place which gave them so good advantage. All this would not serve to retain the Peloponnesians, of whom one, unworthy of memory, upbraided Themistocles with the loss of Athens, blaming Eurybiades for suffering one to speak in the council that had no country of his own to inhabit. A base and shameful objection it was, to lay as a reproach that loss, which being voluntarily sustained for the common good, was in true estimation by so much the more honourable, by how much it was the greater. But this indignity did exasperate Themistocles, and put into his mouth a reply so sharp, as availed more than all his former persuasions. He told them all plainly, That the Athenians wanted not a fairer city than any nation of Greece could boast of, having well near two hundred good ships of war, the better part of the Grecian fleet, with which it was easy for them to transport their families and substance into any part of the world, and settle themselves in a more secure habitation, leaving those to shift as well as they might, who in their extremity had refused to stand by them. Herewithal he mentioned a town in Italy, belonging of old to the state of Athens, of which town he said an oracle had foretold, that the Athenians in process of time should build it anew, and there (quoth he) will we plant ourselves, leaving unto you a sorrowful remembrance of my words and of your own unthankfulness. The Peloponnesians, hearing thus much, began to enter into better consideration of the Athenians, whose affairs depended not, as they well perceived, upon so weak terms, that they should be driven to crouch to others; but rather were such as might enforce the rest to yield to them, and condescend even to the uttermost of their own demands.

For the Athenians, when they first embraced that heroical resolution of leaving their grounds and houses to fire and ruin, if necessity should enforce them so far for the preservation of their liberty, did employ the most of their private wealth, and all the common treasure, in building a great navy. By these means they hoped (which accordingly fell out) that no such calamity should befall them by land, as

might not well be counterpoised by great advantages at sea: knowing well, that a strong fleet would either procure victory at home, or a secure passage to any other country. The other states of Greece held it sufficient, if building a few new ships they did somewhat amend their navy. Whereby it came to pass, that, had they been vanquished, they could not have expected any other fortune, than either present death or perpetual slavery; neither could they hope to be victorious without the assistance of the Athenians, whose forces by sea did equal all theirs together; the whole consisting of no more than three hundred and fourscore bottoms. Wherefore these Peloponnesians, beginning to suspect their own condition, which would have stood upon desperate points, if the fleet of Athens had forsaken them, were soon persuaded, by the greater fear of such a bad event, to forget the lesser, which they had conceived of the Persians; and laying aside their insolent bravery, they yielded to that most profitable counsel of abiding at Salamis.

SECT. VI.

How the Persians consulted about giving battle, and how Themistocles by policy held the Greeks to their resolution; with the victory at Salamis thereupon ensuing.

IN the mean season the Persians had entered into consultation, whether it were convenient to offer battle to the Greeks or no. The rest of the captains giving such advice as they thought would best please the king their master, had soon agreed upon the fight; but Artemisia, queen of Halicarnassus, who followed Xerxes to this war in person, was of contrary opinion. Her counsel was, that the king himself directly should march toward Peloponnesus, whereby it would come to pass, that the Greek navy (unable otherwise to continue long at Salamis for want of provision) should presently be dissevered; and every one seeking to preserve his own city and goods, they should, being divided, prove unable to resist him, who had won so far upon them when they held together. And as the profit will be great in forbearing to give battle, so on the other

side the danger will be more (said she) which we shall undergo, than any need requireth us to adventure upon; and the loss, in case it fall upon us, greater than the profit of the victory which we desire. For if we compel the enemies to fly, it is no more than they would have done, we sitting still; but if they, as better seamen than ours, put us to the worst, the journey to Peloponnesus is utterly dashed, and many that now declare for us will soon revolt unto the Greeks. Mardonius, whom Xerxes had sent for that purpose to the fleet, related unto his master the common consent of the other captains, and withal this disagreeing opinion of Artemisia. The king was well pleased with her advice, yet resolved upon following the more general, but far worse counsel of the rest; which would questionless have been the same which Artemisia gave, had not fear and flattery made all the captains utter that, as out of their own judgment, which they thought most conformable to their prince's determination. So it was indeed, that Xerxes had entertained a vain persuasion of much good that his own presence upon the shore, to behold the conflict, would work among the soldiers. Therefore he encamped upon the seaside, pitching his own tent on the mount Ægaleus, which is opposite unto the isle of Salamis, whence at ease he might safely view all which might happen in that action, having scribes about him to write down the acts and behaviour of every captain. The near approach of the Barbarians, together with the news of that timorous diligence which their countrymen shewed in fortifying the Isthmus, and of a Persian army marching apace thither, did now again so terrify and amaze the Peloponnesians, that no entreaty nor contestation would suffice to hold them together. For they thought it mere madness to fight for a country already lost, when they rather should endeavour to save that which remained unconquered; propounding chiefly to themselves what misery would befall them, if, losing the victory, they should be driven into Salamis, there to be shut up, and besieged round in a poor desolate island.

Hereupon they resolved forthwith to set sail for Isthmus ;

which had presently been done, if the wisdom of Themis tocles had not prevented it. For he perceiving what a violent fear had stopped up their ears against all good counsel, did practise another course, and forthwith labour to prevent the execution of this unwholesome decree, not suffering the very hour of performance to find him busy in wrangling altercation. As soon as the council brake up, he despatched secretly a trusty gentleman to the Persian captains, informing them truly of the intended flight, and exhorting them to send part of their navy about the island, which, encompassing the Greeks, might prevent their escape, giving them withal a false hope of his assistance. The Persians no sooner heard than believed these good news, well knowing that the victory was their own assured, if the Athenian fleet joined with them, which they might easily hope, considering what ability their master had to recompense, for so doing, both the captains with rich rewards, and the people with restitution of their city and territories. By these means it fell out, that when the Greeks very early in the morning were about to weigh anchor, they found themselves enclosed round with Persians, who had laboured hard all night, sending many of their ships about the isle of Salamis, to charge the enemy in rear, and landing many of their men in the isle of Psyttalea, which lieth over against Salamis, to save such of their own, and kill such of the Grecian party, as by any misfortune should be cast upon the shore. Thus did mere necessity enforce the Grecians to undertake the battle in the straits of Salamis, where they obtained a memorable victory, stemming the foremost of their enemies, and chasing the rest, who falling foul one upon another, could neither conveniently fight nor fly. I do not find any particular occurrences in this great battle to be much remarkable. Sure it is, that the scribes of Xerxes had a wearisome task of writing down many disasters that befell the Persian fleet, which ill acquitted itself that day, doing no one piece of service worthy the presence of their king, or the registering of his notaries. As for the Greeks, they might well seem to have wrought out that vic

tory with equal courage, were it not that the principal honour of that day was ascribed to those of Ægina, and to the Athenians, of whom it is recorded, That when the Barbarians did fly towards Phalerus, where the land-army of Xerxes lay, the ships of Ægina having possessed the straits, did sink or take them, whilst the Athenians did valiantly give charge upon those that kept the sea, and made any countenance of resisting.

SECT. VII.

Of things following after the battle of Salamis; and of the flight of Xerxes.

AFTER this victory, the Greeks intending, by way of scrutiny, to determine which of the captains had best merited of them in all this great service; every captain, being ambitious of that honour, did in the first place write down his own name, but in the second place, as best deserving next unto himself, almost every suffrage did concur upon Themistocles. Thus private affection yielded unto virtue, as soon as her own turn was served. The Persian king, as not amazed with this calamity, began to make new preparation for continuance of war; but in such fashion, that they which were best acquainted with his temper might easily discern his faint heart through his painted looks. Especially Mardonius, author of the war, began to cast a wary eye upon his master, fearing lest his counsel should be rewarded according to the event. Wherefore, purposing rather to adventure his life in pursuit of the victory, than to cast it away by undergoing his prince's indignation, he advised the king to leave unto him three hundred thousand men; with which forces he promised to reduce all Greece under the subjection of the Persian sceptre. Herewithal he forgot not to soothe Xerxes with many fair words, telling him, that the cowardice of those Egyptians, Phoenicians, and Cilicians, with others of the like metal, nothing better than slaves, who had so ill behaved themselves in the late seaservice, did not concern his honour, who had always been victorious, and had already subdued the better part of