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of things ? Surely, not more in one calë, than in the other. And, therefore, if matter can be fo modified as to produce a mind capable of the perceptions, or sensations of pleasure and pain ; then, why may not matter be so modified' as to produce a mind capable of perceiving the ratio of things ? seeing one of these seems, at least, to be as irrelative to matter as the other. To say, (as, I think, a late learned and ingenious author intended to be understood to Tay, in what he has offered upon the subject, or else I do not understand him, viz.) that in man there are two distinct minds, of two distinct species, viz. sensitive and rational; and that these are distinct in their acts and operations ; that by one of these a man perceives the ratio of things, and that material and sensible objects are perceived by the other. Upon which I observe, that experience and feeling seem, to me at least, to be against this supposition ; because they seem to be the very same intelligent principle or perceptive power by which I perceive the disagreeableness of pain to myself, and the impropriety or unreasonableness of my causelefly communicating such a disagreeable thing as pain to others; which self-fame

principle

principle seems to be the parent of all perceptions in me. Moreover, were there two such perceptive powers in man, the one connatural to a material system, and the other quite irrelative to and independent of matter ; then, tho' the sensitive mind might be affected, might be strengthned or weakened by the strengthning or weakening of the material system; and the like of the material system with and by such a mind, seeing these are supposed to be connatural to each other : yet it is quite unnatural to suppose, upon the present foot of argument, that this can be the case of a material system and a rational mind, with respect to each other ; because, upon the present supposition, a rational mind is irrelative to, and independent of matter : Then Idiotism would not be the effect of some great disorder in the material system, which, by physicians, I apprehend, it is judged to be ; but it would arise from the want or absence of a second mind, viz. a rational one, which only is capable of ceiving the ratio of things. Then delirioufness and madness would not be the result of any bodily disorder, of a fever, &c. and the removal of these would not be the effect of removing a disorder that was upon

the

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the material composition ; but by the retreat and return of the rational mind to the person concerned. This, I say, must be the case, upon the supposition of two fuch minds in a man; whereas the contrary to this seems to be much better supported from experience and fact. However, whether the rational mind in a man results from a material system, or from an immaterial substance ; this, I think, is most obvious, viz. it rises and falls (if I may so speak) with the material composition it acts in and by ; else whence comes the proverb, once a man and twice a child.

But farther ; though there are no footsteps by which we can trace out any pre-existing state we have been in, or that the present constitution of things is connected with any constitution that is past ; and though there are no certain signs in nature of a connection of this constitution with a constitution to come; yet it will not follow that there is no such connection, or that there has not been, or will not be any such state. As to the evidence against our having pre-existed, which may be supposed to arise from our not remembering any such state, that does not prove the point. There are many images

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pictured upon the human mind, which, as foon as they are removed, or obliterated, (by the interposition of other images that are impressed) they are forgot, and are never remembered afterwards, while life lafteth and this must be the case in a multitude of instances. Now, to argue, that, because these images or perceptions are not remembered by us, therefore they were not, would be to argue against experience and plain fact. Besides, as the memory grows up and ripens by and with the human constitution, so it weakens and decays with it; and, fonietimes, the constitution receives such a lock, by an appolectic fit, or otherwise, that the use of the retentive faculty is almost loft, long before the dissolution of the body; and therefore, if we do or may lose the remembrance of present things, whilst the human frame continues; then, our not remembering that we have pre-existed, and bore a part in a constitution of things that is past, can be no proof that we have not pre-existed. And if the images of present things are liable to be totally obliterated, whilst the human frame continues, which is evidently the cate; then, supposing we shall exist and act a part in a constitution of things to come, yet, o

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cannot be certain that the images of present things will then be present to the mind and be remembered by us. For, if we lose the remembrance of things now, under that constitution in which they are acted; then, we cannot be sure that such remembrance will be restored to us, under another confti. tution of things to come. And, as we cannot be certain that we have not bore a part in a constitution of things that is past ; fo neither can we come to any certainty, that we shall not act, or bear a part, in a conftitution which is yet to come. For, though the multitudes of mankind, who have acted a part in life and are gone off the stage of action, to appearance are not, our fore-fathers are dead, and we know them no more, and they, to appearance, are * as if they had never been; yet this does not prove the negative side of the question, viz. that these, and we with them, will not make a part of a constitution of things to come. And, as the negative side of the prefent question does

not

* Though there are a few of our species, who, by some means or other, have been rendered greatly remarkable, and thereby the remembrance of them hath been perpetuated: yet, this is not the case of the bulk of mankind, who, when they they ccafe to be remembered personally, are scarce remembered at all, but are, to appearance, as if they had never been.

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