ever, in which something like regular principles are laid down. The learned judge then referred, in particular, to the case of the "Attorney-General v. Panther," in which there was an issue from the court of chancery, to try the sanity of a person who had executed a deed then in question, between the parties in the cause, and quoted the opinions of Lords Thurlow and Kenyon upon that case. No two cases, however, formed of circumstances, were alike; but each must be judged of, in a considerable degree, by its own peculiar features. In the present case, the proof of the existence of a lucid interval, at the time of making the second codicil, could only be had from the solicitor who prepared it, the subscribing witnesses appearing to know nothing of the matter. The learned judge then entered into an examination of this evidence, which, he was of opinion, was insufficient to sustain the existence of a lucid interval, so as to defeat the presumption of law arising from the evidence adduced, of the general and habitual insanity of the testator at the time of making the second codicil: he, therefore, pronounced for the validity of the will and first codicil, but declared the second null and void.

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES.

Arches Court, Doctors' Commons. -Reeves v. Reeves. This was a proceeding for a divorce at the instance of Mr. William Thomas Pugh Reeves, of Holborn-bridge, London, against Frances Reeves, his wife, on the ground of adultery.

VOL. LV.

It appeared in evidence, that the husband is the son of Mr. Reeves; a respectable colour manufacturer, of Holborn-bridge, and first became acquainted with his wife in the summer of 1808. An intercourse ensued between them, and they passed for man and wife, under an assumed name, at various lodgings, until June, 1809, when the marriage took place. The connexion continued for some time longer, and was kept, by the young man, a secret from his friends, on account of his being a minor, and an apprentice to his father, and therefore unable to provide for his wife should he incur his displeasure: but Mr. Reeves was at length informed of it by an anonymous letter. This discovery, added to suspicions he had previously had reason to entertain of his wife's fidelity, induced Mr. Reeves, jun. to leave his house: a reconciliation, however, was afterwards effected between him and his father, through the medium of a maternal uncle, and he returned to town, but his suspicions having been confirmed by the inquiries which his friends had made, in the mean time, into his wife's character, which was' found to be little better than that of a common prostitute, he yielded to their recommendations to quit the country, and accordingly enbarked for America, where he has remained ever since, leaving an authority for the commencement of the present suit. Various acts of adultery were then detailed in evidence, as having afterwards taken place between the wife and a Mr. Dunbar, a lieutenant in one of the London militia regiments, at his chambers in Lyon's Inn, upon which, it was contended, S

the

the husband was fully entitled to a divorce.

On the part of the wife, the proof of adultery was not denied; but the defence set up was this, that her innocence was clear up to the time of her husband's deserting her; that he did so at the instigation of his father; and in concert with him, by refusing to allow her a maintenance, had endeavoured to drive her into the commission of adultery, that he might avail himself of it to obtain a divorce. It was like wise stated in the evidence of Mr. Dunbar, the adulterer, and the wife's mother, that in the course of several applications they had made to Mr. Reeves, sen. and some confidential friends of his, for a maintenance for his son's wife, they had offered to comply with the demand, upon condition of being enabled, by her committing an act of adultery, to obtain a devorce, and had unequivocally refused contributing towards her support upon any other terms. This, however, was most positively contradicted by Mr. Reeves and his friends, in their evidence, as was likewise a further suggestion, that they had endeavoured to entrap the wife into adultery by the employment of persons for that purpose. It was contended, however, that there was still sufficient proof in the abandonment and denial of maintenance to warrant the inference, that there was a collusion between the father and son, to obtain a divorce; an inference considerably strengthened by the circunstance, that all the acts of adultery proved were subsequent to the execution of the document authorizing the suit; and therefore, as the husband was himself

the active partner of his own dishonour, and the wife had fallen the victim of vice, merely from the pressure of want, occasioned by desertion, he was not now to claim a remedy to which he could only be entitled, as long as his own conduct remained unimpeached. In support of this argument, the case of Manby v. Manby, and Mitchelson v. Mitchelson, were referred to, as instances in which the husband, though the wife's infidelity was proved, lost his divorce upon the same grounds.

To this it was replied, that the abandonment was justifiable, upon the reasonable suppositions proved to have been entertained by the husband of his wife's guilt; and though he was afterwards convinced of the fact, and it became of public notoriety to all who were acquainted with the parties, yet there might have been wanting that species of proof, withou which it would have been unsafe to have ventured on a suit for a divorce. It was therefore more reasonable to suppose, that the an. thority to commence such a suit in this case, was given more with a view to a prospective proof of the wife's past adultery, than in anticipation of its commission being intended to be forced upon her. The cases cited did not apply to the present one, that of Mitchelson being one in which there was a failure of proof of the crime charged; and in that of Manby, the divorce was refused, in consequence of the husband having neglected to commence any proceedings until after five year's acquiescence in his wife's living publicly in a state of adultery. In this case, it was not pretended, that the husband was

ohargeable

chargeable with any remissness in claiming his right, but that he had attempted to anticipitate the means of obtaining it; this, however, not not being proved, he was entitled to his divorce.

Sir John Nicholl recapitulated the evidence upon the principal facts, and observed, that as the adultery charged was fully proved on the one side, and not denied on the other, the case turned entirely upon the question, whether the sort of defence, set up by the wife, was borne out in proof, for if it was, it would certainly go far to defeat the husband's claim to a divorce; but it must be clearly proved as against him, or it would go for nothing. A variety of circumstances in the ante-nuptial history of the parties appeared detailed in the course of the evidence, but any acts of criminality to be collected from them, could not be made use of in support of the case; they, however, militated against that part of the defence which sought to establish the wife's innocence up to the time of her has band's desertion. He then entered into an examination of the principal points of that defence, as it had been stated in argument, and was of opinion, that its foundation as averred in the plea, was not sustained by the proof. The connection into which the young man had precipitated himself, appeared to be of a most unfortunate nature; and be thought the general bad character of the wife, and strong presumption of her guilt, justified the conduct that had been adopted in removing her from him. The father might, perhaps, have acted more properly in allowing some trifling maintenance; but not being

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bound by law to do so, he had a right to exercise a discretion in that respect; and it was a sufficient reason for the son's not doing it, though compellable by law, that as a minor and an apprentice, his means were inadequate to the burthen, a circumstance the wife was well aware of, and ought, therefore, to have been prepared for, as she might have resorted to the exercise of that industry, which at a previous period had been her only means of support. The only question, therefore, was, whether when the husband abandons his wife, upon a reasonable supposition of her guilt, he is thereby barred from claiming the remedy of a legal separation on account of adultery, which that temporary absence may give her the opportunity of committing? The court has certainly a duty to perform, in guarding the morals of married life; but it cannot make laws for that purpose; it can only enforce those already in existence and it would greatly depart from those laws, by holding the doctrine, that so slight a deviation from the marital duty as this, could; in all cases, give such a general license for prostitution; but where the husband shews himself so grossly inattentive to his own honour, and insensible to the injuries he receives, as in the case cited, his right to claim a remedy for them stands on a very different basis. The present case, however, was certainly not one of that nature, or one in which the court would feel disposed to strain the rigid rule of law, were it even more so. Upon the general com- ' plexion of the case, then, it ap peared that there was nothing in the husband's conduct to deprive S2

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him of the right which the complete proof adduced of his wite's adultery would otherwise entitle him to. The Court, therefore, pronounced for the divorce.

Aberdeen, Sept. 25.-Collie for Bigamy. The Circuit Court of Justiciary was opened by the Right Hon Lord Gillies.

John Roger, late servant to Alexander Collie, farmer at Wantonwalls, in the parish of Inch, was indicted for the crime of bigamy, in so far as he baving, on the 18th of August, 1805 entered into a matrimonial connection with and married Margaret Innes, daughter of John Innes, crofter in Sunside, in the parish of Kinnethmont, with whom, subsequent to that date, and till the end of the year 1812, he frequently cobabited in the house of her said father, and corresponded with her as his wife; the said Margaret Innes, and the said John Roger, being publicly considered. and held to be husband and wife; yet that he the said John Roger, did, nevertheless, and while he very well knew that the said Margaret Innes was in life, and that his marriage with her subsisted, on the 15th day of January last, in the church of Inveraven, in the county of Banff, feloniously marry Mary Mitchell, daughter to John Mitchell, residing at Drum of Carron, with whom he thereafter cobabited as his wife.

The prisoner pleaded Not Guilty, denying the first marriage stated in the indictment, and admitting the last, upon which the case went to proof.

Margaret Innes, the prisoner's alleged first wife, being called, was objected to as incompetent as a

witness, and the objection was sus tained by the Court. She was, however, admitted as a haver, and she produced two letters addressed to her from the prisoner, which, however, were not read in Court.

John Innes, father of Margaret Innes, was then brought forward, and he stated, inter alia, that he considered his daughter as the lawful wife of the prisoner. That about eight years ago, she having fallen with child by him, they were both called before the Kirk session of Inch, for the purpose of being rebuked, as he supposedon which occasion, he afterwards understood they were lawfully married by Mr. Daun, the minister of that parish; and that, in consequence, they had since cohabited frequently in his house, and corresponded together as husband and wife, which he would not have allowed, if he had not considered them married persons.

In that evidence Christian Innes, his spouse, and mother of Margaret Innes, concurred.

The Rev. George Daun, minister of Inch, being sworn, stated to the Court and Jury, that in the year 1805, the prisoner and Margaret Innes were called before him, and the other members of the Kirk session of Inch, for the purpose of being rebuked and fined as fornicators; that, on this occasion, he, the witness, addressed Margaret Innes, and said, that he was confident from ber demeanour and general good character, that she would not have surrendered her virtue to the prisoner without a previous promise of marriage from him; to which she answered that she had not done so, for that he had promised her marriage. Upon

which Mr. Daun interrogated the prisoner, whether or not he had promised to marry Margaret Innes, and he admitted that he had done so. Mr. Daun then observed, that perhaps he repented now; and the prisoner said that he did not repent, and was willing to marry her. Upon which Mr. Daun instantly declared them both married persons, and proceeded to deliver the usual prayer at the dismissing of the session; at which time the prisoner was about to say something, and called out, "Aye, but." Mr. Daun, however, proceeded with prayer; and when he had concluded, the prisoner told him, that he nor no other man should marry him against his will. Mr. Daun then stated in explanation, that he had not married the prisoner and Margaret Innes, but that he considered them as being so by the law of Scotland.

His Lordship then addressed Mr. Daun, in terms expressive of his firm belief of Mr. Daun's good intention, in proceeding as he had done; but that he felt it his duty to inform him, that he had acted rashly in declaring a marriage, without first having the full, deliberate, and unequivocal consent of both parties.

No other witnesses being examined, the Jury was enclosed, and returned a verdict for the pannel of Not Guilty, when, atter an appropriate address from the Bench, he was dismissed from the bar.

lively interest among the residents of Bristol and the neighbourhod of Bath, as well as of the county of Cork; the former having been the scene of action, and the latter the vicinity of an estate (at Phale), value between 2 and 3000l. per annum, the inheritance of which was collaterally involved in the question now decided.

About twenty-three years since, upon an occasion of the marriage of the defendant with Anna Maria Barry, the estate alluded to

was settled upon the defendant by his father, giving him a life interest with remainder to his issue male, or in default of such issue, then to his younger brother, Mr. Rickard Deasy. Nineteen years had elapsed without the birth of an heir to the defendant, when about four years since, the brothers having had a verbal altercation, the defendant and his wife quitted Ireland, and came to reside in Bristol. At this period the villainous conspiracy, so eloquently developed by the plaintiff's leading Counsel, Mr. Serjeant Pell, appears first to have been conceived; the earliest public intimation of which was thus given in the London print called The Star, in September, 1809:

"BIRTHS. At Bristol, the lady of Timothy Deasy, Esq. of a son."

This, as was doubtless intended, reached the observation of Mr. Rickard Deasy; but he was with difficulty induced to believe that a brother's prejudice could prevail so far as to give any foundation in fact, to the numerous doubts expressed by mutual friends, whether Mrs. Timothy Deasy had been previously pregnant or not; and he accordingly