possessor can get at a real value, they are themselves good, though not in intrinsic value.

One case may be supposed, indeed, which is, that those who had deposited securities would not pay those securities; but this is contrary to all probable, we may almost say, possible, chance, for the acceptances or securities are title deeds, by which the bank can come at the tangible property of the drawer, acceptor, and indorsers. Thus the notes of the bank are in reality securities on the goods in the shops and warehouses, and on all sorts of property throughout the kingdom.

How it happens that well-informed, and wellintentioned men could join in the exclamations about bank notes, that they were waste paper, and such like expressions, it is not very easy to conceive: but fortunate it is, that the impossibility of dispensing with those notes, added to the good sense, and general patriotism of the country, has supported their credit in defiance of all the ill-founded clamour that has existed.

These clamours have occasioned timid individuals to hoard guineas, and raised them to a premium which has held out a temptation to the interested to melt some down, and to send others out of the country; but thanks be to the directors, the govern

ment, and the public at large, the danger was warded off when it was greatest, and it is now

over.

A great advantage will come at last out of the forced circulation of paper, (for forced it was, though not by law, by necessity, which is stronger than law), gold will never be so much called for again for general circulation. In many cases notes are far more convenient, and they are much more safe, for by numbering them they can be traced, and robberies are now much less profitable, and consequently much less frequent.

Having given the bank directors the praise that to them is due*, it is but fair to give them also the

* When the Caisse D'Escompte in France was finally closed, by Robespierre and Co. it had been established fourteen years, and had discounted about three hundred millions sterling, (4,000,000 at a time being in circulation). Mr. Paunchaud, who laid the plan, calculated it after the plan of the Bank of England, he having been a stock broker here, and knowing all the regulations. The principal rule was to have paper at two months, with three good names to it. Now that one solvent man will stop in two months is more than 200 to 1. That any two named shall stop is 200 × 200, and that three shall all stop is 200 x 200 x 200, or 8,000,000 to 1.

blame they deserve. It is their duty, and they ought to feel themselves bound in their consciences to prevent forgeries as much as possible by rendering their notes difficult to counterfeit. On this subject they have not used either intelligence or diligence, and every year many pitiable victims fall, at the same time that the public is defrauded of large sums. These are great evils in the sight of God and of man: they make humanity shudder, and ought to make the directors tremble in their bank parlour, as well as when they lay down to sleep in their splendid mansions.

The directors are the less excusable, that, since the restriction in 1797, their gain is immense. It is equal to half the revenue of the kingdom, at the time that the bank was established; and it is gain without trouble, and without risk*.

This is a very small risk. But the Caisse D'Escompte found it still less; for it only lost by bankrupties 72,000 livres, or three thousand pounds sterling. Lending on gold and diamonds is not so safe as this. * On 22 millions the bank gets by 5 per cent..... £1,100,000 By management of national debt

By cash deposits, with which it may discount without

300,000

increasing the notes in circulation

300,000

£1,700,000

But if the directors, who, in some respects will not in this do their duty, the government of the country should interfere, and compel them. Next to the directors, government is certainly to blame; and it is singular enough that as the revenues of kings from the earliest ages, consisted, in part, in the exclusive privilege of coining money, and as it is so still with regard to metallic money, that right should be abandoned entirely in this country; and that at the very time when it is of the greatest value as a source of revenue, and the most essential as a matter of regulation.

Not only is the coinage of paper money allowed (for coinage it is) to the bank of England, but there are about seven hundred mints dispersed through the kingdom, over which government has not any controul, even as to the security that the paper represents.

The bank of England we have proved to be

The notes lost are said to pay all expenses; but that can only be a guess, though it is very likely that they may amount to a large sum. The money lent to government at a low interest produces about £400,000,000, so that the whole revenues are two millions.

secure, but that may or may not be the case with the country banks, where all depends on the responsibility and prudence of the parties. There was a period when this was an alarming situation, when, if an invasion had given a general alarm, the most part of the banks would have stopped; but this is fortunately over; the evil, however, still demands a remedy, and government will not do its duty if it does not interfere.

Every bank should be obliged to pay an annual licence in proportion to its circulation, and to give security likewise in proportion to it*; then the revenue would participate in the immense gain of circulating paper money, and the public would have security against the imprudence or the dishonesty of those bankers.

The failure of the paper money in America, and of the assignats of France, gave double credit to the complaints of those who spoke and wrote

* Suppose one per cent, as a tax on the issues, (to cease when the bank begins to pay in gold or silver), and suppose one-third of the amount of notes in circulation at a time, were given in security, then the nation and the bankers would be about right.