If the system of divine Providence in which sin is followed by evil consequences, really exists, it is not absolutely necessary, that we should be able to account for it, or give a reason why it is established. If we should even have in our minds plausible objections against it, they are of little importance; because what is perceived to be true in fact, must remain so, notwithstanding all the difficulties, which may attend our conception of this truth. Or, to express myself in other terms, on the supposition that a system, in which fear and punishment have a place, cannot be fully reconciled with our notions of the goodness of God, and that we can form in our imaginations a more simple and perfect plan, nevertheless every rational man will submit to the truth of things; because he perceives, if he acts in opposition to them, that his theories, however well contrived and apparently consistent, only mislead him. If we should admit therefore, that it is in the power of the Deity, acting as a moral governor, to prevent the evil consequences of sin, the inquiry may still be made, does he do it in fact? Ought our conduct to be regulated by what may be, and by what we suppose God might do, or ought to do? Ought it not, on the contrary, to be directed by what is, by what we find that God has done, and believe that he will do? Do we not every day observe in other men, or experience in ourselves, that sin is punished, or that it produces evil consequences? If this punishment is wrong, the constitution of nature is wrong; but can it be altered by us? If he who snis, injures himself, destroys himself, renders himself miserable, is it not right, is it not benevolent, to warn him not to persist in his wickedness, and not to injure himself any more?

This act of benevolence is displayed by our heavenly

Father in his prohibitions. When for example he forbids the sin of avarice, his design is to prevent the man, who admits it into his bosom, from extinguishing the kind affections, which are the source of so much satisfaction; and from oppressing his heart with the heavy burden of anxiety: it is because the immoderate pursuit of wealth is not only productive of selfishness and other vices, but also because it deprives him of many comforts, which he voluntarily denies himself, and exposes him to the contempt which his meanness deserves.

Again, when God forbids impiety, it is because it takes a man out of the protection of his maker, and robs him of the pleasure, which a consciousness of the divine approbation affords. It is not only because the love of God is a duty, which he owes to an infinitely benevolent Being, but likewise because it is the most ef fectual motive to virtue, the surest preservative against temptation, the best consolation in affliction. It is because irreligion is dark and gloomy, and destroys every sentiment, which ennobles the heart.

The same observation may be made on every other sin: God probibits them, not only because they are hateful in themselves, but also because they destroy us.

That they injure us in this world is generally allowed: the same evil consequences, however, must continue, whilst we persist in them, in whatever world we exist. Few will deny, that in the Scriptures future punishment is threatened to the wicked; and the reason of man cannot object aught against it, if it is properly understood. Some Christians conceive it to be altogether of a positive kind; but there is another light, in which it may be viewed it is the natural and inevitable consequence of sin; and God, in threatening the wicked, may be

said to reveal to them what this consequence is. So that all the denunciations of wrath to come, which the sacred writers express in such awful terms, may amount to this prohibition: Destroy not yourselves: do not by your present conduct prepare for yourselves tribulation in the other world.

If the Scriptures were simply to make known to us, that there is a future state, without saying a word of any punishment in it, this information ought to be sufficient to alarm the wicked. For as virtue only can make us happy, and vice inevitably renders us miserable, in whatever place we exist, unless we suppose that on entering this new state, a sinner will be immediately and supernaturally changed, which is not a probable supposition, he must infallibly continue wretched, till his vicious habits are corrected, and his moral character reformed.

As God is the author of everything which exists, the evil consequences of sin were established by him. The view, therefore, which we have thus taken of his threatenings and punishments, is not inconsistent with the common system, that they are positive denunciations and positive inflictions; nor does the language, which we have used, contradict the language employed by others. We say with them, that God threatens the wicked with punishment, and inflicts it, when they do not reform. It is the general opinion of Christians, with whom we coincide, that man is a being, in whose soul fear, as well as hope, has a place; and that it is proper to address his fear in order to preserve him from sin, or to reclaim him to holiness. There are Christians, who deny the truth of this opinion, and who assert, that fear ought

not to be made a religious principle. As connected with this assertion, they maintain that punishment has no tendency to reform them, who suffer it; on the contrary, that it drives men to despair; that it is nothing but mer. cy, which can touch the human heart; and that gratitude is the only motive, which can produce actions essentially good. There is something so pleasing in this system, and so flattering to human nature, that many persons adopt it, as soon as it is proposed.

The system however, like many other ingenious hypotheses, is inconsistent with fact and the sacred Scriptures. In the Scriptures, the Almighty is so far from following the rules, which some men would prescribe to him, that he has threatened, as well as promised; there are denunciations of wrath, as well as offers of mercy : and if we attend to facts, we perceive, that crimes are accompanied with forebodings of pain; and that, when they are committed, pain is actually inflicted; by which punishment many sinners are deterred from committing such crimes in future.

There are religious systems, which vilify mankind; but the system, that God governs his subjects entirely by exciting hope and gratitude, goes into the other extreme, and exalts the species too highly. The truth is, that men are anoble order of beings; but they are not so noble, as to be superior to the influence of fear. Motives perfectly refined are above the comprehensions of many: in numerous respects they resemble children; and like them, when they stray, they must sometimes be chastised again into good behaviour. Thus have the wisest of men thought and written. Thus in particular have the authors of the sacred books conceived. Thus did God deal in ancient times with his peculiar people, the

Jews: when they disobeyed his laws, he visited them with famine, pestilence, the sword, and captivity. Thus does he still deal with the world; in his dispensations with mankind, there are fear and punishment, as well as hope and reward.

Do not fear and punishment produce good effects? do they not restrain men from committing sin? Can it be denied, that many are kept within the bounds of temperance and chastity by the apprehension of the wretchedness and degradation, which follow an indulgence in the contrary vices? Does not the fear of censure preserve many from rash speeches, and that imprudence of behaviour, which sports on the brink of vice? Can it be denied, that the penalties inflicted by courts of justice terrify multitudes, and prevent them from becoming thieves, when otherwise they would not be scrupulous in making a free use of the property of their neighbor? Bad as some men are, would they not be worse, if they believed that they could commit crimes with impunity, and if all fear of punishment was removed from their minds? If these causes then operate thus effectually with respect to the present world, why should they not operate with respect to the other world? If men are made honest, discreet, temperate, and chaste, by these motives, why should they not by them be deterred from profaneness and impiety? If God has declared, that nothing, which defileth, can enter the heavenly city, may not men be rationally influenced by the declaration to avoid the sins, which would corrupt their souls?

In answer to these questions, it may be objected, that motives of this kind cannot change the heart, and that their utmost effect will be to produce actions externally decent; that although such actions may be useful to