*

things, for the Deity to exercife pity towards one creature ; then that reason will determine the Deity to exercise the like pity to all others, who are alike the proper objects of it; even tho' he is not obliged, in Strict juftice, to fhew pity to any of them, but the contrary, as ftrict justice requires they should all be punished equal to their refpective crimes. Again, if there be a reason, refulting from the nature of things, for the Deity to exercise a severe revenge upon one creature, then that will be a proper reason, which will determine the Deity to exercise the like revenge upon all other crea

tures

*To fhew pity to the proper objects of pity cannot be a matter of indifference, because it is what the pitiable object is greatly interested in; and therefore, if there be not a reason, refulting from the nature of things, for the exercifing of fuch pity, there must be a reason against it; but furely, there can be no reafon against fhewing pity to the proper objects of pity, because that seems, at least, to imply a contradiction, as it feems to fuppofe a creature to be, and not to be, the proper object of pity, at the fame time, and under the fame circumstances; confequently, a creature's being the proper object of pity, must be a proper reafon to the Deity to fhew pity to that creature. And as penitence feems, at leaft, to render an offender the proper object of pity or mercy; affords a proper reafon to God to fhew mercy to him; and it alfo affords a proper ground of certainty to us, that God will act thus; which certainly refults from the nature of the thing, independent of any divine declaration, which has been, or may be, made concerning it.

fo it

tures, in equal * circumstances, as they are all the proper objects of it, without shewing lenity to one, and feverity to another. Pity and refentment are not indifferent and trifling affairs, and, therefore, are neither of them to be exercised at random, without any rule, or reafon; but, on the contrary, they are matters of great importance to the perfons concerned, and therefore, are neither

* Tho', perhaps, there may not be two men, who are in equal circumftances, in all refpects, as, I think, a late ingenious Author has remarked, in his observations relating to the divine partiality, which partiality, (in instances that appear to me groundless and unnecessary) he has attempted to vindicate; yet, if two men are both the proper objects, either of pity and compaffion, or of a severe revenge, which, furely, may be the cafe; then, I think, they may be said to be, without any great impropriety of language, in equal or in the fame circumftances; that is, their circumftances are fo far equal or the fame, as to render them both the proper objects of either compaffion or resentment, fuppofing, in other refpects, their circumftances are as different, as the two poleftars are diftant from each other. And as equality, or fameness of circumftances, in the refpects before-mentioned, is all that is, or has been, intended, or that relates to the subject; fo were God to treat one creature with lenity, and another with severity, when they are in equal circumstances, as aforefaid; that is, they are both the proper objects of one, or the other, this would be to act repugnant to the nature of things, and would be an. inftance of unneceffary, groundless, and unreasonable partiality: But then, tho' weak and vain men may effect to exert their power wantonly, improperly, and arbitrarily, or without any rule or reafon, as aforefaid; yet far be the impious thought from me, that this fhould be the cafe of the wife and good governor of the universe.

neither to be exercifed, nor omitted, without a proper reason for fo doing. And, tho' it is pretended, that there are inftances of unnecessary and groundless partiality in the divine conduct, like that above-mentioned; yet, I think, the pretence is groundlefs. Suppofe the calling into being a fpecies of creatures called *Angels, and a fpecies of Creatures called men, and a species of creatures called horfes, be neceffary to answer the purpofe of a general good, which good each fpecies of creatures are intended to share in, fuitable to the part each one is to act, (a publick, or general good being, I think, the great, if not the only, end of creation` to our wife and good creator, in calling this world into being) and fuppofing that angels are put into a better condition than men, and men than horses; yet, as this disparity is neceffary to answer the purpose aforefaid, viz. a publick good, and as one species, of those

crea

* I here admit the fuppofition, that there are a fpecies of creatures, called Angels, who are related to, or, at least, a&t upon, this globe, because fome of those men, who reafon upon this queftion, will force it into the fubject; but then, those minifterial and guardian Angels feem to bear fome analogy to the tutelar and guardian Deities of the Pagans,and from hence a question very naturally arifes, viz. if the former of these are admitted, then why not the latter; or perhaps, the question may be, whether thefe are not the fame thing?

creatures muft,of neceffity,have the advantage of another, feeing that advantage cannot be common to them all; fo there is no groundless, no unnecessary, no unreasonable partiality shewn in the cafe. But then, to argue from fuch inftances as thofe above-mentioned, in order to excufe, or rather to justify any unreasonable, unneceffary, any groundless partiality, in the exercife of pity or refentment, which is fometimes done, feems, to me, to be a bold attempt; especially when the moral character of the Deity is at stake, which is the present cafe. And, as to men's difparity, in their natural abilities, or endowments of mind, the shape, fize, beauty and Strength of their bodies, their fortunes, their fituation upon the globe, and other like circumstances, in, and by, which one man has the advantage of another; these plainly depend upon fecond caufes, and cannot, with any propriety, or truth, be confidered, as inftances of partiality in the divine conduct. Suppose one man, by his induftry, or any other means, raises a fortune for himself and family, by which means they become rich; and suppose another man, by his extravagancy, or any other way, wastes the fortune that had been raised to his hand,

and

and thereby brings himself and family to poverty; in this cafe, there is a great disparity of circumstances, betwixt the two families, viz. one is rich, and the other is poor, which gives the former many great advantages over the latter; but then, to confider, or reprefent this, as an inftance of partiality in the divine conduct, would be greatly unjust; and yet it is not more so, than those instances are, that are usually urged to answer this purpose.

PARTY and faction in religion, have a very great influence, not only on the paffions, but alfo on the understandings, or, at least, on the judgments of men; infomuch, that every thing is made to bow down to the idol in vogue: And, as Chriflianity is the fyftem of religion, which is generally received in this part of the world; fo, all arguments and reasonings receive an additional strength, or decrease in their weight, as they feem to fmile or frown upon christianity; thus principles are admitted with pleasure, which otherwife would be rejected with horror; and thus one man contends for the most groundless partiality, and another contends for the most abfolute tyranny, in the divine conduct; (O my foul! come not thou into their fecret, unto their affembly, mine ho

nour