without entering into a war, which threatened them with greater difficulties apparent than they were very willing to undergo.

But the Athenians would yield to nothing; for it was their whole desire that all Greece should take notice, how far they were from fear of any other city. Hereupon they prepared on both sides very strongly all that was needful to the war, wherein the Lacedæmonians were superior, both in number and quality, being assisted by most of the cities in Greece, and having the general favour, as men that pretended to set at liberty such as were oppressed; but the Athenians did as far exceed them in all provisions, of money, shipping, engines, and absolute power of command among their subjects; which they held, and afterwards found of greater use in such need, than the willing readiness of friends, who soon grow weary, and are not easily assembled.

SECT. III.

The beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

THE first and second years expedition was very grievous to the city of Athens. For the fields were wasted, the trees cut down, the country people driven to fly with their wives, children, and cattle into the town, whereby a most furious pestilence grew in the city, such as before they had neither felt nor heard of. Hereunto was added the revolt of the Mytilenians in the isle of Lesbos, and the siege of Plataea their confederated city, which they durst not adventure to raise, besides some small overthrows received. The Lacedæmonians, assembling as great forces as they could raise out of Peloponnesus, did in the beginning of summer enter the country of Attica, and therein abide, until victuals began to fail, wasting and destroying all things round about. The governors of the Athenians would not suffer the people to issue into the field against them, for they knew the valour of their enemies, but used to send a fleet into Peloponnesus, which wasted as fast all the seacoast of their enemies, whilst they were making war in Attica. So the Peloponnesians, being the stronger by land,

won the town of Platea, which wanted rescue; the Athenians likewise, being more mighty by sea, did subdue Mytilene, which had rebelled, but could not be succoured from Sparta. By these proceedings in that war, the Lacedæmonians began to perceive how unfit they were to deal with such enemies for after that Attica was throughly wasted, it lay not greatly in their power to do any offence equal to such harm as they themselves might and did receive. Their confederates began to set forward very slowly in their expeditions into Attica, perceiving well, that Athens was plentifully relieved with all necessaries which came by sea from the islands that were subject unto that estate, and therefore these invaders took small pleasure in beholding the walls of that mighty city, or in wasting a forsaken field, which was to them a pattern of the calamities with which their own territory was the whilst afflicted. Wherefore they began to set their care to build a strong navy, wherein they had little good success, being easily vanquished by the Athenians, who both had more and better ships, and were so skilful in sea-fights, that a few vessels of theirs durst undertake a great number of the Peloponnesians.

SECT. IV.

Of the great loss which the Spartans received at Pylus. AMONG other losses which the Spartans had felt by sea, they received at Pylus a very sore blow, that compelled them to sue for peace. A fleet of Athenian ships bound for Corcyra, wasting in that passage, as their manner was, the coast of Laconia and all the half-isle of Peloponnesus, was by contrary winds detained at Pylus, which is a ragged promontory, joining to the main by a strait neck of land. Before it there lies a small barren island of less than two miles compass, and within that a creek, which is a good harbour for ships, the force of weather being borne off by the headland and isle. This promontory the Athenians fortified, as well as in haste they might, and what was wanting in their artificial fortification was supplied by the natural strength and site of the place. By holding this piece of

ground and haven, they reasonably expected many advantages against their enemies. For the country adjoining was inhabited by the Messenians, who in ancient time had held very strong and cruel war with Sparta, and though quite subdued, they were held in strait subjection, yet was not the old hatred so extinguished, that by the near neighbourhood and assistance of the Athenians it might not be revived. Furthermore, it was thought that many ill-willers to the Lacedæmonians, and as many of their bondslaves as could escape from them, would repair to Pylus, and from thence make daily excursions into Laconia, which was not far off; or, if other hopes failed, yet would the benefit of this haven, lying almost in the midway between them and Corcyra, make them able to surround all Peloponnesus, and waste it at their pleasure. The news of these doings at Pylus drew the Peloponnesians thither in all haste out of Attica, which they had entered a few days before with their whole army; but now they brought not only their land forces, but all their navy, to recover this piece, which how bad a neighbour it might prove in time, they well foresaw, little fearing the grievous loss at hand, which they there in few days received. For when they in vain made a general assault on all sides, both by sea and land, finding that small garrison which the Athenians had left very resolute in the defence, they occupied the haven, placing four hundred and twenty choice men, all of them citizens of Sparta, in the island before mentioned; at each end whereof is a channel that leads into the port, but so narrow that only two ships in front could enter between the isle and Pylus; likewise but seven or eight ships could enter at once by the further channel, between the island and the main. Having thus taken order to shut up this new town by sea, they sent part of their fleet to fetch wood, and other stuff, wherewith to fortify round about, and block up the piece on all sides. But in the mean season the Athenian fleet, hearing of their danger that were left at Pylus, returned thither, and with great courage entering the haven did break and sink many

of their enemy's vessels; took five, and enforced the residue to run themselves aground.

to

Now was the town secure, and the Spartans abiding in the island as good as lost: wherefore the magistrates were sent from Sparta to the camp (as was their custom in great dangers) to advise what were best for the public safety; who, when they did perceive that there was no other way rescue their citizens out of the isle, than by composition with their enemies, they agreed to entreat with the Athenians about peace, taking truce in the mean while with the captains at Pylus. The conditions of the truce were, that the Lacedæmonians should deliver up all the ships which were in the coast, and that they should attempt nothing against the town, nor the Athenians against the camp: that a certain quantity of bread, wine, and flesh should be daily carried into the isle, but that no ships should pass into the island secretly that the Athenians should carry the Lacedæmonian ambassadors to Athens, there to treat of peace; and should bring them back, at whose return the truce should end; which if in the mean time it were broken in any one point, should be held utterly void in all: that when the truce was expired, the Athenians should restore the Peloponnesian ships, in as good case as they received them. The ambassadors coming to Athens, were in opinion, that as they themselves had begun the war, so might they end it when they pleased; wherefore they told the Athenians how great an honour it was that the Lacedæmonians did sue to them for peace, advising them to make an end of war, whilst with such reputation they might. But they found all contrary to their expectation: for instead of concluding upon even terms, or desiring of meet recompense for loss sustained, the Athenians demanded certain cities to be restored to them, which had been taken from them by the Lacedæmonians long before this war began; refusing likewise to continue the treaty of peace, unless the Spartans, which were in the isle, were first rendered unto them as prisoners. Thus were the ambassadors re

turned without effect, at which time the truce being ended, it was desired of the Athenian captains, that they should, according to their covenant, restore the ships which had been put into their hands. Whereto answer was made, that the condition of the truce was, that if any one article were broken, all should be held void. Now (said the Athenians) ye have assaulted our garrisons, and thereby are we acquitted of our promise to restore the ships. This and the like frivolous allegations which they made were but mere shifts; yet profit so far overweighed honour, that better answer none could be got. Then were the Lacedæmonians driven to use many hard means for conveyance of victuals into the isle, which finally was taken by force, and the men that were in it carried prisoners to Athens, where it was decreed, that when the Peloponnesians next invaded Attica, these prisoners should all be slain. Whether fearing the death of these men, or withheld by the troubles which (according to the Athenians' hope) fell upon them, the Lacedæmonians were now so far from wasting Attica, that they suffered their own country to be continually overrun, both by the Athenians, who landed on all parts of their coast, and by those who issued out of Pylus, which became the rendezvous of all that were ill affected unto them.

SECT. V.

How the Lacedaemonians hardly, and to their great disadvantage, obtained a peace that was not well kept.

THEREFORE they endeavoured greatly to obtain peace, which the Athenians would not hearken unto. For they were so puffed up with the continuance of good success, that having sent a few bands of men into Sicily, to hold up a faction there, and make what profit they might of the Sicilians' quarrels; when afterward they heard that the differences in that isle were taken away, and their bands returned without either gain or loss, they banished the captains, as if it had been merely through their default that the isle of Sicily was not conquered, which (besides the longer distance) was in power to offend others or de