of things? Surely, not more in one cafe, than in the other. And, And, therefore, if matter can be fo modified as to produce a mind capable of the perceptions, or fenfations of pleasure and pain; then, why may not matter be so modified as to produce a mind capable of perceiving the ratio of things feeing one of these seems, at least, ? to be as irrelative to matter as the other. To fay, (as, I think, a late learned and ingenious author intended to be understood to fay, in what he has offered upon the fubject, or else I do not understand him, viz.) that in man there are two diftinct minds, of two diftinct species, viz. fenfitive and rational; and that these are diftinct in their acts and operations; that by one of these a man perceives the ratio of things, and that material and fenfible objects are perceived by the other. Upon which I obferve, that experience and feeling feem, to me at least, to be against this fuppofition; because they feem to be the very fame intelligent principle or perceptive power by which I perceive the difagreeableness of pain to myself, and the impropriety or unreasonableness of my caufelefly communicating fuch a difagreeable thing as pain to others; which felf-fame principle

principle feems to be the parent of all perceptions in me. Moreover, were there two fuch perceptive powers in man, the one connatural to a material system, and the other quite irrelative to and independent of matter; then, tho' the fenfitive mind might be affected, might be strengthned or weakened by the strengthning or weakening of the material system; and the like of the material fyftem with and by such a mind, seeing these are supposed to be connatural to each other yet it is quite unnatural to suppose, upon the present foot of argument, that this can be the cafe of a material fyftem and a rational mind, with respect to each other ; because, upon the present fuppofition, a rational mind is irrelative to, and independent of matter: Then Idiotifm would not be the effect of fome great diforder in the material system, which, by phyficians, I apprehend, it is judged to be; but it would arise from the want or abfence of a fecond mind, viz. a rational one, which only is capable of perceiving the ratio of things. Then delirioufness and madness would not be the refult of any bodily diforder, of a fever, &c. and the removal of thefe would not be the effect of removing a diforder that was upon Y 2 the

the material compofition; but by the retreat and return of the rational mind to the perfon concerned. This, I fay, must be the cafe, upon the fuppofition of two fuch minds in a man; whereas the contrary to this feems to be much better fupported from experience and fact. However, whether the rational mind in a man refults from a material system, or from an immaterial substance; this, I think, is moft obvious, viz. it rifes and falls (if I may so speak) with the material compofition it acts in and by; elfe whence comes the proverb, once a man and twice a child.

BUT farther; though there are no footsteps by which we can trace out any pre-exifting state we have been in, or that the present conftitution of things is connected with any constitution that is paft; and though there are no certain figns in nature of a connection of this conftitution with a conftitution to come; yet it will not follow that there is no fuch connection, or that there has not been, or will not be any fuch ftate. As to the evidence against our having pre-existed, which may be fuppofed to arife from our not remembering any such state, that does not prove the point. There are many images

pictured

pictured upon the human mind, which, as foon as they are removed, or obliterated, (by the interpofition of other images that are impreffed) they are forgot, and are never remembered afterwards, while life lafteth; and this must be the cafe in a multitude of inftances. Now, to argue, that, because thefe images or perceptions are not remembered by us, therefore they were not, would be to argue against experience and plain fact. Befides, as the memory grows up and ripens by and with the human conftitution, fo it weakens and decays with it; and, fometimes, the conftitution receives fuch a shock, by an appolectic fit, or otherwise, that the use of the retentive faculty is almost loft, long before the diffolution of the body; and therefore, if we do or may lose the remembrance of present things, whilft the human frame continues; then, our not remembering that we have pre-existed, and bore a part in a conftitution of things that is past, can be no proof that we have not pre-existed. And if the images of present things are liable to be totally obliterated, whilft the human frame continues, which is evidently the cafe; then, fuppofing we shall exift and act a part in a constitution of things to come, yet, wo

Y 3

cannot

cannot be certain that the images of prefent things will then be prefent to the mind and be remembered by us. For, if we lofe the remembrance of things now, under that conftitution in which they are acted; then, we cannot be fure that fuch remembrance will be restored to us, under another conftitution of things to come. And, as we cannot be certain that we have not bore a part in a conftitution of things that is past; fo neither can we come to any certainty, that we shall not act, or bear a part, in a conftitution which is yet to come. For, though the multitudes of mankind, who have acted

a part in life and are gone off the ftage of action, to appearance are not, our fore-fathers are dead, and we know them no more, and they, to appearance, are * as if they had never been; yet this does not prove the negative fide of the queftion, viz. that thefe, and we with them, will not make a part of a conftitution of things to come. And, as the negative fide of the prefent queftion does

not

*Though there are a few of our fpecies, who, by fome means or other, have been rendered greatly remarkable, and thereby the remembrance of them hath been perpetuated: yet, this is not the cafe of the bulk of mankind, who, when they they ceafe to be remembered perfonally, are fcarce remembered at all, but are, to appearance, as if they had never been.