race of men, (as their own hiftorians have represented the Jewish nation to be) who were seldom long free from that very idolatry which thofe Canaanites ftand charged with. To fay, that those Canaanites entertained wrong and unworthy notions of a Deity, and of his providential government of the world, that their tutelar Gods were meerly fictitious, and that their manner of worshipping them was ridiculous in itself, as well as directed to falje objects, is only to say, that they were as weak, vain, and ridiculous as other Idolaters, who have not fallen under any fuch resentment. And if the idolatrous Canaanites were not more vile than other Idolaters, nor more the objects of divine refentment, which they do not appear to have been; then, furely, God, that is, the fupreme God, was not so partially severe to them, as is here fuppofed; seeing his tender mercies are equally over all his works, without fuch a partial regard for one, more than for another. I am sensible, that some of our great men have infifted, that there are other inftances of like partiality in the divine conduct, as that above mentioned; and, therefore, if God may, confiftent with rectitude, a& partially in one

inftance,

instance, then he may in another, provided no injuftice is done to any thereby; and this has been urged,in order to fhew, that the non-univerfality of a revelation is no just objection against it's divinity; fo that, upon this foot of argument, if the idolatrous Canaanites had rendered themselves the proper objects of that fevere refentment, which

was

exercised towards them, then God might, confiftent with rectitude, correct them as he did, whilft he treated all other idolaters, who were equally culpable, with much greater lenity, feeing no injuftice was done to any thereby. Upon which I obferve, whether the non-univerfality of a revelation be a just* objection against it's divinity, or not, is a point the prefent question is not concerned with and therefore, may fairly

;

be

*In my difcourfe on miracles, I entered into the queftion, whether the non-univerfality of a revelation be a just objection against it's divinity, or not? and introduced all the reasonings, fairly and candidly, that accrued to me, on both fides of that queftion; and then concluded the whole with the following reflections. "If God gives a revelation univerfally to all, it must be done in one or other of these ways; viz. either, first, by applying immediately to the mind of every individual of our fpecies, and thereby revealing, to every individual, the truths intended to be made known; or elfe, fecondly, by applying immediately to fome one or more of our fpecies, and revealing to him, or them, the truths intended

to

be dropped here. And were the Deity to act with ftrict juftice, through his whole conduct, or did moral rectitude require that he should, then he would not, he could not, act in that partial manner as is here fuppofed. In the exercise of vengeance, or punishment, ftrict justice requires, or it confifts in punishing exactly equal to the demerit of the crime; fo that, if two criminals are equally culpable, then justice, or equity, requires, that they fhall have equal punishment; because, otherwife, one, or the other, will be unjustly dealt with; lenity *, or punishing less than the demerit of the crime, being as contrary to equity, as cruelty, or

punish

to be made known, as aforefaid; and then apply mediately by him, or them, to others, by requiring him, or them, to reveal or publish thofe truths to others, and them to others, and fo on, till that revelation is communicated univerfally to all: And as we are not very good judges, which of these ways is liable to the least inconveniency, and which beft anfwers the purpose of a publick good, fo, it may be urged, that this takes off, or, at least, it very much weakens, that objection against the divinity of a revelation, that arifes from it's not being given univerfally to all. I introduce this here, to fhew my readers, that in the Book referred to, I have not leaned to one fide of the question, viz. that the non-univerfality of a revelation is a just objection against it's divinity; tho' this is what has been unkindly and unjustly faid, or, at least, infinuated of

me.

* See this point more largely and fully confiderel, in my enquiry into the ground and foundation of Religion.

1

punishing above it; and confequently, if God treated the idolatrous Canaanites with greater feverity, than he did other Idolaters, who were equally culpable, then he must have acted unjustly by one, or the other; which would have been acting contrary to rectitude, upon the present fuppofition, but this is groundlefly urged. Juftice is a negative virtue, when it takes place of, and is preferred before, criminal injustice; like as the abfence of pain is, or, at leaft, may be faid to be, negative pleasure. Juftice is not the offspring of bounty, or generofity, but only acting fuitably to a precedent obligation, that has not been cancelled; and therefore, it has no pofitive virtue, or merit in it. And, as it is, at best, only a restraint from vice, so it can be, at most, but a negative virtue, and lays no foundation for a reward. Juftice is only valuable, when it coincides with, and is fubfervient to, goodness, by reftraining from the contrary: fo that, when justice becomes incompatible with goodness, which may fometimes be the cafe, then it degenerates into vice; that is, it becomes, in the exercise of it, wrong and evil. It was not justice, but goodness, that was the

fpring of action to God, in calling this world into being, as he could not poffibly be under any precedent obligation to give being to what was not; and therefore, it is not justice, but goodness, which is the primary rule, and the ground and reason of action to him, in the government thereof; and this is what moral rectitude requires. Goodness is the spring of action to God, even in the diftribution of vengeance and punishment, as well as in the diftribution of reward; it is that great concern and regard God has for his creatures well-doing, which raises in him a just indignation, and a strong resentment, against those who oppose it. And if God does not act from capricious humour and arbitrary will, but is guided by the reafon of things, the latter of which is most certainly the cafe, (excepting in thofe inftances in which the reason of things cannot be a rule to him, as when it is perfectly indifferent whether he acts one way or another) then he will act equally, by all his creatures, in equal or the fame circumftances; becaufe the propriety or fitnefs of things requires that he fhould. As thus, if there be a reason, resulting from the nature of

things