pofing there be not a division of mind) and increase of form, there is, to appearance at least, an increase of mind alfo, as each particular individual body, form, or compofition of matter, thus produced, has a particular mind, to act or operate upon it. By mind, I mean, that there appears to be, in each individual, a diftinct, active or felfmoving principle, with which, I think, there must be, in each individual, fome low degree of intelligence, to introduce a ground, or reafon, or motive, or excitement to action, and to direct that power, when exerted, to the end proposed to be obtained by it; I fay, there must be fome low degree of intelligence to occafion the exertion of the felf-moving power, because otherwise it would not be exerted at all; and this intellectual and active faculty I call a mind. And, in this cafe, the increase of mind feems to refult from and be the produce of the increase of body, particularly modified, circumftanced, &c. Upon which I obferve, that if a mind of a very low and inferior kind may refult from, and be the natural production of a compofition of matter, particularly modified, circumftanced, &c. which feems to be the case of the mind of

a

a Polipus; then, that may be the cafe of minds of a fuperior kind. This case, and the reasonings upon it, feem, to me, of fome weight; and, therefore, I think, it is not unworthy the notice and attention of our most able and learned immaterialists.

I AM fenfible, it may be urged, that minds are of two diftinét fpecies or kinds, viz. fenfitive and rational; and tho' the former of these may result from a material system, properly conftituted and circumstanced, feeing it has only material and fenfitive things for it's object, and upon which only it's thinking and reflecting powers are exercifed; in which cafe the mind is connatural to the objects it is exercised upon and is converfant with, and which is the case of the mind of a brute; yet, in the latter case, viz. that of a rational mind, it is quite otherwise, the ratio of things being irrelative to matter and fenfe, and, therefore, must be imperceptible to a mind that refults from a material fyftem only; and, confequently, can only be cognizable to a mind that results from a principle that is diftinct from and superior to matter, viz. an immaterial substance, and which is the cafe of the mind of a man. Upon which I

obferve,

obferve, that if a fenfitive mind cannot take cognizance of the ratio of things, because the ratio of things is irrelative to matter and fenfe, which is the principle from which a fenfitive mind refults or flows; then, from hence it may seem to follow, that a rational mind (such as the fupreme Deity may well be supposed to be) cannot take cognizance of material and fenfitive objects, for the fame reason, viz. because material and fenfitive objects are quite irrelative to an immaterial substance, which is the principle a rational mind flows from. Again, if a mind that refults from an immaterial fubftance can take cognizance of material and fenfible or fenfitive objects, (which is fupposed to be the cafe of the mind of a man) notwithstanding material and fenfible objects are irrelative to the principle that mind results from; then, by parity of reason, a mind that results from a material compofition only, may take cognizance of the ratio of things, (and which may be the cafe of the mind of a man also) notwithstanding the ratio of things is irrelative to the principle that mind results from. Befides, the thinking power, or thinking itself, feems, at leaft, to be as irrelative to matter in one

cafe,

cafe, as in the other; that is, whether the object it is exercised upon be fenfitive or rational. And therefore, if the material system which conftitutes an animal called a horse, produces fuch a mind as is fenfible of pain, and, from it's reflecting upon the disagreeableness of that fenfation, does carefully avoid the place where it has fuffered it, or where what appears to the animal to have caused that pain did take place; then, why may not a material compofition of a more curious kind produce a mind which is not only fenfible of pain and, from a sense of the disagreeableness of that fenfation, carefully avoids it himself, but also avoids communicating pain to others, and prevents the communication of pain by and to others, from a sense of the propriety and fitness of such a conduct; that is, from the ratio of things? I fay, if a material fyftem may produce fuch a kind or degree of intelligence, or a perceptive power as is fufficient for the former; then, why may not a more curious system of matter produce fuch a kind or degree of intelligence, or a perceptive power which will be fufficient for the latter? Seeing intelligence itself, or the perceptive power, confidered abftractedly

from

from the objects it is exercifed upon, feems, to me at least, to be equally as irrelative to matter in one cafe, as in the other? What connection, what relation is there betwixt folidity, figure, magnitude, &c. which are the known properties of matter, and those perceptions which conftitute the fenfations of pleasure and pain * ; more than betwixt the known properties of matter, and the perceptions of the ratio of things? Or what connection or relation is there betwixt compreffing, dilating, dividing, uniting, extending, contracting, feparating, compounding, &c. which are the known ways that matter is capable of being acted upon, and the perceptions which conftitute the fenfations of pleasure and pain; more than betwixt these, and the perceptions of the ratio

* I call the sensations of pleasure and pain perceptions; because, I think, I do as much perceive that cutting my flesh gives me uneafinefs, or pain, as I do perceive that the whole is equal to all it's parts, which is a truth independent of time or place; or, as I do perceive that to do by others, as we may reasonably defire and expect that others will do by us, in like circumftances, is a proper rule of action to men; the truth of which propofition is founded in the reason of things: I fay, it feems, to me, that I do as much perceive, or it is as much an act of perception in one cafe, as in the other; and that these perceptions are the produce of one perceptive power only, tho' the objects, or things perceived, are of distinct and different kinds.

Y

of