The offences man is capable of, that are relative to the perfon of God, if I may fo speak, are mostly of the negative kind, (viz.) a want of a juft fenfe of the kindness and beneficence of his maker and preferver. How far, and how frequent, and in what way a man is to make public profeffion of his gratitude and thankfulness to the Deity; and whether offences of this kind will make a part of the grand inqueft, I am not a judge; and therefore, can only obferve, that it has been looked upon, among men, to be a mark of greatness of foul rather to defpife and overlook fuch ingratitude, than to shew any refentment to it; but then, how far fuch fort of greatness may be applicable to the Supreme Deity must be left to the determination of more capable judges. And, though it is common for men to talk of doing honour or dishonour to God; yet, I think, those terms are relative to us, and ferve rather to exprefs the propriety and impropriety of our fentiments and behaviour with regard to a Deity, than to exprefs any addition to, or diminution of God's honour and reputation, if I may fo fpeak. The divine honour, or the greatness worthiness and reputation of the Deity, is what it is, independent of any thing and every thing that his creatures can think, fay, or do; and therefore, as God's honour can receive no lustre,no increase, from what men can say or perform, fo neither can it in the leaft be fullied, or even fhadowed thereby. And, as reward is no other than a return of kindness, or a rendering good for good; and punishment is no other than the retaliation of injury and wrong, or a rendering evil for evil; fo, in this view of the cafe, the Deity has received no good from his creatures, nor has he suffered any evil by them; and therefore, as he has no kindness to return to them, fo he has no injury to retaliate upon them, on his own account. But then, as God's end, in calling his intelligent creatures into being, was that they might in common partake of his goodness and be made happy thereby; fo by this he becomes a party in their caufe, and is interested in their weal or woe, and will return the kindness, and refent the injury done to his intelligent creatures, as if it were done to himself. It was a just fenfe of this, that led the wife King Solomon to make the following remark, Proverbs xix. 17. He that hath pity upon the poor, (so as to relieve them in their diftrefs) lendeth unto the Lord; and that which he hath given, will be pay him again. And, UPON these principles, chiefly, if not wholly, I think, the just and reasonable expectation of a future judgment and retribution is grounded. For, though the unequal diftribution of providence, as it is called, that is, though certain circumftances concur which render one man's life eafy and happy to him, and other circumstances concur to render life a weight and a burthen to another man; like as one horfe falls into the hands of a bad master, who ufes it ill; and another horfe falls into the hands of a good master, who uses it well; which advantages and disadvantages are the produce of fecond causes, and are perfectly accidental with regard to any special divine determination concerning them, or any fpecial divine interpofition with regard to them, and which, I think, contain the fum of the argument drawn from the unequal diftribution of providence for a future retribution; I say, tho the different states of thefe two men, or thofe two horfes, do not feem to require that there should be a future retribution, in order to set things upon an equal foot with regard to them; yet the good or bad part men act, by voluntarily contributing to the good or burt burt of the commonweal, moft certainly does, because their good or bad behaviour, in this respect, render them the proper objects of reward or punishment. Befides, with regard to this argument drawn from the unequal distribution of providence, I beg leave to observe, that if all the good and evil men partake of in this world must be placed to the account of providence; and if rectitude requires that all men should have an equal share of these, if not in this world yet within the period of their existence, whether their disparity, with respect to these, refults from, and depends upon fecond caufes, or not, or whether it refults from their vertuousness and viciousness, or not; which the argument drawn from the unequal distri. bution of providence (as it is called) plainly fuppofes; then it will follow, that as the fame difparity does take place among the other species of animals that inhabit this globe, fo the prefent argument does equally conclude for a future ftate of existence, and a future retribution with refpect to all those animals, as it does for the fpecies of mankind. Though, I think, thofe terms judgment and retribution are greatly improper, in the cafe under confideration; because the ideas that are ufually annexed to those terms terms are quite irrelative to the fubject, in our prefent view of it. Judgment, and retribution confequent upon it, in the common use of those terms, fuppofes and has reference to a law or rule of affection and action, which law intelligent beings are to direct their conduct by, and for which they are accountable; judgment being an enquiry into, and forming a judgment from that enquiry of the propriety or impropriety of a man's conduct with regard to fuch law; and retribution being a returning to him, or bringing upon him that good or evil which the propriety or impropriety of his conduct renders him worthy of: whereas, in the prefent cafe, judgment confifts in inquiring into, and forming a judgment of the quantity of good and evil each individual has been a partaker of in this world, and alfo it's proportion, when brought into a comparison, with the good and evil that each and every other individual has been a partaker of; and retribution confifts in bringing upon each individual fuch a quantity and proportion of good and evil in futurity, as will reduce all these to an equality, without having any referrence to the keeping or tranfgreffing any law. Now, though this would be reducing the |