to fuppofe, that what has existed eternally is a defigning mind, than to suppose the contrary, as I have before fhewn. And,

SUPPOSING it equally hard and difficult to conceive how mind fhould produce matter, as how matter fhould produce mind; yet nothing will follow from hence in prejudice of Deity. For, were it to be admitted, that mind and matter cannot be productive of each other; thne, as mind and matter do both exist, at least, this is generally allowed to be the cafe, fo all that will fol

low

The Author's Farewel.

163

low is only this, viz. that mind and matter have both existed eternally, by, or from an abfolute neceffity in the nature of things; that as there has always been an intelligent active mind, fo there have always been materials, viz. the various fpecies of matter, for that mind to act or operate upon. This, I fay, must have been the case, supposing matter to have existed eternally; and therefore, the doctrine of a Deity, or of a neceffarily exifting mind, ftands firm and unfhaken, notwithstanding that fuppofition. But then, I think it but juft to obferve, that the neceffary existence of matter, feems to lie open to this objection, viz. that whatever exills neceffarily, will exift in every part of space, and in every point of duration; because, that neceffity of nature which caused it to exift in one part of space, and in one point of duration, would equally cause it to exift in every part of space, and in every point of duration; but whereas matter does not appear to exist in every part of space; therefore, from hence it may feem to follow, that it does not exist neceffarily, and confequently, that it is not eternal.

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AND as the most perfect intelligence takes place in that defigning mind, whom we characterise by the term God; fo from hence it will follow, that God will act invariable, at all times, (at least, whenever he does act) agreeably to this intelligent principle; because as it is right he should act thus, fo nature does not afford a motive or temptation to him to act otherwife. But then, this immutability in the divine conduct does not refult from any fatality, not from any natural unavoidable neceffity the Deity is under to act thus; but from the natural and effential difference in things, which renders it proper that God fhould act thus, and from the natural perfections of the Deity, which put him out of the reach of all temptation to act contrary thereto. God does most clearly perceive the right and wrong, which take place in all inftances and cafes, thro' the whole univerfal nature; and as acting right is, in the nature of the thing, better, and therefore, preferable to acting wrong, which renders fuch a manner of acting, the proper object of choice to every intelligent being; fo we may be affured, that God will always act right, not only because it is in nature better, and preferable to acting wrong,

wrong, but also because there is nothing in nature which can poffibly introduce an excitement in him to act otherwife. * And

in this, I apprehend, confift the moral perfections of the Deity, viz. that the divine power and the divine intelligence are voluntarily and immutably subject to the eternal and invariable rule of right and wrong; by which God is always difpofed to act right and do good, when he is at full liberty to act otherwise. And, indeed, were the Deity under a natural neceffity to act right and

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* RESTRAINT from action arifes either from want of power, or from want of inclination or will; the former of these is ufually expreffed by the term cannot, and the latter by the term will not. And according to this representation of the cafe, it may, very properly and truly, be faid of the Deity, that he cannot ceafe to be; as this reftraint arifes from want of power, it not being (as we conceive) within the reach of divine power, for the Deity to annihilate himself; and therefore he cannot ceafe to be. In like manner, it may, with equal propriety and truth, be faid of the Deity, that he will not act contrary to perfect rectitude; this reftraint ariting, not from want of power, but from want of inclination, as there is nothing in nature which can poffibly dispose or incline the Deity to act wrong, and as there is in nature wherewith to difpofe or incline him to act right; and therefore, he will moft certainly do the latter, and will not do the former. But were it to be faid, that the Deity cannot act contrary to perfect rectitude, this would be fpeaking neither properly nor truly; because the Deity is not reftrained from acting wrong, for want of potver, but only for want of inclination; and therefore, he can act wrong, but will not.

and do good, tho', I think, the fuppofition is abfurd, because fo far as neceffity operates on the Deity, so far the Deity is only an intelligent pafive fubject, that does not act, (ftrictly speaking) but is acted upon, is only a paffive inftrument in the hand of neceffity, (if I may fo fpeak) to bring forth what is produced by it; but admitting the fuppofition, then the Deity would be less perfect, and less valuable, in a moral fenfe, than those of his creatures who act right and do good voluntarily, or from choice, and not from neceffity. If it fhould be faid, admitting that God is at full liberty to act wrong, then we cannot be certain but, fome time or other, he will do fo; or, rather, we can have no certainty when he will not. Answer: tho' motive is not the phyfical caufe, but only the ground and reafon of action; yet it is fo far neceffary thereto, as that action will not take place without fome previous reason exciting to it. And as there is a reason, refulting from the nature of things, why the Deity should act right, and a reafon against his acting wrong; and as there is nothing in nature, which can poffibly introduce an excitement in God to act wrong; so these afford a moral certainty, that the Deity will

always

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